



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Key Developments

Electoral Commission Certifies Lists of Blocs

LD2009153695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Candidate lists of 42 electoral associations and blocs have been certified by the Central Electoral Commission, Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov told a news conference at the Russian Novosti news agency in Moscow Wednesday.

In his opinion, such a large number of lists certified a month before the list submission deadline is proof of the real threat that an enormous number of electoral associations and blocs will take part in the election campaign. "On one hand, it is a recognition of democracy and, on the other hand, the situation may turn absurd," said the official.

On election day voters may be given a bulletin instead of ballot sheets. "It will be very difficult for them to cope with the situation, and some may want to throw the bulletin into a waste basket," said Ryabov.

According to Ryabov, there are already 14 candidates in a one-mandate electoral district. "Taking into account independent candidates, some electoral districts may have 20 candidates for a parliament mandate," he added.

The Central Electoral Commission should control the collection of signatures with maximum attention. The Commission hopes for support from law-enforcement bodies to watch out for violations.

Ryabov thinks "the people should use their right to power, and we should enable every citizen to make a correct choice."

The election results will be determined by the will of the electorate, said Ryabov. He is sure the elections will be held and their results will be valid.

Eighty Associations Join Election Campaign

LD2009165095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The federal lists of candidates who will contest seats in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, already include 6,500 nominees. Another 3,000 candidates will run in single mandate constituencies, deputy chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Aleksandr Ivanchenko has said.

He said that 80 public associations had joined the election campaign already. Twenty nine act on their own and 49 have formed 19 election alliances. Ivanchenko said

that 13 alliances had their lists authorized by the Central Electoral Commission and were actively gathering the 200,000 required signatures of their supporters. "It is quite clear that the number of contenders for seats in parliament will grow," the electoral commission chairman has said.

At the same time he said that the situation should not be over-dramatized: far from all contenders will be able to collect the required signatures and quite a few will drop out already at the first phase of the election campaign.

Ivanchenko recalled that in 1993, of the 33 election associations a mere 13 were included in the ballot papers. "I believe that the same will happen this time. Still, the voters will be given not a ballot paper but a note pad for voting," Ivanchenko said.

Progress of Communist, Agrarian Campaigns Reported

MK2009055695 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
19 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Kryuchek: "Gennadiy Zyuganov Expects To Win a Majority of Seats in the Parliament. Leftists and National Patriots Have Decided on Joint Effort"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's Communist Party leader, Gennadiy Zyuganov, staying in Khabarovsk at the moment, has come out with several declarations, most interesting in the present-day stage of electoral plotting. First, Mr. Zyuganov has promised, in the event of communists' acceding to power, not to take any repressive actions against the executive power leadership in the provinces or business managers. All of them can safely continue working, concerning themselves exclusively with being helpful to Russia. Second, Mr. Zyuganov told journalists of the informal agreements on joint efforts with Yuriy Skokov's Congress of Russian Communities, Nikolay Ryzhkov's "Power to the People" movement, and Mikhail Lapshin's Agrarian Party. If one considers that all of these organizations have the same informal or even official agreements on concerted action with other parties and movements, the real potency of the leftists and the national patriots at present can be imagined. Gennadiy Zyuganov then went on to tell the public that support for communist ideas is of a mass nature and stressed that on 17 December, the Communist Party will strongly count on the backing of the provincial electorate. In the event of success in the election, Gennadiy Zyuganov expects leftist forces to win more than half the seats in parliament, although Mr. Zyuganov doubted the elections will be fair. Finally, he said that communists and agrarians have already agreed on common candidates in 40 constituencies.

At the same time, the Agrarians' leader Mikhail Lapshin is also studying the Far East as a future battleground for significant, if not major, political encounters. Leaders of the regional communist and agrarian cells informed Mr. Zyuganov of the unprecedented popularity leftist ideas have gained among the working class and in rural circles. Indeed, impoverished peasants and unpaid workers, according to the polls, for the major part are coming out for the return of the former methods of economic management. The communists, as usual, promise factories to the workers and land to the peasants.

Skokov on KRO's Political Platform, Elections

MM2109092095 Moscow TRUD in Russian
16 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Yuriy Skokov under the "Discussion Platform" rubric: "Yuriy Skokov: Power for the Future"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Every day the question "what shape is our future to take?" becomes increasingly acute. Who will determine it? Will we at least be asked what we want? What must be done today so that the people are yet again not left as silent witnesses to decisions concerning their fate?

We in the Congress of Russian Communities [Kongress Russkikh Obshchin — KRO] proceed from the premise that the crisis in the country has become universal. It has gripped society, the economy, the organs of state power, and the moral and cultural spheres. The spiral of systemic crisis continues to develop and the future is throwing down increasingly dangerous challenges to us — meanwhile a new redivision of the world is already gaining momentum.

Russia must not lag behind! Our society has a number of problems which must be tackled immediately. Vitrally important national interests cannot be safeguarded without increasing the effectiveness of state administration. Flexible management of the economy cannot be created in conditions of real decentralization without having clearly defined areas for social and economic transformations. The unity of society cannot be achieved without a new system of social guarantees.

In dramatic periods of our history the state has united society's forces in order to get out of a crisis. But today Russia's state mechanism is on the verge of collapse. We do not have a state for the people which protects society's basic, vitally important interests — the current state machine mainly serves the interests of officials.

Not one of our society's key contradictions will be resolved until new Russian statehood is created. It must be based on our people's most important historical

traditions, on their dramatic experience, and on a sober assessment of impending global threats.

There can be no new Russian state without the revival of the Russian people — the foundation of our society. We must stop the physical extinction of Russians, their social, economic, and political fragmentation, and the erosion of Russian culture. The KRO is tackling the "Russian question" in a peaceful key: Russia was, is, and will be a multi-ethnic country, a country with a lively diversity of lands and cultures. This is our historical strength and our long-term advantage. The Congress' strategic slogan is: "Without the unity of the Russian people, there can be no union of Russian peoples. Without a union of Russian peoples, there can be no strong, effective state — the guarantor of nationwide interests."

Russia can be a great power only as a federative, rule-of-law, democratic state. Russia's unity entails taking account of regional interests and special characteristics and also means a firm guarantee of human rights and the people's rights. The KRO sees Russia as a union of peoples and a federation of regions.

In conditions of the sharpening of global competition and the struggle for strategic survival in the 21st century only efficient states will ensure their societies' security. A strong, effective Russian state under society's safe control which is capable of achieving the long-term objectives of security and the development of fraternal peoples — this is the KRO's priority on the threshold of the new millennium.

Our aim is the gradual, consistent formation of a market economy with a strong state sector and with the state's active participation at all stages of the building of a new economy, and with a clear and intelligible method of accountability for the consequences of each step. In the economic sphere we stand for "reliance on our own efforts." We are for protecting the interests of our own working people and goods producers and for the revitalization of our scientific and industrial potential bearing in mind our traditions and utilizing our competitive advantages.

It is time everybody realized that we are now living in a completely different social environment. Without radical transformations in the sphere of social and socio-labor relations not a single economic or political reform will be effective. That is why we have proposed our own system of negotiating processes, which is new in Russian politics. It has been tested in labor collectives and can be applied in Federation components, in sectors of the economy, and at the federal level. This negotiating model is a pledge of equality and partnership relations

between goods producers, trade unions and their associations, and executive branch organs. This mechanism gives working people the opportunity to participate effectively in the elaboration and adoption of decisions directly affecting their interests.

The guarantee of human rights was and will remain the foundation of human existence. It is as a result of the clumsy attempts at reform that human rights in our country have come under fierce attack. We have protected, are protecting, and will protect the rights of Russian citizens and Russian peoples and the rights of our compatriots outside the Russian Federation's borders.

I want to remind you that our Congress itself appeared as a civic initiative, as a spontaneous self-organization of ordinary people in response to the crisis developing in the country. We are not a party which expresses the interests of a particular group of people at the expense of other groups. The KRO is a nonparty movement. Our current ideas are not a political program but an agenda for nationwide debate and a challenge issued to our great country's ordinary people. We want them and politicians to express their demands of the future authorities and to help us establish the authorities' aims and priorities. That is why we decided that the KRO's future action program would be a reflection of the broad masses' instructions and a communal people's program, not a declaration by a group of Moscow politicians. To shake off political apathy and involve people in the process of making decisions about their own future — that is the KRO's strategic concept.

When creating a party for themselves the current authorities, threw down a challenge to society: "Russia is our home, not yours." So, we are now declaring the beginning of a legitimate struggle for power and intend to give the current powers that be a fight in the run-up to the Duma elections.

We will fight for power in order to halt the people's extinction and to protect people from bandits, bribe-takers, and social and economic ills. We will fight for power in order to restore people's faith in the state. We will fight for power in order to put it at the service of national interests.

Everybody senses the concern for our future and for the preservation of our state and our country. Everybody wants to recapture the feeling of certainty and spiritual equilibrium, of what was previously called "collectivism" and which was every person's desire to live in the kind of community in which you sense and know that you are not alone in this world!

Currently, Russian society often talks about nostalgia. But this nostalgia is not a yearning for the communist past and for unfulfilled dreams. It is a legitimate desire for a stable and certain life, faith in a just state, and the hope that the state and society will stick up for you and not leave you in the lurch. We will support this belief — and we will guard the Russian words in which it is expressed. In Russia the word "comrade" has for a long time denoted people who are close in their community of views, activity, and way of life — and I hope that we will remain comrades.

We in the KRO believe that life must be based on fairness. That is the immutable law of life. But fairness must be incorporated into laws so that a person's life does not depend on the arbitrariness of officials or on the whim of the powers that be. The KRO will fight for power in order to channel it into the creation of a joint future instead of into the splitting of society and the state.

'My Fatherland' To Seek Left-Center Faction

LD2009164995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The My Fatherland association will undertake as its election goal to build a powerful left-center faction in the new State Duma, Stanislav Assekritov, a member of the association's political council and deputy president of the International Fund of Economic and Social Reforms said in an interview on Wednesday [20 September].

Assekritov is one of the top ten candidates on the My Fatherland list.

Asked whether his movement would cooperate with any party or movement, Assekritov said that the question of an alliance was ruled out because most political parties and movements have already had their lists registered at the central electoral commission.

"However, we shall sign certain agreements with the agrarians, Nikolay Ryzhkov's bloc Power to the People and the Congress of Russian Communities to coordinate action and support each other's candidates on a concerted basis in those constituencies where there may be insane competition," Assekritov said.

My Fatherland walked out of Ivan Rybkin's alliance early this month. It has more than 60 local branches.

Regional Activities

Rossel's 'Transformers' Oust NDR in Urals

MM2109100995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Pashkov: "Rossel Intends To Transform Fatherland Without Moscow Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It seems as though the age-old dream of Russian officials and every party official is being realized. Sverdlovsk Governor Eduard Rossel has announced that the "Transformation of the Urals" public movement that he set up — and which has already transformed itself into "Transformation of the Fatherland" — is opening branches in Russia's major cities and that a representative forum of the movement will be held in Yekaterinburg Saturday.

It will finally bring some clarity to its list of candidates for the State Duma elections. Most probably, Rossel will be on that list and will head it.

When asked whether this contradicted his statements that he has no desire to be a Russian parliamentary deputy any more, Rossel said that in the event of a victory for the movement he would surrender his seat to another transformer. It should be noted that the provincial transformers' movement, which was set up with the clear aim of supporting the disgraced Rossel, has become an object of close attention from Moscow politicians in the wake of Rossel's election victory. Having achieved something that had never happened in the Urals before — replacing a top official who had been unseated from on high — it seems as though the transformers are now thinking bigger. At any rate, according to Rossel, they refused point blank to support Shakhray's party.

"That is typical Shakhray — to start talking about something that does not yet exist."

This turn of events is somewhat unexpected, given that the movements supporting Shakhray made a great deal of effort and spent a lot of money to get Rossel elected during the gubernatorial elections. That may be why Shakhray tried to "call the tune," without talking to the piper in advance. Rossel also refused to support the Skokov, Lebed, and Glazyev bloc. As he put it, the last time Skokov visited they had a long talk, which resulted in the parties agreeing that it would be better for each of them to go their own way.

"We both advocate that there be reasonable people in parliament. But I believe that these people should be elected in the regions. Ryzhkov, Ryabov, and other people from this area are now phoning me — they want to run in one district or another. Nobody can prevent

them from doing so. But we have our own candidates in the Urals," Rossel said.

With the return of the disgraced governor, the Russia Is Our Home [NDR] movement has suffered a tangible defeat in the Urals. However much the transformers may deny it, their own movement has become the "government" party, ousting NDR, since the administration has budget money, quotas, and various privileges. When [local] government leader Valeriy Trushnikov — to whom Lebed gave invaluable support in the election struggle for the governorship — tried to become regional leader of the bloc, he was strongly advised not to.

Rossel joked that directors and various administrators are now actively returning from vacation. It seems as though many people now want to become transformers or to make friends with them. It is said that Shumeyko will be going to Yekaterinburg to be with the transformers on the day of their triumph.

Election Guidelines

Shumeyko Applauds Decree on Regional Elections

LD1909174095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1728 GMT 19 Sep 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian president's decree on elections of authorities of the state and local self-rule in Russia's component states is aimed at bringing order in the election process, said Russian Federation Council Chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.

"It (decree) will not bring along anything except the positive," Shumeyko said at a news conference, commenting on the presidential fresh decree.

He said 28 of Russia's component states have no charters so far, and four republics have no constitutions.

"It is impossible to conduct the elections amid a lack of local laws since the charters or constitutions lay down separation of powers between branches of power," Shumeyko said.

He said some regional executive and legislative bodies encroached on each other's powers.

Shumeyko cited as an example some regional legislatures, or Dumas, which claimed the right to sack regional administration heads.

He informed the conference that a meeting was to be held in the Kremlin on October 20 under the sponsorship of the presidential administration on regional charters and constitutions, and local self-rule.

There is a pressing need for the conference as "it is impossible to conduct authorities in regions without bringing order in the process of local legislature," Shumeyko said.

He cited as an example of order the recent gubernatorial election in the Sverdlovsk region, where Eduard Rossel was elected regional administration head.

This election could be held because the region has a bicameral parliament and a charter, Shumeyko said.

As for election of regional candidates to the Russian Federation Council, or the upper house of parliament, Shumeyko said "the letter and spirit of the Constitution do not envision the election of this house".

This referred to the ongoing debate, originating in the State Duma, or the lower house, which challenges the principle which mandates the formation of the Federation Council.

The lower house is in the drive for making the Federation Council an elected body.

The matter was taken to the Russian Constitutional Court.

Shumeyko said the Federation Council should be formed on a different principle.

The principle may be brought in question after the Constitutional Court issues its interpretation of constitutional clauses concerning Federation Council formation, Shumeyko said.

"I cannot place above law even my personal interests," he said, referring to his advocacy of the formation principle.

Electoral Commission Not To Reregister Blocs

MM1909182795 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Lyubov Tsukanova: "The Central Electoral Commission Will Protect Voters From Party Inconstancy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Rybkin's electoral bloc, which the "My Fatherland" association has quit, has no intention of falling apart and last Friday asked the Central Electoral Commission to register its new, reduced membership. Despite all the prophecies of defeat, Ivan Rybkin has no wish to swap his image as a constructive politician for one as a stern member of the opposition. Since it is practically impossible to stand out in the "repudiators'" competition, Rybkin's bloc emphasizes constructivism.

But the Central Electoral Commission has been in no hurry to register it, having seen in the case of Rybkin's

bloc a kind of conflict which might also arise in other electoral blocs. Moreover, one of the members of the Central Electoral Commission surmised that in the tough election struggle situation some "infiltrated Cossacks" ["zaslannyye kazachki"] might start messing up rivals' blocs. To save the voters from such excesses, the Central Electoral Commission has decided to prepare an explanation which will clearly state that, if an electoral bloc has started collecting signatures in support of itself, i.e. a new stage of legal relations has come about, then changes in the bloc's composition must not influence the course of the election campaign.

As specifically regards Ivan Rybkin's bloc, since it had not yet started collecting signatures, its reregistration will take place simultaneously with the witnessing of new lists of candidates.

Commission Approves Election Campaign Regulations

LD2009212795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2050 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia's Central Election Commission approved on Wednesday a document regulating candidates' access to the mass media during the election campaign.

The document provides equal and free access for all candidates to air time on federal and regional television channels and to the press. Under the new regulations, air time will be provided free of charge between November 15 and December 15, while in the press the campaign will begin 10 days earlier.

Candidates will have 30 minutes of free air time in the morning and in the evening between 7 a.m. and 10 a.m., and between 6 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. The allotment of air time and space in the press will be determined by election commissions, with the participation of mass media representatives and members of the president's court chamber for mass media disputes, by way of drawing lots.

All expenses incurred by the provision of free access to air time and the press will be covered from the federal budget or the budget of a respective subject of the federation.

The regulations prohibit television companies to interrupt programmes containing election advertisements by commercials. They are also obligated to provide equal access to air time both to candidates and their opponents and cannot interrupt programmes with the participation of candidates by programmes involving their rivals.

Moreover, programming should be made in such a way that would rule out a concurrent run of election programmes on different channels. All such programmes will have audio and video copies which will have to be kept for six months as of the day of showing. Any changes in the text can be made only with the authors' consent.

Election associations and candidates may be provided additional space in a newspaper or air time on television for an additional payment from their own funds.

Control over the observance of these regulations will be exercised by the Central Election Commission and election commissions in the subjects of the federation. Disputes will be settled in a court of law.

Forecasts & Commentary

Filatov Predicts Elections To Be 'Hard Trial'

LD1909204795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1919 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Parliamentary elections will be a hard trial, Chief of the Russian President's Staff Sergey Filatov said addressing the conciliatory commission for implementing the Public Accord Agreement Tuesday. The commission members discussed the basic principles of interaction between the participants in the election campaign.

For the first time ever parliamentary elections are to be held on a solid legal footing, said Filatov. He also said that about 60 election blocs will take part in the elections.

Up to 10,000 candidates will be advanced to the State Duma and around 30,000 to local government bodies, he went on to say.

He said "everything must be done to avoid scandals during the election campaign." Some of the political forces "have already initiated a campaign of scandals," he added.

Vice Chairman of the Central Electoral Commission Aleksandr Ivanchenko said that districts electoral commissions had been shaped by September 15.

He also said that many election blocs were actively collecting supporters' signatures. "The Communist Party was the first to bring the lists of signatures to the Central Electoral Commission," he said.

The participants in the conference adopted a statement on the basic principles of campaigning. The document says that the signatories to the Public Accord Agreement and the participants in the election campaign are urging everyone to conduct the campaign legally.

Chernomyrdin's Election Comments Assessed

MM1909143995 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Sergey Agafonov: "Russian Premier's Japanese Views of December's Election Harvest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tokyo — According to a relatively strange, but long-standing tradition, Russian politicians, irrespective of their rank and position, are franker in their contacts with the foreign press than they are when talking to their fellow countrymen. Thanks to this tradition many valuable observations and assessments of our domestic Russian affairs can be found more clearly and fully in statements by Russian figures for foreign audiences. The latest proof of this was the interview published at the end of last week between Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian premier and head of the "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] electoral association, and Japan's ASAHI newspaper.

In his conversation with the Japanese, Viktor Stepanovich touched on a number of "hot" subjects in domestic Russian life, not least sharing his predictions regarding the prospects for the coming Duma elections in December. Chernomyrdin did not hide the fact from the Japanese newspaper that, in his view, none of the Russian political parties at these elections will garner a convincingly victorious "harvest" — and that includes the NDR. Moreover, according to the Russian premier, "we (that is, the NDR) will probably not have any major success in the December Duma elections."

Very confidently predicting this unreassuring result, Chernomyrdin at the same time told the Japanese that the NDR electoral bloc was set up not only and not so much for the Duma campaign as for the presidential elections in June 1996. In other words, the NDR plans to enter the era of major political maturity not this winter but next summer, from which it invariably follows that the current head of the NDR is currently concerned above all not about the Duma electoral battles but the coming presidential battles — that is, where his main political interest is focused.

It should be noted, however, that Viktor Stepanovich did not admit even to the Japanese that he sees himself as the direct successor of the current Russian president — those words were not spoken in the ASAHI interview, but, at the same time, the premier stressed that he became head of the NDR with the president's knowledge. Chernomyrdin stressed that he cooperates "calmly and closely" with Yeltsin and that there are no differences between himself and the president. According to the premier, "we now need to prepare for the pres-

idential elections, and in this sense the current president and I are allies."

Ryabov Sees 'Nightmare' for Electoral Commission
MM2309110195 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Anatoliy Stepovoy: "Elections Could Turn Into Theater of the Absurd, Central Electoral Commission Chief Believes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia has never known such competition for deputies' seats. Central Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov has announced that there are already 20 candidates for each State Duma seat.

The Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission has received applications for registration from almost 50 electoral blocs. Understandably, not all of them will be able to collect the required 200,000 votes from sympathetic citizens, but the activeness of the candidates could — in the opinion of Central Electoral Commission members — turn the commission's work into a real nightmare.

The main feature of the current election campaign for the Federal Assembly is the veritable pilgrimage by almost all the public organizations registered at the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice. A graphic example of that is the attempt to nominate candidate deputies by such exotic associations as the Society for the Study of Stalin's Creative Legacy, the Armed Forces Flight Crew Association, and so forth.

There are also a lot of people wanting to gain a deputy's seat and, consequently, immunity, among representatives of criminal structures and extremist political organizations. Is the Central Electoral Commission able to put any barriers in their way?

No, Central Electoral Commission Chairman Ryabov firmly stated. And he explained that the absence of any law on political parties in the country makes it possible for representatives of extremist and pro-fascist associations to legally participate in parliamentary elections. The mechanism for coming to power is absurdly simple — in order to be nominated in a district, a contender for a Duma seat need only collect the signatures of around 1 percent of the voters. Once he is on the ballot paper, the candidate deputy is able to present himself any way he likes.

Some 105 million Russians could take part in the December elections. Each of them will have to decide whom to vote for (or whether they should vote at all). But it is already obvious that even sophisticated voters

will find this difficult. Not to mention elderly or infirm people....

The election situation is also confusing election professionals to a certain extent. Thus, a ballot paper containing the names of 50 candidates was called by Ryabov not democracy but a mockery of democracy. But those are the current laws in Russia.

Shakhray Sees Potential for Repeat of Oct '93
MM1909160795 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray, leader of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, by Oleg Gerasimenko under the "Society and the Individual" rubric; place and date not given: "Submit a Declaration of Income! Will the Politicians Follow Sergey Shakhray's Example?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Gerasimenko] What is your prediction for fall 1995?

[Shakhray] I shall give you my prediction for two separate periods — preelection and postelection. Before the elections the Duma will meet in October, turn down the budget submitted by the government, and express no confidence in it. The Duma will do that for two reasons. First, before the elections it is important for the deputies to show that they are opposing the government and give "Russia Is Our Home" a bloody nose. The second reason is that both Chernomyrdin's bloc and Rybkin's bloc have offended many deputies: The deputies took part in the work to prepare these blocs but were then excluded from the electoral lists. So you have to add the deputies' wounded pride as a factor too.... After the Duma places a vote of no confidence in the government on the agenda events will develop like this: There is no point in dissolving the Duma — after all, new elections have already been called. The president will face a situation in which he has to dismiss the government and order it to perform its duties until election day, which will deprive the deputies of the image of wounded combatants.

The election results are already clear: Around 70 electoral parties and associations will enter the finishing straight. The Russian's normal reaction is to junk all this party election literature. The votes will be fragmented — they will be spread extremely thinly. The result could be a situation in which only one party clears the 5-percent hurdle. And that party will get all 100 percent of the seats in the Duma. Nonsense, isn't it?

[Gerasimenko] Are you joking?

[Shakhray] Such is our election law. That is what happens if you take the idea to its absurd extremes...

[Gerasimenko] Your personal idea was to create four or five large electoral blocs, was it not?

[Shakhray] It failed although it was a great idea: An election based on four or five blocs is realistic, but 70 is obscene.

[Gerasimenko] Let us rely on the voters' intelligence. In that event, how might the votes be spread?

[Shakhray] I think that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation could get around 12 percent. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will get half the votes it polled in 1993. Rutskoy, Skokov, and Lebed will share that vote....

Overall, if we do nothing and let the elections take their natural course the left-patriotic and Communist forces could poll 50-60 percent. If the Duma election results turn out that way, there will clearly be an attempt to convene the Constitutional Assembly and divide powers and ownership. The result will be a crisis between the president and the parliament. Then unfortunately there could be a repetition of October 1993. For the simple reason that by March next year all the crisis phenomena in the economy, politics, and regional affairs will have their repercussions. No one will be able to stop them but it will be possible to delay them. The president has food for thought here: Perhaps he should call a round table of all 70 parties before the elections and say to them — "What are you doing to the voters? Amalgamate, make amendments to the law on elections..."

[Gerasimenko] I apologize for asking a tactless question but suppose that you personally are defeated in the Duma elections. What do you intend to do then?

[Shakhray] Most probably I will return to university teaching. I really like working with students. I have a fallback position — I could set up my own law firm. Then the figures in my declaration of income will be quite different.

'My Motherland' Leader on Chechnya, Elections

LD2009165495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Colonel-General Boris Gromov, ex-Deputy Russian Defense Minister, adviser to the Russian Foreign Ministry on military issues and leader of the My Motherland electoral movement, has called for immediate withdrawal of all troops with the exception of interior units from Chechnya.

"Those who started the war, that is us, must make the first move towards peace," Gromov told the Argumenty I Fakty newspaper today.

According to him, people in Chechnya must be calmed down. "Money and all necessary materials must be supplied there so that local residents can start preparing for winter," noted the general.

Asked about mistakes made by the federal authorities in Chechnya, Gromov said "we have made only one mistake: why go to Chechnya?" In his opinion, other methods should have been used to normalize the situation there. The general did not specify what methods he meant.

According to Gromov, the start of the war in Chechnya was concealed from everyone, including him — Deputy Defense Minister, and the whole Defense Ministry Board. "Everything was done secretly," he said.

Commenting on elections to the new Duma, the general said he will use legislation to settle problems of Russian military and economic security, building of the Armed Forces and assistance to Afghan war veterans.

After separating from Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin's bloc, the My Motherland movement plans to join the election campaign on its own. However, "we are ready to admit all those who wish, especially if they want order in the country and people's control over the authorities," said Gromov.

Describing the situation with the Armed Forces, the general said the state has money to maintain them. "Certain people must be gathered together to decide who shall give how much money."

In the general's opinion, the state does not respect the Armed Forces, because they do not have authority in society. "It would be enough to use the Armed Forces inside the country once or twice, and they will be destroyed," he said.

"It is terrible if the same people head the Armed Force and take the same decisions. In that case the Armed Forces will be wrapped up in internal quarrels and become disagreeable for society," stressed Gromov.

Increase in CPRF's Influence Perceived

MM1909142995 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 15 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI analysis service: "Is a 'Rose-Colored Thermidor' a Realistic Possibility? Political Prospects of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the approach of the parliamentary elections, there has been a noticeable increase in the intensity of the activities of various sociological and political science centers, which provide

the information market with a continuous supply of the results of all kinds of public opinion polls, forecasts, changes in the popularity ratings both of individual political figures and of this or that electoral bloc. Despite the great diversity of opinions expressed, the majority of them have had to record a definite trend toward an increasing movement to the left of a significant proportion of the electorate. The noticeable leftward drift even of those "seasoned political campaigners" who previously behaved as if there either was no left-wing section of the political spectrum or it did not merit their attention, is associated with this very trend. This "march to the left" is now taken into consideration by practically everybody, at least as an "ideological indicator." Among typical examples we might mention the Russian United Industrial Party, which, as the result of several unusual and unexpected changes, has recently laid claim to a position to the left of center, and even the most right of center organization — "Russia Is Our Home," whose regional representatives, while not moving to the left, are taking into consideration the changes in the political situation and marching on the spot facing this direction.

The nascent situation is giving some experts grounds to predict, on the basis of the prevailing sense of social pessimism and nostalgia for the recent past among a sizable section of society, the inevitability of some kind of "rose-colored Thermidor," the likelihood of which is, of course, being greatly exaggerated [allusion is to the coup in France in 1794, which saw the ouster of Robespierre]. On the other hand, a certain disquiet has been noted among the traditional leftist parties, in particular with regard to the possibility of "their" voters being disoriented, as, in their opinion, the favorable situation and the electorate's prevailing mood might be used by "disguised" outsiders or outsiders who have temporarily "changed color" in an attempt to win them over to their side. One should immediately point out here that it would be more accurate to speak not so much of outsiders but of their own "left-wingers," who are either walking in various directions in rather untidy columns or are treading on each others' heels as they elbow their way along the same twisting, bumpy, and increasingly narrow communist path.

The acknowledged favorite of the left wing is the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF] — the largest such party in Russia (with around 500,000 members), which has an influential faction in the State Duma (47 deputies). Among the undoubted advantages of this party, founded on the basis of the Communist Party of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, which was disbanded in 1991, one might point to the CPRF's widespread organizational structures in almost all of Russia's regions that depend mostly on party mem-

bers of the old school. However, an influx into the CPRF of citizens previously not belonging to any political organizations has been recently noted, which casts doubt on the received wisdom that the CPRF is only supported by pensioners, out-of-work members of the intelligentsia and white-collar workers, and unskilled workers. Strange as this might seem, sympathy for the communists is also increasing among a certain section of workers in the economy's private sector. According to reliable information, this shift started only after the events in Chechnya and mainly from "Russia's Democratic Choice" and "YaBLoko" toward the CPRF and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR]. Nevertheless, the influx of new forces into the CPRF and of its rejuvenation is, and will most likely remain, its main problem: The majority of party members belong to the category of over 50-year-olds, which in part explains the great stability of its electoral base. The second reason for this stability is the extreme seriousness of all socioeconomic problems and the general negative attitude toward the version of the reforms which is being implemented — the most negative reaction actually coming from those social groups in the population which constitute the communists' support. It would, however, be more accurate to speak of two-way or interdependent processes. Information from various specialists and analytical centers suggests that around 40-47 percent of Russian citizens presently consider themselves to be destitute and fear the increasing threat of mass unemployment, which at present accounts for 13 percent of people of working age in the country. Even if it is made for show, an offer of funds to revitalize society through the implementation of this or that scheme corresponding to their social expectations, will naturally win votes, especially against a background of the rejection of both political and economic radicalism. Although, it should be pointed out that the attempts to bring back communism already have the same overtones for just as significant a proportion of the population.

The formula chosen by the CPRF for its election campaign — "Russia, Labor, People's Power, and Socialism," which is skillfully explained in the main program documents, is definitely capable of attracting supporters with the most diverse political and ideological orientations, as it corresponds in many respects to the traditional expectations and the established thought patterns of significant sections of the population. The combination in the CPRF program of the ideas of state patriotism, collectivism, Orthodoxy, and a strong state with a simultaneous recognition of the economy's diversified nature and the priorities of state-public forms of ownership accompanied by strict state regulation — although it might give rise to justified charges of eclecticism (from the right), and opportunism (from the left) —

is a fairly competitive commodity in the market of ideological chaos and speculation of the many contenders for the leadership and the various political dilettantes. The parties' main aims have already been successfully tested out during a number of election campaigns in the regions, where the CPRF managed to secure itself a certain representative presence in the majority of local parliaments. The success of former oblast party committee secretaries in the contest for gubernatorial seats in seven central Russian oblasts makes it possible to speak of the formation of a kind of "red belt" around the democratic capital. If accurate, the forecasts of several strategic analysis centers that the 1995 parliamentary elections will most likely result in victory for the regional leaders, mean that the CPRF will have a realistic chance of direct and indirect success, first and foremost in the pro-communist regions.

In the opinion of Gennadiy Zyuganov, the enduring leader of the party and of the communist faction in the State Duma, they could secure much better results in the elections if they formed an alliance with a series of organizations with patriotic leanings, in particular with the associations of "peasants, socialists, commodity producers, women, and veterans." The many proposals to form different kinds of alliance involving the CPRF have already been made on many occasions and continue to be discussed in the mass media. Among the CPRF's possible and potential allies, with which it will in any case coordinate its election campaign, mention is made of the regional federations of trade unions and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia as a whole, the Congress of Russian Communities, and Mikhail Lapsin's Agrarian Party of Russia, of which the majority of experts consider the alliance of the agrarians and the communists to be the most significant. However, you have to bear in mind that for a number of reasons their close cooperation is only likely in single-seat electoral districts but is unrealistic in the drawing up of party lists. Strange as it may seem, the establishment of a partnership between the CPRF and other more radical communist organizations seems in practical terms to be unrealistic, in spite of the appeal by the 20th Congress of Communist Parties to all communists to form a single electoral bloc. Zyuganov fought for too long for his reputation as a moderate communist and civilized politician to sacrifice it rashly for the sake of a fairly uncertain advantage accompanied by the certain loss of his membership to the club of the capital's political beau monde.

While remaining an uncompromising critic of government policy and not possessing any kind of elevated official status whatsoever, the communist leader invariably figures among the 10 most influential public figures and actually ranks alongside the most outstanding

representative of the democratic opposition, G. Yavlinskiy. Taking into consideration the specific nature of the mentality of the Russian voting public, for whom personal sympathies ("for one of us") and the correspondence of slogans (even illusory ones) to their expectations are much more significant than whether the proposed programs are realistic, it is possible to forecast that Zyuganov's popularity will increase as a result of the election propaganda campaign which is now under way.

A very specific and important factor in the electoral situation today is the absence of a strict link between the blocs' and parties' financial resources and their potential to influence electoral behavior. The CPRF's financial resources, even if you assume that such structures as "Tveruniversalbank" and "Kredo-bank" might support it, can be described as quite modest, especially in comparison with its main rival, the "Russia Is Our Home" bloc. At the same time, the recent victory in Kolomna of the communist and cosmonaut, G. Titov, over an opponent with much greater financial resources, was further confirmation that in a political contest between financial might and what seem to be slightly antiquated ideas, not everything is so clear-cut and various outcomes are possible.

With regard to the CPRF's prospects today and tomorrow, it is necessary first of all to scrutinize the existing socio-political climate, which might be characterized as a chronic economic crisis, impoverishment of the population en masse, an absence of social protection, an ideological collapse, and a great gap between rich and poor. Against this backdrop, the CPRF's main aim — to demand social justice (note justice and not equality as used to be the case) — seems very relevant to the present and attractive to a significant proportion of the population. The second positive factor for the CPRF is that it is strictly an opposition party which has in practical terms been completely underrepresented in the federal structures of executive power, and, with this background, it is challenging for power which (compared to those who have power and wish to retain it) puts the CPRF in a more favorable position. The advantages of such a situation are confirmed by the precedent of victories by liberal-communist forces in several East European countries, countries of the near abroad, and individual regions of Russia.

In comparison with other parties and blocs, the CPRF possesses a series of both clear and hidden advantages, first and foremost the opportunity to refer to the standard of living enjoyed during the period of so-called "developed socialism" by people who now represent the most destitute section of society, and second the existence of a genuine base of support, that is the

possibility of relying on its organizational structures not only at a regional level but also at the rayon level and in individual enterprises and institutions. Third, the CPRF has a sufficiently large number of professionally trained party workers, who are well versed in methods of carrying out mass election campaigns and, what is more important, and has a relevant campaign idea (of social justice) which is acceptable to a significant proportion of the electorate. Set against the background of the democratic authorities having discredited themselves by getting carried away by the implementation of the idea of privatization and at the same time partially ignoring the present vital interests of the majority of the population, the CPRF appears in the eyes of the (very forgetful) average voter — and maybe he is shortsighted and even mistaken — to be untainted by the negative aspects of life today (corruption, involvement in the dividing up of state property, responsibility for the increase in crime, reduction of social protection, and so on). All the state and political forces cannot help but take this into consideration: As a result, four years after the putsch and the ensuing period of anti-communist hysteria, the "grass roots" and the "anti-communist elite" are in principle (and on certain terms) prepared to share power with their former, irreconcilable enemies. Hypothetically speaking, a certain not so much communist as socialist renaissance of the completely respectable West European (or to be more accurate Scandinavian) type may turn out to be absolutely realistic in the future. The obstacle to this is the (existing) very sharp differentiation between rich and poor, which does not exist in the Scandinavian countries or, on the whole, in Europe (unlike the United States, which served as a yardstick to many representatives of the first wave of reformers). Therefore, going down this road will cause new problems and may give rise to extremely unhealthy phenomena, although from the angle of the interests of the majority of the population and of the country as a whole, this would be the most appropriate and acceptable course. It is here that an immense potential for reform by the upper circles of the present authorities is hidden, which as yet is little called on and has essentially been handed to the communists on a plate.

Nevertheless, when assessing the CPRF's chances at the forthcoming elections, it would not be right to overestimate its potential, all the more so if we are relying on information from sociological research which is always of doubtful value in forecasting.

A lesson of the 1993 electoral campaign was that overly optimistic forecasts can have exactly the opposite result. In spite of the genuine nostalgia for the past among a fairly significant section of the population, it is caused

not so much by a yearning for illusory communist aims and ideals as by the necessity for day-to-day certainty in the future and normal social protection, which is partly reminiscent of the now well-known historical situation and the old slogan about the "soviets without the communists." Like the LDPR, the CPRF is partly a "party of malcontents" and partly a party of "social revanche," though it is more constructive than the LDPR. In this way, the danger of a communist renaissance — which is being actively publicized by many sociologists — may prove to be a very effective means (even stronger than the hysterical anti-communist propaganda itself) of influencing the undecided section of the voting public, over which the most bitter battle will be fought.

PRAVDA Sees Disarray in Left-Center Groups

MM2009104195 *Moscow PRAVDA in Russian*
19 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Boris Slavin and Valentina Nikiforova under the "Events and Commentaries" rubric: "Elections Taking Place. But for Now, Only Within the Blocs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] PRAVDA has already reported that the opposition electoral blocs' fragmentation is to the president's advantage. But this epidemic is also spreading to the so-called left-of-center opposition, whose formation was the president's idea. He wanted to cut the radicals off from the right and left, leaving something like a two-party system in Russia with the party of big-time capitalism, "Russia Is Our Home," and its socially democratized opponent the "I. Rybkin Bloc." The president evidently forgot, or he pretended to have forgotten, that Russia has always been a country of extremes and that centrist forces are doomed here.

"Civic Union's" failure in the last elections is evidence of this. It is very likely that the "I. Rybkin Bloc" will share the same fate. Conceived as a union of V. Shcherbakov's and A. Volskiy's United Industrial Party, M. Shmakov's Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the patriotic organization "My Fatherland," led by Afghan War veteran General B. Gromov and former Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] leader V. Mishin, and up-to-date propagandist leader of the Russian television channel O. Poptsov, it slowly fell apart in the course of two weeks so that it proved necessary to withdraw its list from registration.

Today all the organizations and "names" listed above have left the "I. Rybkin Bloc." The reader will ask who has stuck with the leader of the left-of-center bloc, which he himself describes as powerful.

We have not actually found any important organizations in it. Perhaps the most noteworthy organization is the

"Union of Realists," led by former Presidential Chief of Staff Yu. Petrov. Another administrator from the presidential team, the Russian Federation president's administrator of affairs P. Borodin, adds weight to it.

On the central list we find roving ideologist V. Nikonov, chairman of the Afghan War veterans' foundation; S. Trakhirov, leader of the "League of Russian Cities" association; V. Kirpichnikov, and other leaders of small movements.

It remains a mystery why "Imperial" Bank President S. Rodionov decided to support the bloc. Maybe he was won over by a key word in the bloc's program: "Together. Think, work, and extricate the country from the crisis together." Only time will tell whether they can put these ideas into effect.

While the ruling blocs are falling apart, the patriots are making an attempt to unite. Recently the "Union of Patriots" was formed and Russian National Assembly Chairman A. Sterligov and Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs President A. Tizyakov joined it. The bloc is led by Colonel General V. Achalov, who is supported by the All-Russia Officers' Assembly and a number of other organizations and movements from 50 of the country's regions. It would be nice if the patriots did not damage each other during the elections but coordinated their actions with the country's other opposition forces.

Parties Seen Fragmenting as Elections Near

MM2009101895 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Vasily Ustyuzhanin: "A Split, Another Split.... Parties in Russia Multiplying by Cell Division"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Virtually all the party formations have undergone splits. The Communists, who dream of entering the Kremlin and uniting all the lands and different dialects from Kamchatka to Brest in a new USSR, cannot unite themselves. Ilich's heirs are entering the elections as three party columns. First in line is Zyuganov's 500,000-strong Communist Party of the Russian Federation followed by Tyulkin's and Antipov's Working Russia, with Stepanov's and Mlynnik's tiny "Union of Communists" bringing up the rear. It is true that N. Andreyeva's All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) also intended to brandish its old Leninist rifle in the pre-election march. But the Bolsheviks also became bogged down in squabbles, and there is no sign yet that the intransigents have made peace.

The outwardly inseparable "Russia's Democratic Choice" has also split up. Some "Russia's Choice" people are marching behind Gaydar, others have broken

away and created the electoral bloc "89" (indicating the number of components of the Russian Federation including the most "pro-Russian" component — Chechnya). "Democratic Russia," which used to raise half of Moscow for rallies, has now ceased to exist and its two sections have also split asunder, like a ship at sea. One part, headed by Ponomarev, Starovoytova, and the rest, has formed a bloc with the Free Trade Unions and headed toward the right while the other section, headed by Zaslavskiy, has set off in goodness knows what direction.

The patriots, whether moderate or die-hard, also suffer from a deep-rooted psychological incompatibility. One half of the Democratic Party of Russia headed by Sergey Glazyev has attached itself to the Congress of Russian Communities, the other, headed by Govorukhin, has formed the "BSG" — the Stanislav Govorukhin Bloc. Some former members of Rutskoy's "Derzhava" party, among them Viktor Aksyuchits, leader of the Russian Christian Democratic Union, have also migrated there. Oleg Rummyantsev, the young founding father of Soviet social democracy, has also joined the Govorukhinites — until now he had been harnessed together with Vasily Lipitskiy's social democratic union. The social democrats have fragmented into different party compartments — the nationalists, the patriots, the democrats — and some have even been spotted in Chernomyrdin's cozy, dry little house. On the other hand, Sergey Shakhrai has taken his Party of Russian Unity and Accord, slammed the door, and moved out — on a wild goose chase.

The supporters of the National Salvation Front are also glaring at one another. The pro-Konstantinov lobby in the Front really detests I. Smirnov's supporters in the Front, and they will compete for votes separately. The National Republican Party of Russia, led by well-known Duma scandalmonger N. Lysenko, is being hindered in his quest for votes by S. Belyayev, the St. Petersburg national republican, who regards himself as the party's leader and views the Duma member with the Ukrainian surname as an upstart. Only Ivan Rybkin's bloc has received heaven's blessing. The surprise defection of six fugitives from "My Fatherland" (B. Gromov, S. Shatalin, and the rest) has been offset by the "miraculous arrival" of Pavel Borodin, the president's administrator of affairs. He was the 12th name on the bloc's electoral list. Now absolutely no one else is going to split away from the speaker — Pal Palych [Borodin] is to Ivan Petrovich [Rybkin] what Borodino was to Kutuzov: Retreat is now impossible, because Moscow is next in line.

Daily Views Blocs' Election Activities

MM1909122195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Batygin: "Speaker Will Not Remain Alone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One sensation of the election campaign has been that the Central Electoral Commission has canceled the decree on the registration of Ivan Rybkin's bloc.

"The grounds for this," Nikolay Ryabov, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, said, "were that the 'My Fatherland' association had left the bloc. Consequently the Rybkin bloc can no longer exist in its old capacity. Since we must include in the main document — the ballot slip — not only the bloc but also its components."

Rybkin has managed to carry out the bloc's internal restructuring quite swiftly. The top three have now been joined by the leader of the "Union of Realists," Yuriy Petrov, and State Duma Deputy Chairman Artur Chilingarov. Ivan Petrovich wished "election luck" to his former fellow fighters who have left the bloc.

So far there are no grounds for concluding that Rybkin's political career is declining, but one thing is clear: Luck has evidently deserted the lower chamber speaker recently. Indeed, when his bloc is reregistered at the Central Electoral Commission Ivan Petrovich [Rybkin] prefers to vacation in Sochi. What is this: Total certainty of success or...?

The present election campaign, in which over 270 parties and movements are taking part (in 1993, 147 public associations were allowed to take part in the elections) is not managing without blunders, alas. It is a case of the chronology of the election marathon. As Ryabov specified, the campaign connected with submitting the political lists ends not 17 September but 22 October! It is this day which is the deadline for submitting to the Central Electoral Commission and district commissions signatures of voters supporting parties' lists and individual candidates.

A few more details about the procedure for the "Duma 1996" campaign. At the all-Russian seminar "Mass me-

dia and the elections" organized by the Central Electoral Commission and the Russian Union of Journalists, Ryabov's deputy, A. Ivanchenko, described the draft instruction on the procedure for election campaigning in the state mass media. In particular, in accordance with the draft, election associations and blocs that have undergone registration will be given free air time on the all-Russian companies' channels from 15 November through 15 December.

If the dates for the televised election debates are still "at the planning stage" the details announced by A. Vengerov, chairman of the Russian Federation president's appeals court for information disputes, is already "physically present." The leader of the court of appeals has stated that the premature start of election campaigning is inadmissible. Some regional mass media have violated existing legislation. This applies in particular to agitation for the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia.

Last weekend was not used for leisure by all politicians.

Yegor Gaydar, leader of "Russia's Democratic Choice," held a reception for citizens for personal questions in Cherkessk on Saturday and Sunday. As one might suppose Gaydar planned that the trip would have the effect of deepening his own ideas (and those of the party in general) about the situation in the multi-ethnic republic bordering on Chechnya.

It looks as though the recent sharp words which the leader of "Russia's Democratic Choice" had to say about G. Yavlinskiy who had "delivered a stab in the back" to Gaydar's bloc by not wanting to cooperate with it now need to be amended.

"We have coordinated candidatures for almost all majority districts with 'Russia's Democratic Choice,'" G. Yavlinskiy noted.

As they say, one old friend is better than two new ones. Will Ivan Petrovich Ryabov have occasion to repeat this well known saying? Personally it seems to me that there is more grief in his wish of "luck before the elections."

Central Asian States Sign Aral Sea Declaration
LD2009200295 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network
in Uzbek 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov, and Uzbek President Islam Karimov came to Nukus to take part in the final part of the conference on developing the Aral Sea region.

The summit of the heads of Central Asian states took place at the Supreme Assembly of the republic of Karakalpakstan. During the meeting, the presidents of the Central Asian states signed a declaration on the stable development of the Aral Sea region.

Afterwards, the presidents held a news conference for journalists.

President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan expressed gratitude to the organizer of the Nukus international conference; the United Nations; and to its representative in Uzbekistan, Khalid Malik. The Uzbek leader spoke about the necessity to make the social conditions of the 35 million people who live in the Aral sea region better, to improve the ecological situation in the region, and to install water purifying equipment which is up to world standards, and emphasized that the Aral problem lies at the center of the world community's attention and is a paramount task for a number of Central Asian states. Islam Karimov said that this Nukus conference was one of the important steps aimed at saving the Aral Sea region.

Major states and authoritative world organizations say that they will spare no efforts to counteract the ecological disaster that is taking place in the Aral Sea region. The World Bank expressed the wish to allocate \$250-300 million to resolve the Aral Sea region's problems.

At the news conference, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan stressed that the Aral problem could be resolved only on the basis of mutual cooperation.

They also answered questions in which journalists were interested.

Following that, the Nukus international conference on the stable development of the Aral Sea region ended.

The seeing-off ceremony for Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, and Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov took place at Nukus Airport today. President Islam Karimov of the Republic of Uzbekistan; Ubbiniyaz Ashirbekov, chairman of the Supreme Assembly of Karakalpakstan; and other officials took part.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 21 Sep
LD2109063793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0620 GMT 21 Sep 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Today's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dwell on the future of negotiations between the Federal authorities and representatives of unlawful armed formations in the Chechen Republic following the terrorist act staged in Groznyy on Wednesday morning with a view to killing Oleg Lobov, The Russian President's Representative in Chechnya.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA runs the full text of a statement issued by the Command of the Combined Group of Federal troops in the Chechen Republic. The statement has been sent out to Aslan Maskhadov, Co-Chairman of the Special Supervisory Commission, and Sandor Meszaros, military observer from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Reviewing the implementation of the Agreement on military issues, the Command of Federal troops concludes that "the (Dzhokhar) Dudayev side does not comply with the Agreement provisions". In view of this, the Russian side demands in particular that "in accordance with the Agreement, the Dudayev side should carry out the first phase of the disarmament of unlawful armed formations before September 27, 1995."

"In the event of a breach of the Agreement on military issues and failure to meet the disarmament time-table within the specified limit, the Russian side reserves the right onesidedly with the use of force to disarm unlawful armed formations and volunteer detachments", the Statement said.

IZVESTIYA believes that "the war of ultimata may lead to a resumption of full-scale war in Chechnya". The newspaper quotes a Federal Security Service spokesman as saying that "the terrorist act against Oleg Lobov, the Russian President's Representative in Chechnya, is connected, most likely, with tough statements made by the Federal side at the talks with the Dudayev delegation. The bridge blast was an intimidation attempt meant to show strength."

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA points out that the terrorist act in Groznyy against Oleg Lobov "was staged immediately after the Chechen side had stated that further peace talks had no sense".

TRUD recalls that just as the Russian President's Plenipotentiary Representative Polyanichko was perfidiously murdered when the Chechen-Ingush conflict stabilisation process began to gather momentum, this time

Lobov was the target. Luckily, the terrorist act failed to serve its purpose."

PRAVDA, for its part, notes that "the terrorist act itself, just as mounting nightly firing on the positions of Federal troops show that the Dudayev side still counts on force."

"In this respect, the latest 'surprise' sprung by Dudayev sounded as quite a serious alarm signal to the Federal authorities".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is of the opinion that the assassination attempt against Oleg Lobov was a kind

of reply to the tough-worded statement issued by the Command of the Combined Group of Federal troops.

"Considering the assassination attempt against Lobov, the unprecedented actions to appoint 'intransigent' commandants, and the incessant firing on and killing of Russian military men, one can hardly expect that the demands set out in the Statement will be complied with. Therefore, can this Statement happen to be the last one?"

Yeltsin Meets Advisors in Sochi on Balkan Situation

LD2009210795 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1700 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka arrived in Sochi today for a meeting with Boris Yeltsin, who is vacationing there. Well-informed sources told ITAR-TASS that the meeting between the leaders of the two countries is scheduled for Thursday. Just 45 minutes after the arrival of the Belarusian leader, a plane landed at Adler airport bringing Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev from Dushanbe for a meeting with the president. The topics of his meeting with Yeltsin had already been announced earlier, but the arrival of the Belarusian president was a mini-sensation.

[Begin recording] [Yeltsin] Today is a heavy day, a difficult day. Today all the time, all the time, there are meetings and conferences, meetings and conferences. [end recording]

[Correspondent Arkadiy Melkonyan] One of Boris Yeltsin's meetings was with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, at which the situation that has arisen in the Balkans in connection with the Yugoslav crisis was discussed. Also considered was a range of other elements in Russia's foreign policy.

[Melkonyan, addressing Kozyrev] Andrey Vladimirovich, you have just returned from Dushanbe. What impression did the southern border leave on you?

[Kozyrev] I must say that the border has now been reinforced and has better facilities, although, of course, the border guards need help. Contacts are being improved between the border guards and the commissars. But the fighters aren't laying down their arms, as it were, either. So I have the impression that it's worrying, but, at the same time, there is no reason for any panic or confusion.

[Melkonyan] After this, there was a sitting of the inner [malyy] Security Council, as the president defined its status, with the participation of Foreign Minister Kozyrev, Defense Minister Grachev, Federal Security Service Director Barsukov, Ambassador to Great Britain Adamishin, and Ilyushin, first assistant to the Russian president.

At the meeting, a whole range of issues was examined, also connected with the Yugoslav crisis and designing a Russian strategy and tactics to resolve it. [end recording]

Sets Policy Objectives

LD2009180195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1708 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Wednesday [20 September] held a meeting with Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev and head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Mikhail Barsukov devoted to problems of the Bosnian settlement, the presidential press service reported.

Also invited to Sochi for the meeting was Russian Ambassador to Great Britain Anatoliy Adamishin, who earlier submitted to the President his memorandum concerning Russia's stance on the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

"The president listened to opinions of all the participants in the meeting and formulated objectives and guidelines for the corresponding ministries concerning the realization of the stance which had been worked out", the press service said.

Yeltsin is currently holidaying in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, combining sports and recreation with business meetings.

Belarusia's Lukashenka Meets Leaders in Sochi**Discusses Bilateral Ties With Yeltsin**

WS2109105095 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1000 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Our special correspondent Leanid Anop has just reported from Sochi where Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is currently staying. The third day of Alyaksandr Lukashenka's visit to the Russian Federation has started with a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. During the talks, the leaders of the two countries discussed political and economic problems experienced by Belarus and Russia, as well as military cooperation issues. Then both presidents played a tennis match.

Meets Grachev, Security Service Head

LD2009171995 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 1600 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The working visit by the president of Belarus to Russia is continuing. Today, Alyaksandr Lukashenka arrived in Sochi. Our special correspondent Leanid Anop reports by phone:

[Anop] [passage omitted] In the afternoon Lukashenka had a meeting with the heads of several power departments of the Russian Federation, in particular with the

Defense Minister Colonel General Pavel Grachev. The range of issues discussed was very wide. They discussed questions and problems of military construction in the two states, Army reform and rearming the Armies of Russia and Belarus. This is all the more important in that our state was and remains needed by Russia in the most varied aspects. [passage omitted]

Alyaksandr Rygoravich Lukashenka also had a meeting today with Mikhail Barsukov, the director of the Russian Federal Security Service. [passage omitted]

Moscow Tables Bosnia Resolution at Security Council

LD2109072195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0707 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UNITED NATIONS September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The draft resolution on an immediate stop of the Moslem-Croatian offensive which Russia motioned at the U.N. Security Council may be put up for the vote within 24 hours, on conditions.

The vote will be held only on the condition that Serbs withdraw their heavy guns from the area around Sarajevo and the Moslem-Croatian coalition does not try to seize more Bosnian territory than the 50 per cent which is to go to the coalition under the Contact Group's peace plan.

These conditions were announced by U.N. Security Council chairman Francesco Paolo Fulci, of Italy, after the council's Wednesday consultations.

The draft resolution was formally submitted to Security Council members at the request of the Russian envoy, Fulci said.

However, this does not necessarily spell that the voting will be held.

The Security Council will be closely watching developments in Bosnia.

If Bosnian Serbs do not pull their heavy weapons back from the 20-km exclusion area around Sarajevo, and the Bosnian governmental and Croatian troops do not stop their offensives, the Security Council will further pressure them into compliance with its conditions, Fulci said.

He said the Security Council at its consultations heard the report of the U.N. Secretariat on the latest developments in Bosnia.

The report reiterated that NATO's ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs to remove their heavy guns expired on Wednesday at 4:00 a.m. New York time.

According to the U.N. Secretariat, the Bosnian government and Croat troops are slowing down their offensives.

However, there are reports that the Serb army is mounting an increasing resistance in western and southwestern Bosnia, Fulci said.

Ilyukhin Backs Modern Air Defense System for Serbs

LD2009185795 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1807 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Viktor Ilyukhin, head of the Russian State Duma Security Committee believes that Russia must provide military assistance, including the supply of air defense weapons, to Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.

If we immediately provide Serbs with modern surface-to-air missile systems, it would drastically change the situation in Bosnia since it would prevent NATO from using its main weapon, air strikes, the Slavic World news agency quoted Ilyukhin as saying in an article.

Ilyukhin believes that the aggression against Serbs began after Russian leaders ceded their powers to the U.N. Security Council and NATO and promised it would not interfere.

He said that Russia is still 10-15 years ahead of other countries in the design and creation of mobile air defense systems.

If Russia begins serial production of its new air defense systems, it will enjoy "non-nuclear invulnerability of purely defensive nature," said Ilyukhin.

Participation in NATO Peacekeeping Forces Problematic

LD2109083595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
0803 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Ambassador to Brussels Vitaliy Churkin does not think Russia can participate in the multinational peacekeeping forces in Bosnia in the form suggested by NATO, that is under NATO military command. Asked by journalists if he can visualise Russia's participation in operations in Bosnia alongside NATO units, Churkin answered in the negative. He said he believes that problem will be discussed and studied in detail for long.

[Paris AFP at 1735 GMT on 20 September in a Brussels datelined report adds the following: "Asked

if Russia could contribute troops to a NATO force, the ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, responded: 'I don't think so.'

"This is a matter ... which needs to be very thoroughly discussed and proper solutions should be found," he added.

"I don't want to jump to any far-reaching comments in this regard although it would be no surprise to you if I say that the past few weeks have made working together with NATO more difficult for us.

"But this is something we all have to live with," he added.

"Not only would Russian involvement make the force appear more neutral in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, it would also help to appease Russian complaints about NATO running the entire Bosnia show, NATO diplomats believe.

"Churkin however said he did not share the view, widespread in NATO, that the UN had proved itself incapable of handling a situation like Bosnia and that it should hand the reins over to the alliance.

"Despite difficult circumstance, the UN's overall performance had been quite good. 'I would not as a basic premise discard the usefulness of the United Nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina,' he said.

"Churkin said Russia had yet to be formally approached about participation in any force.

"I am of course aware of other proposals but to the best of my knowledge they are not conclusive yet and I expect this will be a matter to be discussed for weeks to come."

Moscow May Quit Joint U.S. Exercise if Raids Resume

LD2009145395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1417 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — If NATO air raids on the Balkans are resumed, Russia may refuse to participate in the planned peace-keeping Russian-U.S. exercise in the United States, ITAR-TASS learnt here on Wednesday from a high-ranking representative of the Russian Defence Ministry.

However, the source specified, the final decision on Russia's participation in the joint exercise will be taken on Thursday, September 21, in the morning.

If the decision is positive, a reconnaissance group led by General Aleksandr Sokolov, deputy commander-in-

chief of the Russian Land Forces, who is in charge of peace-keeping issues, will go the U.S. at the end of this week.

Under the plan, the exercise is to start on October 16.

Daily Considers Role of 'Secret' Treaties in Balkans

MM2009145495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Sep 95 pp 1, 3

[Article by Nikolay Pashkin of RIA NOVOSTI: "By Surrendering Cities Without a Fight Belgrade and Pale Might Be Playing a Double Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade — Any war has its secret aspects. The present war in the Balkans provides almost daily grounds for assuming that both politicians and the military do one thing but think something quite different.

The talk of a secret treaty which supposedly existed between Yugoslavia and Croatia on a "bloodless" exchange of the territories of Serb Krajina (the western part went to Croatia, the eastern part to Serbia) had not yet died down before this same topic resurfaced — only this time in respect of Bosnia, where during the past 10 days the Muslims and Croats, acting behind the backs of NATO and the United Nations, have occupied more than 4,000 square kilometers of Serb lands. Cities in central and western Bosnia are surrendering practically without a fight, while the civilian population, piling their goods and chattels onto carts and into cars, are leaving them as though following a planned procedure.

All this provides grounds to think that the Serb leadership, both in Bosnia itself and in Belgrade, has decided to utilize the situation created by the NATO bombing and to release in advance cities and villages which are to pass to the Muslims and Croats according to the plan of the international Contact Group. It is being said that people are being driven from their homes not by their own politicians but by the powerful Western alliance, which has brought its air power to bear upon the Serb regions of Bosnia. For the Serbs will, sooner or later, have to part with one-fifth of the Bosnian territories because, according to the international intermediaries' plans, they will own only 49 percent of the lands out of the 70 percent they seized during the conflict.

There are undoubtedly arguments against this version too. They include the fact that the cities which the Serbs have quit include ones which the Serbs should have kept under the international arrangements. In other words, it makes no sense to yield positions to the enemy now in order soon to return to them. So Ranko Petkovic, director of the journal MEDUNARODNA POLITIKA and a leading Belgrade analyst, turns out to be right,

for he believes instead that everything is accounted for by chronic panic among the population caused by two weeks of bombing, as well as by the Serb Army's loss of morale.

Asked whether he allows the possibility of the Pale politicians secretly playing games with their own population, who would never agree to leave their homes voluntarily, Prof. Petkovic maintains that all this is happening, rather, because of an internal demarcation within the Bosnian Serb leadership, which is no longer capable of influencing the situation to the former extent. In the professor's opinion, not the least role in the present situation is also played by fear of the might of the Muslim-Croat army, which is acting with the support of regular Croatian units. It is possible to believe this, for Croatia's military budget, which now stands at over \$5 billion, is almost five times greater than the expenditure on the army that the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs and also federal Yugoslavia, put together, can afford.

There are, however, facts attesting that a secret treaty on an exchange of territories between the Serbs and Croats really does exist, only with the proviso that at present the sides which reached agreement on this (they most likely include the West) cannot picture quite accurately how this secret plan can be finally realized in practice. It has been pointed out that the territories being lost by the Serbs, like the cities of strategic importance to them, are passing to the control primarily of the Croats, not the Muslims. Here the Serbs have evidently made a conscious choice of the lesser of two evils. In addition, the Serb army has nonetheless not been so weakened as to give up an area of such impressive dimensions in the space of a few days. Consequently, the army is doing this consciously, is it not?

I could also spend a long time arguing about the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs remain under the influence of Belgrade: They maintain that the split between Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia is just a game, while in the opinion of others the Serbs in Bosnia have long been acting at their own discretion, even despite the fact that they act as a single team with Yugoslavia at the peace talks, and Radovan Karadzic visits the Yugoslav capital far more frequently than is officially reported. Only one thing can make the question of their relationship clear: Will the Bosnian Serb leadership — both military and political — fulfill the U.S. peace plan to which the Serbian president has agreed?

Daily: Bosnia Shows Loss of Russia's 'Moral Force'
MM2009145395 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
20 Sep 95 p 7

[Article by Stanislav Menshikov: "If There Had Been No Shelling, It Would Have Been Necessary To Invent It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rotterdam — The American bombing in Bosnia has not just an immediate, Balkan aim, but also serves the longer-term aim of securing by military force U.S. leadership in the world and Washington's "sacred right" to reshape East Europe and the former USSR and of bringing bowed but still-unbroken Russia to its knees. We would refer doubters to the U.S. press today.

It turns that the bombing was not revenge for the shelling of the market in Sarajevo. Indeed, the planning for this action began two months before the events in Sarajevo.

This is what THE WASHINGTON POST, citing top White House officials, has to say: "After three years of concessions to the European allies over the war in Bosnia President Clinton decided in June that only resolute U.S. leadership could save his foreign policy from disaster. Alarmed that the deteriorating situation in Bosnia was casting a pall over his presidency, Clinton issued strict instructions to his advisers: "Work out a new policy which will enable Washington to seize the initiative." America's top bureaucrats soon came up with "the biggest air operation which NATO has ever mounted." Fearful of negative voter reaction, Clinton stipulated "Only, no U.S. ground forces must be involved in the military operations."

By the end of July everything was ready to go, but... The seizure of Srebrenica by the Serbs plunged faint-hearted Washington into a cold sweat. However, after Croatia's invasion of Krajina, which was prepared with U.S. assistance, the doubts disappeared. This was a "gift which fell into the administration's lap," the newspaper writes. Encouraged by the success, Clinton waited for the right occasion.

The shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace fell most opportunely. If there had been no shelling, it would have been necessary to invent it. This was exactly like the "incident" engineered by the American special services in the Gulf of Tonkin in the sixties, which gave the pretext for the invasion of Vietnam. History repeated itself 30 years on, resulting in new aggression and fresh human casualties.

THE WASHINGTON POST relates all this with evident self-satisfaction: What a great guy our president is! It is

not put out at all by the fact that NATO is regarded as an international organization where decisions are made jointly and where orders are issued from Brussels rather than Washington. But when the United States feels the need to boast about its "own success" the pretense can be dropped. As matters developed, Clinton rejected Chirac's secretly proposed participation by France: "We thought that if the French took the lead, they would do everything wrong," THE WASHINGTON POST writes, citing an anonymous member of Clinton's entourage. Only the United States could be leader. Chirac was put in his place. You can bomb your own atoll, but in Europe we will make do without you....

Moscow kept silent all this time, only after the event voicing indignation that it had not been consulted. As if the Kremlin did not have, in addition to the Foreign Ministry, two foreign intelligence services which still know just about how to do their job. When the evil deed was done, Boris Yeltsin had to vent his spleen publicly before going away on vacation. And then — wonder of wonders — NATO members and Americans become worried all of a sudden and made a bee line for Moscow one after another to sniff out what was on the "retired" superpower's mind. ("Retired" but still a nuclear power!). But there was no need for them to get cold feet — U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott discovered nothing in Moscow except "disagreements over tactics." The American press joyfully quoted Kozyrev when he stated that Russia was in no position to resist the West.

This is what THE WALL STREET JOURNAL writes in this regard, citing Yegor Gaydar's former economic adviser Anders Aslund: "Russian foreign policy is in complete disarray. It is doubtful that Russia has the military force to back up its big talk. During Soviet times 25 percent of the gross product went on military needs, now half the country has disappeared and the military get only 5 percent. Consequently Russia's military budget is ten times less than it was in the USSR."

A splendid result. First Gaydar, at Aslund's bidding, slashed our defense expenditure to a stingy level for the good of the economy's "recovery," and now Aslund scoffs that the simpletons Yegor and Andrey swallowed his bait. Russia, which is denied the right to protect its own national security and legitimate geostrategic interests, finds itself in a dreadful and most dangerous fix. These are no minor "mistakes" committed by our ministers; far greater consequences are at stake here, for which responsibility will have to be accepted sooner or later.

Listening to Kozyrev's prattle about the "impossibility of resisting the West," I could not help being reminded of UN Security Council sessions in the days before Gorbachev when Soviet diplomats, not mincing their words, lambasted aggressive U.S. and NATO actions and fearlessly defended the insulted and injured peoples of the world. Those speeches were models of the art of oratory, the whole world paid heed to them, and they were feared like the plague by Western politicians. Those speeches, incidentally, rarely relied on military force; they were underpinned by the country's moral force, before which the nuclear arsenal of the United States was powerless. That force was a real barrier to the diktat of the transatlantic power and its dreams of an "American Age." Under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze and later under Yeltsin that moral force was, alas, squandered and lost.

Yes, it is time to restore that moral force. American aggression in Yugoslavia deserves to be morally condemned at the UN General Assembly Security Council in a loud and clear voice. It is not so much Russia's military might as its right to serve as guarantor of peace and security enshrined in the UN Charter which is needed as much today as in the past. No such move on the part of the present authorities is to be expected, if only because they are, to put it mildly, morally compromised — both in Chechnya and on the banks of the Moskva River. Others must defend international morality.

Is this nostalgia for the Cold War, then? Self-isolation from the civilized world? Not at all. It is the American bombing in Bosnia which is reviving the war — a hot and a cold war. This bombing is the action of barbarians who deserve to be officially pilloried at the United Nations.

Russians, Serbs, and other peoples are not "inferior" races who understand only the language of crude force and who should, according to bogus defenders of rights acting in concert with the West, be blithely dismissed.

Duma Deputy Urges Setting Up Aid Fund to Serbs
LD2009135195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1252 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Olga Kozlova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Member of the State Duma (Russian parliament lower house) Vladimir Kozhemyakin, deputy chairman of the State Duma Committee for Nationalities Affairs, who has just returned from a tour of Serbia and Montenegro where he was as a member [as received] of a delegation from the Russian-Serbian Friendship Society, supported an initiative here on Wednesday to set up a special aid fund to Serb people.

He said in an interview with ITAR-TASS that NATO air raids resulted in flooding Serbia with another 52,000 refugees. Several thousand people died.

"We were shocked by the tragedy of our Serb brothers," Kozhemyakin stressed. "This is a veritable genocide. We saw crowds of women, the aged and children fleeing bombing raids. But it is especially hard to see the eyes of orphans," he noted.

Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Aleksey Podberezkin, a co-author of the initiative, who also visited the Balkans as a member of the same delegation, said that work now is well in progress to supply Serbs with food, medicines, warm clothing and other prime necessities.

He said that the Russian delegation handed over a letter to Serbian parliament speaker Dragan Tomic where the Troytskiy cultural and educational centre which was recently set up under the aegis of Aleksey II, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, expressed readiness to receive a group of Serbian orphans whose parents fell victims of barbaric bombings.

Children will live and study at the school of well-known teacher Mikhail Shchetinin near Krasnodar.

Moscow Assures Buha on Efforts To Stop Military Actions

LD2009142795 *Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian*
1945 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina from the "Versions" program]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today, Russia stood on the threshold of a critical choice — whether to give military aid to the Bosnian Serbs or refuse to her Serb brothers. To find out Russia's position, Bosnian Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha flew to Moscow last night. I met him in the Kremlin in Yuriy Baturin's, President Yeltsin's national security aide, office.

Baturin did not conceal from the Versions team the fact that Aleksa Buha had asked him to plead with the Russian president to provide the Serbs with military aid.

Evidently, Buha had been inspired by what Yeltsin said at a recent news conference to the effect that if NATO did not stop bombing the Serb positions Russia, along with humanitarian aid, would undertake stronger measures in defense of the Serbs. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Buha in Serbo-Croatian fading into Russian translation] I did not discuss the question of Russian military aid at all. The military aspect is not my specialization. I only informed my Russian friends of the

situation which has taken shape when we are fighting five armies and there is a danger of the collapse of the peace talks and stepping-up of military operations and a cross may be placed on the talks. And here in Moscow I received assurances that Russia is doing everything to stop the military action.

[Aleksandr Zotov, Yeltsin's special envoy to former Yugoslavia] I think if this offensive continues we will not hesitate to table the question in the Security Council so that an appropriate resolution can be passed. [passage omitted]

I cannot yet speak of the content of the resolution but at any rate the main thesis will be that the sides — clearly specific sides have to be indicated — should stop using the situation to conduct offensive action for the purpose of getting back the territory which they have lost. [end recording]

General Lebed: NATO Acting Like 'World Policeman'

AU2109111795 *Hamburg STERN in German*
21 Sep 95 p 28

[Interview with General Aleksandr Lebed by Matthias Schepp and Irina Shedrova; place and date not given: "Betrayal of Serbs Is Deadly Sin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [STERN] General, what did you think when you watched on television NATO planes bombing Serb positions?

[Lebed] NATO is behaving like a bull in a china shop. The world policeman who is allowed to do everything.

[STERN] Are you furious because Russia was not briefed about the attacks beforehand?

[Lebed] Of course. The only thing that is missing is that we abandon our nuclear weapons. Then the West will soon use Russia as a doormat quite openly.

[STERN] Why are you on the side of the Serbs, the aggressors in the Balkan war?

[Lebed] For centuries, the Serbs have been our allies. It is a deadly sin to betray them. We will win or die with our brothers. If Russia were to say that clearly, the hotheads in the West would soon cool off.

[STERN] Is Russia going to supply the Serbs with weapons?

[Lebed] My principle is: Act first and talk later. I will not tell a German correspondent what an ass Foreign Minister Kozyrev is.

[STERN] What are Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's mistakes?

[Lebed] Kozyrev defends all sorts of interests, but not those of Russia. As a result, we no longer have any friends, enemies, or alliance partners. We have nobody. We change our position according to a random principle.

[STERN] But Yeltsin gave the West a big thrashing.

[Lebed] He grumbled a little. Russia is already so weak that one only listens to us politely, but does not react. Thanks to our infantile government, the West has pushed Russia out of all markets. India wanted to buy missile engines from us. The Americans said that this was prohibited. The West treats us like a Third World state. In the G-7....

[STERN] ...the summit meeting of the leading industrial nations....

[Lebed] ...there is no room for Russia. I would not beg for an eighth stool.

[STERN] Well, the West has won the Cold War.

[Lebed] I advise the West to love Russia. If there is an explosion here, the whole of Europe will become a graveyard. One need not love Russia out of love, but out of hatred.

[STERN] Therefore, your former allies want to get into NATO.

[Lebed] Many may want to do that. NATO would be strong enough to ward them off. Instead, it is clearing the way to our borders via Poland and the Baltics. We saw in 1939 how that ends.

[STERN] You mean the Hitler-Stalin Pact?

[Lebed] Yes. Germany and Poland were facing each other without a buffer zone. History is repeating itself, but this time there will be more than 50 million dead.

[STERN] A third world war?

[Lebed] If NATO advances further, a counterbloc will form: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and central Asia. Russia could annul the existing disarmament treaties and there will be a new arms race.

[STERN] How far does Russia's sphere of interest go?

[Lebed] The minimum are the states of the former Soviet Union. 25 million Russians live there. Our men are treated like slaves and our women are offended like whores.

[STERN] Is Russia supposed to protect the Russians abroad with arms?

[Lebed] All Russia needs to do is to turn off the gas. For example, 100 percent of Moldova's coal and gas come from Russia. But they scream: We are sovereign.

We will talk with human beings in a civilized way and to pigs like pigs.

[STERN] Do you want to reestablish Russia's role as a world power and support former allies like Castro in Cuba again?

[Lebed] Russia has all it needs to be strong and powerful — 150 million people and many raw materials. We are not canvassing for alliance partners. We have to establish order in our country.

[STERN] How?

[Lebed] We need a dictatorship — a dictatorship of the law, in order to combat the mafia, crime, and corruption. We are still worlds away from a democracy such as in Germany or France.

[STERN] But the people like the Western lifestyle.

[Lebed] Potatoes from abroad, everywhere English advertisements, U.S. preachers in our churches — this cuts me to the quick.

[STERN] Do you want to restrict these freedoms?

[Lebed] In Russia there is the freedom to be robbed and murdered. Nothing else.

NATO Offers To Revise 'Map of Flank Limitations'

*LD1909173095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1721 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[By Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — NATO intends to offer to Russia a revision of the "map of flank limitations" envisaged by the Treaty on conventional forces in Europe. This decision was taken as a step to meet Moscow halfway as Moscow believes that the limitations envisaged by the Treaty are not in keeping with the existing realities after the disbandment of the Warsaw Treaty and breakup of the Soviet Union, ITAR-TASS learnt from diplomatic sources on Tuesday.

The proposal will be made officially shortly at a meeting of the NATO Council on "16 plus one" formula with the participation of the Russian ambassador in Brussels. A compromise with Russia is thus intended, the sources said. They said this has no connection whatsoever with NATO's future spread to the East. Nevertheless, a number of local observers regard this as a "compensation" for the future spread of NATO to the East. The document on its methods and terms is to be adopted by the NATO Council on Wednesday.

The Treaty on conventional forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1990 by the then Soviet Union and

the sides should have achieved the agreed upon level of reduction by November 17, 1995. The restriction on armed forces in Russia's North Western region and in the Northern Caucasus was envisaged under the Treaty proceeding from the presence of large troops contingent in Baltic republics and in the Transcaucasia. Russia of late has posed to NATO more than once the question of revising these arrangements which prevent it from keeping sufficient numbers of troops and combat equipment at its Western and Southern flanks.

NATO diplomats note that changes could be made in the map as it is the appendage to the Treaty. But the stance of NATO remains the same: the fundamentals of the Treaty should be unchanged. Moreover, it is believed in NATO that Russia still keeps very large amounts of armaments in the above-mentioned districts.

At the same time, NATO believes Russia may use the conference to be held in May to verify the Treaty in order to demand its renewal. The document envisages arms reduction of "groups of states". NATO and the Warsaw Treaty were then meant. This wording became senseless now.

After NATO officially informs Russia of its proposals, as well as Ukraine, whose interests are also taken into consideration, the matter will be discussed in Vienna in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This will apparently take place this week.

Churkin Not Satisfied With Offer

*LD2009203795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1938 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[By Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — NATO offered Russia on Wednesday [20 September] to review the "maps of flank limitations" determined by the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE). However, these proposals do not meet the interests of Russia which wants to have more troops and military hardware on its "flanks," especially in the North Caucasus.

Russian Ambassador in Brussels Vitaliy Churkin said the proposal reflects NATO's understanding of Russia's position. "But we cannot be satisfied yet because the proposed conditions do not quite meet our requirements," he told journalists on Wednesday.

At the same time, he pointed out that NATO is "moving in the right direction." The Alliance has prepared a serious document which will provide the basis for future talks, he added.

NATO agreed to reconsider the "maps of flank limitations" as a goodwill gesture in response to Moscow's complaints that the existing limitations do not correspond to the present-day realities following the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moscow set forth the initiative at the 16 plus 1 NATO meeting.

Sources in NATO said this is a compromise with Russia, adding that this proposal is not linked to NATO's future expansion to the East. At the same time, some observers tend to regard the Alliance's goodwill gesture as some kind of "compensation" for its enlargement.

Diplomat: Moscow Not Officially Informed

*LD2009190095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1807 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The Russian Foreign Ministry received information about U.S. and NATO plans to redraw the "maps of flank limitations" established for Russia by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, however, Moscow was not officially informed about these plans, a high-ranking Russian Foreign Ministry official told INTERFAX Wednesday [20 September].

He said that the CFE issue dominates "all Russian contacts with Western partners on security issues."

The issue is all the more urgent as the date approaches for the limitations on conventional forces in flank regions to come into effect (November 17, 1995, - IF Note), said the diplomat.

He suggested that the impending deadline could be the reason Western countries began discussing the CFE issue.

The diplomat recalled that as early as in 1993 Moscow said that recent geopolitical changes in the world made fulfilling the CFE flank limitations impossible.

"The Russian side put forward concrete proposals, offered its calculations and has been holding talks with Western partners on the issue for two years," he said.

The Foreign Ministry official expressed the hope that the new U.S. and NATO proposals would take into account Russia's interests, especially in North Caucasus where Russia faces new security problems.

The diplomat ruled out the possibility of Russia quitting the treaty.

"We proceed from the assumption that the treaty is the cornerstone of the entire European security system," he stressed.

Daily Questions Aims of Concessions*MM2109092595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Sep 95 p 1*

[Article by Aleksandr Sychev: "Russia Allowed To Transfer Tanks to Caucasus, But Only as Compensation for NATO's Eastward Expansion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington has agreed to review certain provisions of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty, allowing Russia to resolve one of the most acute problems in safeguarding its security — increasing its military might on its flanks (in other words, in a number of border regions, primarily the North Caucasus).

The state of affairs on its flanks began to concern Moscow from the time the Warsaw Pact collapsed. Those concerns only intensified with the collapse of the USSR. The CFE Treaty was signed 19 November 1990. Many years of minute calculations of guns and mortars and arguments over the meaning of concepts such as "serviceman" and "soldier" came to an end. We miraculously emerged from the deadlock and signed a document clearly stating where and in what numbers NATO and Warsaw Pact armaments would be located.

But the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and the Soviet Union — which under the Pact was reliably protected by the troops of its allies and its own armed forces in the Baltic, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine — became a thing of the past. Russia was left with its external European borders practically bare and without the right to strengthen them.

But the West had no plans to let Russia back out and brushed Moscow's fears aside.

The West has its own considerations pertaining to the flank restrictions — the strengthening of Russian military might on the flanks could be used by it to exert pressure on the newly independent states, particularly in the Baltic. Turkey resolutely opposes a review of the treaty, fearing an increase in Moscow's influence in the south.

Generally speaking, everything pointed toward Moscow's being unable to resolve this problem for a very long time. So Washington's agreement to meet it halfway was unexpected, to put it bluntly, and had immediate consequences. NATO immediately stated its intention to propose to Russia its own version of the revision of the "flank restriction maps." Even Turkey, our main opponent on this issue, can now do nothing and is restricting itself to attempts to permit as few Russian troops and armaments into the North Caucasus as possible.

It has not yet been possible to work out what exactly NATO intends to propose to Moscow. The Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry refused to make a statement on this "ticklish subject." The explanation for the refusal was that NATO's proposals had not yet been received through official channels. It is planned to hand over the proposals during the upcoming "16 plus one" working meeting in Brussels, which will be attended by Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin.

But we can state with confidence that, even after this, the veil of secrecy will not become any more transparent — it is not the tradition of Russian diplomats to provide the press with leaks about the progress of talks, and they do not know how to use that means of pressuring their partners anyway. So we will probably find out how many tanks we would like to deploy on our flanks and how many we have been allowed when the corresponding protocols are signed or when those tanks move to their new bases.

Consequently, we will dwell on the actual moment when the mood of the United States and NATO changed. There are suspicions that the West is expecting an equally weighty concession from Moscow in return. Such as?

Although NATO affairs are not dependent on Moscow, as U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry stated yet again on an official visit to the Czech Republic, the West would nonetheless like Moscow not to kick up too much of a fuss on certain problems. The bloc's eastward expansion could be just such a problem for NATO.

The fact that this is the area where Moscow will have to make concessions was also confirmed by the NATO Council sessions scheduled for this week in Brussels. There is virtually only one item on the agenda — the adoption of a document on the methods and terms for admitting new members of the bloc. Allowing Moscow to strengthen its Armed Forces on its flanks should ease its fears over the future disappearance of the "buffer zone" between NATO and Russia and the prospect of the bloc reaching its borders.

Official Russian and NATO representatives deny such a linkage. But there is nothing else they could do.

Daily Views Kozyrev's 'Mysterious' Central Asia Talks*MK2009120995 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
20 Sep 95 p 2*

[Report by Leonid Velekhov: "Andrey Kozyrev Conducts Mysterious Talks in Central Asia. For the First

Time of Late, the Minister Does Not Take Along a Single Journalist on a Trip"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Rather diplomatically evading a meeting with the Serb Republic's foreign minister, Aleksa Buha, who arrived in Moscow, Andrey Kozyrev spent Monday and Tuesday [18-19 September] in Central Asia — first in Uzbekistan and then in Tajikistan. In line with the official explanation, the Russian minister's trip was called for by the need "to discuss some questions of bilateral relations;" to sign several documents, including a Russian-Uzbek treaty of cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and information; and finally, to compare notes on the situation along the Tajik-Afghan border. The latter subject suddenly acquired special urgency and revealed a new aspect right on the eve of Mr. Kozyrev's visit in the wake of an armed clash in Kurgan-Tyube Sunday [17 September] between government armed forces, the First and the Eleventh brigades of Tajikistan's defense ministry. It was perhaps this extraordinary development, revealing that taking part in the inter-Tajik political standoff are not two sides — the government and the opposition — but also that government forces are split by internal conflicts, which made the Russian minister alter the original itinerary of the trip and start it by going to Tashkent. Earlier, INTERFAX reported, he was first to visit Dushanbe and then Tashkent. This merits a comment: Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov does not hide his rejection of Moscow-backed Tajik leader Rakhmonov and he is, in fact, leading an informal coalition of Central Asian presidents which is calling for making peace between Dushanbe officials and the opposition and for immediately holding free elections in the republic. The fact that Andrey Kozyrev should have discussed the problems of a Tajik settlement first with Mr. Karimov and then with Mr. Rakhmonov is conspicuous, and it could hardly be fully explained by technical changes in the trip's itinerary.

Andrey Kozyrev's talks in Tashkent, to all appearances, were marked by a substantial positive shift in Russian-Uzbek relations. For example, the Russian minister finally managed to secure President Karimov's consent to open the Russian Federation's general consulates in Fergana and Samarkand, where the majority of Uzbekistan's Russian-speaking population lives. The opening of consulates would make it easier for ethnic Russians to obtain Russian citizenship and, if need be, to move from Uzbekistan to Russia. Furthermore, Mr. Kozyrev managed to receive Islam Karimov's consent to open a military attache's office at the Russian Federation Embassy in Tashkent, something Uzbekistan authorities opposed for a long time. Dominant in the solution of this question is not so much a military, but a purely humanitarian aspect: the setting up of

a military attache's office would help the numerous Russian-language military men comprising the greater part of the officers of the former Turkestan Military District manage their day-to-day difficulties.

As for an inter-Tajik settlement, the content of discussions on this subject between Andrey Kozyrev and Islam Karimov in Tashkent on Monday [18 September], and with Emomali Rakhmanov in Dushanbe on Tuesday, is shrouded in mystery. Contrary to the practice of recent years, the minister did not take along on the trip a single member of the mass media. One can also not expect any information "leak" upon completion of the trip, which ended yesterday. From Dushanbe, Mr. Kozyrev proceeded to Sochi yesterday, without calling at Moscow, to meet with Boris Yeltsin, to whom he will report the results of his talks in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

ITAR-TASS Previews Visit by China's Qian Qichen
LD2109071795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0703 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Vladimir Solntsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The preparation of an official visit of President Yeltsin to China is going to be one of the main objectives of a visit to Moscow of Deputy Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Qian Qichen, which begins tonight. On Friday he will hold talks with his Russian counterpart Andrey Kozyrev and on Saturday he will be received by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin.

The date and the programme of Yeltsin's visit to China have not been fixed yet, although Chinese sources told TASS here that, probably, it would begin on November 9. TASS learned from reliable Russian sources that ten bilateral agreements are being prepared to be signed at the third Russian-Chinese summit, which deal with various aspects of relations between the two countries.

Talks in Moscow between Qian Qichen and Russian leaders will give a chance for the two countries to exchange views on a wide range of issues dealing with bilateral relations and the international situation. Sources at the Russian Foreign Ministry told TASS that the Bosnian crisis was going to be one of the topics for discussion and that the stands of the two countries on that problem were very close. According to the sources, the views of Moscow and Beijing "coincide a great deal on problem of peacekeeping, sanctions and other power practices." Both countries have supported on more than one occasion the idea of giving a more practical shape to the partnership in the international arena between Russia and China.

After ending his visit to Moscow, Qian Qichen will fly to New York on Saturday for attending the U.N. General Assembly session.

Military-Political Accord Set for Yeltsin Visit to PRC

*LD1909135895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1349 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[By Andrej Kirillov and Vladimir Soltsev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 19 (ITAR-TASS) — Up to ten Russo-Chinese agreements are being drawn up for President Boris Yeltsin's visit to China, which is to take place at the end of the year, ITAR-TASS has learned today from trustworthy Russian official sources.

Readied for the third Russo-Chinese summit, they said, is "a very important military-political document, envisaging trust-building military measures along the entire former Soviet-Chinese border. It will not be a bilateral document, but, in fact, a five-nation agreement, because talks on it were started before the collapse of the USSR and now they are being conducted with China by a joint quadripartite delegation, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan."

The other documents, which are being prepared for the visit, include an agreement on the protection of intellectual property, cooperation in combatting transnational crime, cooperation between control agencies, a protocol on the quality of goods, and a document on cooperation in the Khanka Lake Preserve.

Sources within the Russian Foreign Ministry have stressed that the Russian side was laying accent not on the number of documents, but on their careful and thorough elaboration so that they would be really "workable" and not mere scraps of paper.

Chinese sources in Moscow informed ITAR-TASS that Yeltsin's visit would most probably begin on November 9th. However, a high-ranking Russian diplomat has noted in this connection that there is yet no decision on the concrete timelimits of the visit and that Yeltsin would determine them depending on his work agenda. It has still not clear whether Yeltsin will visit Shanghai,

in addition to Beijing, where he is being invited by PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin, because the programme of the visit has still not been thrashed out with the Chinese side. Jiang Zemin, who had travelled to Yekaterinburg during his visit to Russia last September, was formerly Secretary of the Shanghai Party Committee and Mayor of the city, which is regarded as the "show window" of the Chinese reforms.

Preparations for the forthcoming summit meeting will be the focus of the upcoming visit to Russia by Vice-Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, who is expected to arrive in Moscow on Thursday evening. He will have talks on Friday with Russian Foreign Minister Andrej Kozyrev and will be received by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin before flying to New York for the U.N. General Assembly session.

Moscow Insists Iraq Strictly Observe UN Resolutions

*LD1909201895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1919 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 19 (INTERFAX) — Russia still insists that Baghdad strictly observes all U.N. Security Council resolutions, including those on missing Kuwaiti citizens and the return of Kuwaiti property.

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a briefing in Moscow Tuesday that Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk confirmed Moscow's commitment to this position during his visits to Kuwait and the UAE on September 16 to 18.

According to Demurin, his meetings there "touched on a number of international and regional issues as well as the situation in Bosnia."

Demurin underlined that all sides "voiced their common interest in the immediate settlement of the Balkan crisis by peaceful political means."

Demurin said his interlocutors supported "more substantial progress in the settlement in the region, chiefly between Syria and Israel," in discussing the Middle East peace process.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Eying Sverdlovsk Prosecutor for Moscow Post

MM2109135395 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 21 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Sergey Plotnikov under the "KP Prognosis" rubric: "The Urals — the Cradle of Prosecutors"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia is the motherland of elephants. The Urals are Boris's support base. The president's hot line continues to draw cadres from deep within the Urals, and ties among people from the same area remain a great thing.

This must be why the rumors that Vladislav Tuykov, Sverdlovsk Oblast's present prosecutor, is being groomed to replace Ilyushenko, the eternal "acting" [general prosecutor], are being taken so seriously in Yekaterinburg. Why not? On the chief count he is a suitable candidate.

In the past Oleg Lobov, the present chief pacifier of Chechnya, was chairman of Sverdlovsk Oblast Soviet Executive Committee. Former administration head Yuriy Petrov was first secretary of the same oblast committee of the CPSU. Viktor Ilyushin, the president's first assistant, carried the Urals Komsomol to new achievements. Altogether there were a lot of them in the boat. Boris Yeltsin remained the helmsman, just as today.

Vladislav Tuykov can be singled out among the somewhat lesser figures. Rumors are going around Sverdlovsk territory that the oblast prosecutor is being groomed for promotion.

Particularly as Vladislav Tuykov has never been sullied by anything. If the prosecutor were a knight and were to choose his own motto, this would suit him: "Moderation and caution." Maybe these qualities do not attract the ladies but, on the other hand, they promote career growth.

Serving now the party, now democracy, overseeing legality under Rossel, then under Strakhov, now again under Rossel, Tuykov contrives not to quarrel with any of them. In addition, he is young, ambitious, and persistent. No one will argue with the fact that Moscow is becoming, as it were, a branch of Yekaterinburg. Is this good? Is it right?

Yeltsin Sets Up Antiterrorist Center Led by Zorin LD2009161995

[FBIS Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian at 1945 GMT on 19 September in the second part of the "Versions" program, Tamara Zamyatina presents a nine-minute re-

port on the edict signed by President Yeltsin in which he is setting up an antiterrorist center of the Russian Federal Security Service [FSB]. The video shows the edict dated Moscow, Kremlin, 14 September.

Recalling the hostage-taking tragedy in Budennovsk two months before the edict and showing footage of women escaping from Budennovsk hospital, Zamyatina says:

"It was the impotence of the supposed power departments of Russia that prompted the president to decide to gather the special services spread around various departments into a clenched fist — the Antiterrorist Center of the Federal Security Service," Zamyatina says.

She notes the edict came into force on being signed, on 14 September. She adds that yesterday, Mikhail Barsukov, director of the FSB went to Sochi to tell Yeltsin how the antiterrorist center is being set up.

Zamyatina says the public is interested in this new center. Will the center carry out political orders, disperse rallies in Chechnya, or remove an unsuitable governor, she wonders.

Zamyatina asks Vladimir Tomarovskiy, first deputy head of the public relations center of the FSB, if there is still a danger of the FSB and Antiterrorist Center being drawn into political struggles.

Tomarovskiy tells the TV program that fighting crime and terrorism is now a political problem, and it is a big problem presenting a great danger to the state.

Zamyatina quotes an unnamed leader of the FSB as saying the Antiterrorist Center will bring back the prodigal sons — the legendary special sub-units of Alfa and Vypel who for disobedience to the president were at one time moved from the Ministry of Security to the chief security administration and Ministry of Internal Affairs.

One of the members of the Antiterrorist Center, whose face cannot be discerned against the light and whose voice is distorted, tells the TV program that the sub-units had well trained men and when they leave they live a normal, healthy life.

Zamyatina says that in the spring of last year during one of the president's working tours in Kazan, she was struck how members of the Alfa group guarding Yeltsin "went into church carrying weapons, frightening the old women at prayer," and what a contrast this made with them later, among the greenhouses and the tomato plants.

She brings up the question of what is more important in the work of the new center — defending human rights or the interests of the state?

Yuriy Baturin, the president's aide on national security, discusses the question of fighting for human rights and against terrorism and brings up the analogy of what is more important for a doctor — to overcome the illness or save the life of the patient.

They discuss the question of the Constitution, on which Baturin previously worked.

Zamyatina says that unfortunately, Colonel General Viktor Zorin, head of the Antiterrorist Center of the FSB, declined to take part in the program but he kindly spoke to her on the phone and helped in preparing the program. However, Sergey Goncharov, president of the Association of Veterans of the Alfa Group, told the TV program that he was a man capable of bringing order and commanding the center, as he can take control of a situation.

Agency To Coordinate Operations

MM2009152595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by Sergey Ptichkin: "Antiterrorist Center Set Up at Russian Federation Federal Security Service"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has long been a feeling within the Federal Counterintelligence Service-Federal Security Service [FSB] in favor of creating a unified headquarters to combat terrorism. The Budennovsk tragedy has only confirmed that the security service professionals are right — a unified coordinating center empowered to take the most resolute action is vitally needed.

As a rule, minutes or sometimes even seconds will count in emergency situations when there is a threat of major acts of terrorism or the taking of hostages. Forces from the Army, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the FSB, the Air Force, and the Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters — that is, the most diverse structures, and structures which are not subordinate to each other — can be involved in eliminating the threat. The success of the antiterrorist operation and the survival of the people accidentally involved in the maelstrom of terror will depend on how coordinated their actions are.

Careful analysis of the Budennovsk events has shown that all the problems arise not from any lack of professionalism but from a lack of coordination in the actions of various ministries and departments, even though the top people in the power structures may be on the spot at the publicly played-out drama.

It had been expected that a standing "shadow" headquarters would be set up that would be legally entitled in the event of a real threat to "show itself" and un-

questioningly involve any state or even private structure capable of providing real assistance in the fight against terror. Our state does have experience of such leading centers....

The FSB Antiterrorist Center is based primarily on its own professionals — the "Alfa" group and the former "Vypel" — but, if necessary, it can involve and coordinate any subunits of any other power ministries and civilian services.

Yeltsin Submits Spanish Treaty to Duma

LD2109100595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0916 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin submitted to the State Duma for ratification a treaty between Russia and the Kingdom of Spain on legal assistance in civil cases which was signed in Madrid on October 26, 1990, the Russian President's press service said.

Yeltsin's covering letter to State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin said that the Treaty complies with the interests of Russia and international legal standards in the sphere of providing legal assistance in civil cases, and corresponds to the Russia-Spain line aimed at strengthening cooperation in this field.

The ratification of the Treaty would provide Russia with a legal basis for the validity of decisions by Russian courts in Spain.

The Spanish side has ratified the Treaty.

Premier Chernomyrdin Interviewed in Komi Republic

LD2009113195 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1810 GMT 19 Sep 95

[Studio interview with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by correspondent Irina Lapina in Moscow and by other correspondents in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic; date not given; from the "How Shall We Live?" program — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lapina] Hello. The simple idea that we need to work rather than wring our hands in despair has always been attractive, especially during hard times. In our times, this phrase is more and more often connected with Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin, the name of the prime minister of the Russian Government. He will answer your questions today. Viktor Stepanovich, let us perhaps begin with this, with your strict optimism. What gives you confidence that, if we get on with things, we will be able to achieve a very great deal and in general what gives you the ability —

and probably even the right — to condemn or complain about those who hold different views?

[Chernomyrdin] Well, I do not think that this was my invention. This conclusion was reached a long time ago and it has long been clear that how we live depends on how we work, naturally. But this is such a broad concept that everyone listening to us today is able to understand that those who do not work live in difficult circumstances.

For me, optimism comes from the fact that we, the government, and the programs that we have and that we are working on, and the conditions that we will create give me optimism. This is how I speak and this is how I think.

[Lapina] Viktor Stepanovich, you are currently doing a lot of travelling throughout the country. Now you are planning to go to Syktyvkar. Our colleagues have asked us to organize direct contact and so we have set up a television link today and we will be able to talk to one another. But for the time being, Viktor Stepanovich, what do you get from these trips? It is clear that in preparation for your visit things are painted, done up, replastered, everything is put in order. You leave and what happens next?

[Chernomyrdin] This should all be kept up for longer afterward, where they are prettying things up. I know about these things myself, I went through all this myself when all this was done, when there were preparations for a visit. I do not think that things are like they were before, but it is no bad thing if the boss expects guests....

[Lapina, interrupting] Preparations are done as they should be.

[Chernomyrdin] If there are preparations for the guests. There is nothing bad about this. Of course it would be good if this kind of rhythm, this kind of desire and attitude remained later, and if things were always like this, if each of us was always ready to receive guests.

As for my trips, this is not just me going off to stay with people, my work is connected with these trips. I travel to the regions and look at the problems in these regions. What problems there are, how they developed and, the main thing, what needs to be done. What is also important, that what we have noted actually takes place. But before I can make a proper decision, I, of course, need to see something of what is happening. I need to see things in the form that they actually take.

[Lapina] You are about to visit the Far North, and the Far North means raw materials — oil and gas. These are the raw materials that we sell and for which we receive convertible currency. But why do the oil and

gas workers not receive a better deal than everyone else? Why this paradox?

[Chernomyrdin] Maybe there is a paradox here, and maybe there is not. People who mine or produce something that can always be sold abroad — what kind of a deal should they get? What about those who make things that are only needed inside this country, needed by everyone every day and every hour? So there is a good case to be made for natural resources to be owned by the state, which means by everyone, by all our people. Everyone should benefit. That is what we are doing. In any event, I think, the oil and gas workers and others who extract mineral resources are at the moment in a slightly different situation. Not from the point of view that their work has become easier or there is less of it, nothing of the sort. People are working as they have always worked, in the same tough conditions, but they have more opportunity now. That is more or less as it should be, the important thing is to make proper use of it. Make proper use of it, and understand things correctly. [passage omitted]

[Lapina takes a question from Syktyvkar on Chernomyrdin's views about the Komi Republic and its economic potential]

[Chernomyrdin] I have indeed been there [in Komi], but cannot say that I know this region as well as some other northern regions in which I have worked myself, such as Tyumen. But I know the problems, especially those of the oil industry, those related to our fundamental resources, like in Komi. I know these problems, they are in many ways similar to the problems of many other regions.

[Syktyvkar newspaper editor in chief] Viktor Stepanovich, your predecessor, former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar once said that there are 10 million too many people living in the north. Do you agree with this view, and does our government have a concept of the economic development for Russia's northern territories?

[Chernomyrdin] First of all, I do not know how Gaydar arrived at such figures, or who made the estimate. What sort of estimate was that? Too many people living in the north? In the same way one might say there are too many people living in Krasnodar. Anyway, I do not know what Gaydar had in mind and what sort of estimate he used. I think this is unfair and even wrong, shall I say it straight away. One cannot talk about people with such disregard. The point is, each state, each region solves its problems its own way.

Talking about our north, Komi in particular — remember what a boom there was in Komi several years ago,

what forces we summoned to develop the deposits — timber, oil, gas — I can briefly talk about any of them. I can talk about coal mining, especially development of the large Vorkuta coal field with its high-grade coal. Did we need to do this or not? Of course we did. How could we decide otherwise? Of course, we could stretch this development into dozens of years or more. Yes, we could do it if we had had the means at that time, in the Soviet Union.

Now, the situation has changed somewhat. The pace of development, the means, and the structure have changed. What I can say is that today all people in the north should have jobs, should be employed. We should think about those in employment and the pensioners. Here a question may arise: Do pensioners have to live in Vorkuta or even further to the north or, perhaps, we should create opportunities for them to go and live in other regions with a milder climate, more comfortable to live in? This is a serious question. What does it mean — superfluous? I do not accept that. There are no superfluous people. There was a policy carried out by the state at a time and we have the consequences that should be understood and implemented to the end. This is what I have to say, first of all.

Second, regarding the future plans for the northerners and for development of the northern economy. There are plans, there is a program. Everything will again depend on our means. Should we again be taking it by storm, without leaving anything behind? No, we will not be doing this again. We will, first of all, create normal working and living conditions for the northerners, as well as people of other regions. We have already started doing this. I can say today that yes, we are building, we are finding areas where we will invest money to enable retired northerners to relocate, if they wish. We are looking for such places near Moscow, in the central regions of Russia and in the south, where possible.

Incidentally, I recently gave a speech, on Miners' Day when the minister, the chairman of the committee that is already building housing for our miners, including for the Vorkuta miners... [pauses] We will do this, this needs to be done. [passage omitted]

[Lapina] Viktor Stepanovich, we have many questions from viewers of the "How Shall We Live?" program. First of all, they expressed their bewilderment that the prime minister did not seek an answer with them to such a sacred issue, and they praised your appearance in the previous program and want you to agree to make these meetings regular. Let us divide today's questions crudely into two sections — economics and politics — and begin with the unpleasant one, politics. How are things with our home, which is Russia?

[Chernomyrdin] You are right. Russia is our home. If you mean our movement Russia Is Our Home, that is one question, if you mean all our home, our Russia, then I have to say [words indistinct]. I can see how things are developing here and there has been some progress if you consider the fact that we have only organized ourselves quite recently. We have held a congress where all our basic policies were adopted in a declaration, we adopted a pre-election, that is we adopted a program and now we have to get down to work. We just have to get down to work, and work seriously. I do not think that we are doing enough. We are not talking to people very much, we are not saying a lot, or explaining much. We still have time, not much time has passed. But I think that all of our intentions that we want and that we are laying as the foundations for the construction of Our Home are what Russians need. These are our life.

You can say that it is a good thing that such a movement has been set up, that it exists. I am sure that we are not subordinating others to us. Some people say we are just the Agrarian Party, others we are just the industrialists or the producers or the trade unions, but I must say that we do not speak of Our Home like this. This is Our Home. Trade unions, agrarians, and producers and consumers should be in it, there will be women in Our Home and women's movements. We are everyone. First and foremost, we need to sort things out in Our Home. We plan to do everything that we need to do for Our Home.

[Lapina] Can we say that the original plan has failed. After all, it was proposed that two powerful center blocs should be set up. One left of center and one right of center, and to cut off all of the extremists. That was the model for a two-party system. Ivan Petrovich Rybkin, mentioning wise terms and virtually citing higher mathematics, claimed he would receive 67 percent of the votes at the elections. Why is this not working?

[Chernomyrdin] I would not venture to say whether or not this is coming off. But as far as the percentage is concerned, we will see only after 17 December.

[Lapina] Why such differing moods from the president? We can remember his first statements on this, and between the lines we could see he was talking about clear-cut victory. But the Rybkin bloc is virtually stillborn and the president has reduced his prediction for Our Home to either 12 or five or eight. What is the reason for his disillusionment?

[Chernomyrdin] I have not heard him say five. I have heard him say 12 and eight. We must get down to work. That is the first thing. Second, I would not say that Ivan Petrovich Rybkin's bloc has collapsed completely.

Not at all. But we are talking in allegories here. The formative process is under way. The creative process is under way. It is a bloc, and a bloc is a bloc. Ivan Rybkin's is not the only bloc. We know of many more, and many others we have already forgotten. I cannot even remember them, various blocs. So we have a movement, not a bloc. It might come off, or it might not, whether you want it to or not. But it is a movement, all the same. There is not a bloc that cannot [word indistinct]. I think that Ivan Petrovich Rybkin's bloc will survive, it still exists. And I believe him when he says easy come, easy go about those who are quitting. By leaving, they are not doing anything worthwhile. But with this huge spread and variety I can only of course sympathize with our people as they try to figure it all out.

[Lapina] It is difficult. What is going on? Nobody expected there to be unity, of course, but neither did they expect such fragmentation into various blocs, alliances, associations, factions, parties. And there are some very strange alliances. For example, I cannot understand the Alliance of Industrialists and Trade Unions. To use the current phraseology, this means the capitalists and unions getting together. This is another paradox. Is it possible? Will the unions in this case not lose their primary function? Or am I missing something here?

[Chernomyrdin] I would also say that in the classical scheme of things producers [words indistinct] Once again, in the classical scheme of things it does not always turn out that way. But you can ask them when you meet them on the air. Maybe they have other members, maybe their main thrust is in a different direction. There is food for thought here. They do not always gel with each other, not entirely, to be honest. But once again, I say that I have not met them since they set up their alliance. Maybe there is something that I, or we, do not know. Maybe they have thought up a way of making it work. Well, we will see. As regards the number of blocs, you know, many countries have gone through this. We are also at that stage of democracy when everyone wants to organize something and achieve self-fulfillment. But how? At work? You might get noticed, or you might not. We have tried that, achieving superiority, so to speak. And we have seen that we cannot do it. So people are organising themselves. It will pass. I do not think that we will always have to live like this, under a system where we have so many parties that I cannot even remember all their names. I think it will pass, it will blow itself out and then real parties will be formed, probably. That does not mean that there should be only one in Russia. We have been there as well, already. Maybe not two, that is not enough either, I think. But there will be the main

parties and blocs representing specific parts of, so to speak, the electorate. There will always, of course, be the agrarians. And why not? And there will probably be the industrialists as well. And the trade unions, who have always been and will be. And the greens. There is nothing wrong in that. But there will not be so many as now, of course. So our movement, Russia Is Our Home, will have a centrist or center-right bearing, so to speak. But that does not mean shutting anyone out, you're not one of us and so forth. Nothing of the sort. We have people who used to be in the Communist Party. We have agrarians. I say again, it is Our Home. And we welcome to Our Home everyone who wants to do good for Our Home, to furnish it.

[Lapina] Viktor Stepanovich, regarding the latest political news. Do you regret getting into these political games with blocs? To put it in officialese, your duties as prime minister concern the economy. We used to say, happy is the economy that is free from politics. So was your consent to head one of the blocs a tactical miscalculation?

[Chernomyrdin] That is a tough question. I have to say that I do not think it was. I never thought it was. Nobody forced me to do it. [words indistinct] Nothing of the sort. I will say why. If there had been elections two years ago, in 1993, and I had said that the government at the time with me in charge of it, was not up to engaging in politics, at a time when we had to sort out the government and decide what kind of government it was, who was in it and how, create some kind of system, then of course we would not have been up to that kind of political battle. But a lot of truths are surfacing now. We know what kind of government we have and who is who in the government. We also know what we are working on and how we are working. A system has appeared. Not everything comes off, and by no means everything has been done. But we are already now working in a normal fashion. That is the first thing.

Second, and most importantly. Why did I decide to do it, and why do I not regret it? Because in order to achieve real success in real terms the government needs powerful support in our parliament. I can say that many laws, or otherwise, but all the main ones, especially those on the economy, are drafted by the government. Then they are submitted to parliament, the State Duma. Then the Duma spends months poring over them. They work like this: With about 100 laws just laying there not being looked at, or being looked at slowly. You want to get something done? I am not a supporter of life by decree, resolution, or edict. We should live by the law. We have to learn to live by the law. So the government, any government, needs powerful support from legislators if it is to achieve

any kind of results. Especially at a time of transition, as now, when the legislative framework is only just being created. When we need laws, we do not have them. There is no legislative framework or foundation. So right now, the government needs support from this legislative assembly. This is why the government should have a solid foundation and solid support. It does not mean that when someone says something everyone else nods in agreement. We do not need that.

What we do need is an overall understanding of how to tackle the main issues and tasks that the country now faces. What kind of work is this? One man says one thing, and two shout: Out, out. [words indistinct]

[Lapina] The other extreme, of course.

[Chernomyrdin] Is that the way to get things done? I am supposed to be thinking about work. How am I to tell my colleagues to think about the job in hand when others are yelling: Resign, resign? What kind of situation is that? We do not need that. When we are all thinking about how best to get the work done, we might not know the answer. But if we have the support, then we really can get the job done and be a real government. Then, I think, matters will progress a lot more intensively. And plenty of issues will be handled differently. And I want to tell our viewers again that the government is duty bound to create conditions for work. You understand? Conditions for work. And our people know how to work. But there have to be the rules of the game. So that to fit in, nobody has to go on bended knee before the boss. He should do as the law says he should. He should be protected by law, be he in Ryazan, or Rostov, or Krasnodar, or Komi, or Syktyvkar. Wherever. There should be a law for one and all.

[Lapina] And the law should work?

[Chernomyrdin] First, it has to exist. The laws should be understandable. Are you with me? Then you can expect more of the government. But at the moment, when there is a problem then we get a resolution or an edict, or we ask the president to sign an edict. And that is it. Is that the way to get things done? This is why the government must have a bulwark. That is how they work in all other countries. Take any state, and it has a ruling party or a ruling majority or a ruling movement, whatever it is called, which forms a government. What is wrong about that?

[passage omitted] [Syktyvkar announcer] Over to Natalya Melnikova from the RESPUBLIKA newspaper.

[Melnikova] Viktor Stepanovich, what do you think of the possibility of setting up a ministry for the affairs of the North or for the Northern Territories. After all, the Komi Republic is not the only northern territory. Sixty-

four percent of Russian territory is northern territory, and a huge quantity of natural resources are located there.

[Chernomyrdin] Yes, there is a lot of discussion at the moment about setting up a ministry or department specifically for the North. The State Duma and the Federation Council have already had appeals from the republics. In principle, I do not support this snowballing of ministries. I, as the chairman of the government, here today tell you that I am no supporter of this. That is the first thing.

Second, if I was convinced that just by setting up a ministry lots of problems will be solved then there will be no debate about setting up such a ministry. What will the problem be? There will be no problem. But once again, if I was convinced that this alone will resolve things, then I would have set one up a long time ago. Incidentally, the committee that already exists as part of the Nationalities Ministry still exists in the same form, but is just part of the ministry. We will make a decision on this soon. We will look into it again, from all points of view. If necessary we will make a decision. But once again, the ministry is not the point.

I return once again to the same question. We need to set up a powerful system. A system, yes. We need mechanisms to bring all of this into line, we need a mechanism.

[Syktyvkar announcer] Another question concerning matters specific to the north and worrying very many of us. (Nikolay Razmyslov) from the KOMI MOY, ZEMLYA KOMI newspaper.

[Razmyslov] Viktor Stepanovich, what is the future of extra payments for the North, will they be stopped?

[Chernomyrdin] This is not the first time that I have been asked that. I do not understand where this comes from and who it suits. First, this issue has not been discussed, it is not being discussed, and I do not think that there are any plans to discuss it in the foreseeable future. At least while I am in the government here, I do not see any need to raise this issue of stopping the extra payments for the North. This is not sensible, it is not the time and there is no reason for it.

If anybody wants to abolish these allowances, we will first send him there — let him live there for some time, live there properly. Then we will see whether he still wants to do abolish the allowances. Here, in Moscow, anyone can say anything. I think such things come from Moscow. [passage omitted]

[Chernomyrdin] I can say there are many who would like to take part in this region's development. I believe it

is right to encourage those willing to work in this region. I do not see anything wrong in that. This will mean employment for our people who will be working there. This will create good working conditions for our own people. The region will benefit from the results, it will generate income. What should we do and what means of transport will we be using? There is an option, as you were saying, to use the Arctic Ocean and there is a usual, normal option. Everything will depend on whom we are dealing with. We are only interested in exporting the finished product, we should have full processing facilities. This will be of benefit to us, first of all. Such is our plan.

[Lapina] Viktor Stepanovich, there are two very pressing questions that we cannot escape. Let us start with Yugoslavia, about which there are more than enough claims, opinions, and predictions: The collapse of our foreign policy, betrayal, we sold out the Serbs, nobody takes any notice of us, Russia carries little weight on the international scene. We are interested in your viewpoint, the viewpoint of a calm and reflective man.

[Chernomyrdin] Let me say immediately that I do not accept these, how can I describe them, outspoken claims about how we sold someone out, we did not do all we could, our foreign policy failed. People have been there and returned with all sorts of stories, you know, but it is not as simple as all that. Do you really think that we have not learned from our experience? Our experience, incidentally, of what started in precisely that region? Some people have not learned, and want us to act tough and go full steam ahead. That will not happen. We do not need that. But this does not mean that the methods now being used to resolve the crisis are to our liking. They are not, by a long way. Not by a long way.

The latest progress now being made is not without Russia's involvement. Let us be straight about this. It was made absolutely clear, not by shouting and screaming, but quietly and firmly, that bombing is not solving anything. Neither will it. In any event, we have to sit at the negotiating table. And Russia has had, has, and will have its say. And Russia has said that if the bombing raids are not stopped, then we have our methods. We can unilaterally decide to lift the embargo. We have not done that yet. We are honoring our obligations that we undertook in the United Nations. Under the UN's auspices. We are honoring them, but we have given a warning and the president has made it absolutely clear.

But all this talk about our foreign policy failing. Kozyrev not doing his job — well, Kozyrev has his shortcomings. And he has been criticized for them, as well. He has been told off by the president. But you can

say that about anyone and everyone. I am not making excuses here for anyone, but I want to say straight that there is too much at stake here: People. We have not betrayed anyone, and neither do we intend to betray anyone. But neither do we intend to stay silent.

What happened today was not without Russia's knowledge and participation. We should proceed by using such methods. The questions should be solved at the negotiation table. By the way, these questions will be solved at the negotiation table and not by bombing.

[Lapina] Is there a solution to the Chechen problem?

[Chernomyrdin] Here, too, there is a solution, I can say it unequivocally. Here too, some would like to push us into similar actions. Here again, patience runs out; they say it is time to end it all. No, we do not need this. Some ask: Why do we need this ceasefire, and wouldn't it be better if we were to end the whole thing once and for all? They have forgotten everything already. They forget that only a month ago hundreds were dying. You understand, I can say it again: For me, Chechnya is Russia. I cannot hold with this attitude toward the Chechens or anybody else.

I believe that we should find courage and patience in the same way. Maybe some people should be making more effort to solve these problems. There is a lot to think about here. There are no simple solutions. We have already gone too far. It has not happened today or yesterday. This question is 3 years old. Those who, while sitting in quiet places, are beginning to raise their voices and proffer advice, should have been thinking of this before. No, we do not need a war there today. There are decisions, they should be adopted. We should sit down at the negotiation table with the same people. There are simply no others, you see. Whether some like it or not, we have to search for solutions together with them. And we will find them. But to fight — no.

[Unidentified man] Today Vorkuta is tense, and the miners are worried, mainly because of economic reasons, such as the uneven rail transport charges and the so-called Northern subsidies, which are well known to everyone but which increase the price of a tonne of coal. As a result of all this, the Vorkuta and Inta miners are no longer among the highest wage earners. There are also many other problems. For example, the Promyshlennaya mine stopped operating in May. However, it has not been officially closed and therefore there has not been any financing for proper closure or civilized laying off of the workers. The closure order has still not been received from the Ministry of Fuel and Power engineering.

[Chernomyrdin] Of course there are various charges and there is injustice, if you are talking about the miners. However, if a railway worker were sitting next to you right now, he would have asked me the same question: How are the rail transport workers supposed to survive? There is less freight now but they have to transport it as far as before. How shall we live? How will they live? We have to preserve the rolling stock, we have to renew it, we have to repair the tracks. I could continue: We have to maintain villages, we have to provide health care to people, and we have to provide schools for children. This question becomes a kind of a chain.

Unfortunately, to my great regret, neither the coalminers nor the transport workers have anything to do with it. Obviously we have to solve this matter. First, it is a governmental matter. I would like to repeat this to make sure that no one thinks that I am trying to shift the responsibility onto someone else. Nothing of the kind. We will make a decision on charges, on coal, and on the mines as well.

[Lapina] [passage omitted] Viktor Stepanovich, there are many problems and the production crisis is one of them. Producers complain that they have insufficient incentives. Can you tell us briefly what you think about it?

[Chernomyrdin] You know, I agree with those who say that we are failing to create proper conditions for producers, that we are not supporting them. We should not be just backing them. We should be constantly helping them, and I mean not just us, the Federal Government. There are many other factors too, such as laws, for example. I am for creating incentives for producers and for making special concessions to them, especially for medium-size producers, producers at the medium level. Some are saying that we should support the Magnitogorsk metallurgy combine or some other powerful plant. Yes, I agree. However, companies like that are already running smoothly. Of course, we should continue to back them, but we should also help medium-size producers to get on their feet.

We should invest in them and help them. They are absolutely right if they are dissatisfied. As far as organizational matters are concerned, when we discuss, for example, the situation in our northern regions, we still think whether we should do certain things there. As for medium-size businesses, we have already set up a department which will deal with entrepreneurs. We should not just totally ignore them. They should be supported, like farmers.

[Lapina] Thank you, Viktor Stepanovich. In conclusion, is there anything else you want to say but did not have time?

[Chernomyrdin] First and foremost, I would like to use this opportunity to wish people well, that they may work in peace, live in peace. We have to create normal, peaceful conditions in which to build things up and work. That is where we start the next stage, the stage of normal development and normal living, in which we can create, build up everything.

So once again, from the bottom of my heart, I wish you well and, of course, some tolerance and happiness.

[Lapina] Thank you, Viktor Stepanovich. I hope that our conversation has been useful to us both. Unfortunately, fresh replies give rise to fresh new questions. The only solution to this is to give honest replies to these. Thank you very much.

Security Council Secretary Lobov Interviewed

BR1909152395 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Sep 95 p 8

[Report on interview with Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov by Flemming Rose in Moscow; date not given: "Old Friends Support Yeltsin"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Behind the facade: The Security Council is a key institution in the new Russia and has been shrouded in secrecy since its founding in 1992. BERLINGSKE TIDENDE got behind the facade in an interview with the council's day-to-day chief. [passage omitted]

Since then Oleg Lobov has been a fixture of Boris Yeltsin's political team, which includes several old colleagues from his days as party chief in the Urals.

Viktor Illushin, Yeltsin's closest political adviser today, was formerly first secretary of the Komsomol young communist league in Sverdlovsk. The Russian president's former chief of staff, Yuriy Petrov, succeeded Yeltsin in the post of party chief of the Ural region when Yeltsin was called to the Central Committee in Moscow in 1985.

Former First Deputy Prime Minister Gennadiy Bubulis and Yeltsin's current speech writer, Lyudmila Pikhoya, also come from Yeltsin's home town. Evil tongues talk of a political mafia from the Urals around Yeltsin.

Mafia or not — the fact is that not a single one of the people Yeltsin took with him to Moscow from his home region has betrayed his master and protector in a chaotic period in which political betrayal and personal ambition have constantly created new political alliances and put former friends and close allies on opposite sides of the political — and sometimes actual — barricades. And even though Yuriy Petrov and Oleg Lobov disagreed profoundly on the radical course of

reform which a group of young economists under Yegor Gaidar's leadership were given responsibility for in the spring of 1991.

Lobov has now worked together with Boris Yeltsin for 23 years. They met for the first time at the end of the 1960's during a trip to Sweden and Finland where they studied Scandinavian architecture. Asked how he would characterize Yeltsin after decades in his inner circle, Lobov said concisely:

"He is an intelligent man. That is the most important thing — after that come all the other qualities. Yeltsin is possessed of unusual intellectual abilities. That becomes clear when you have worked with him for many years."

Since Yeltsin ascended the throne of power in Russia in the early summer of 1990, Lobov has held the posts of first deputy prime minister, adviser, economics minister, and most recently secretary of the Security Council, which on 29 November last year took the fatal decision to send in troops against the breakaway republic of Chechnya.

Agreement on Chechnya

Normally it is only Yeltsin, government head Viktor Chernomyrdin, the chairmen of the two houses of parliament, and Oleg Lobov who have the right to vote at meetings of the Security Council; but on especially important issues Yeltsin can ask the approximately 15 members to declare their opinions and put their signatures to the decision made.

"Yeltsin did that when the decision was made to use military force against the Chechen rebels. The decision was unanimous. All those present supported it, regardless of what some of them have said later," said Lobov, who also rejected any similarity between the Communist Party's powerful Politburo and the Security Council, something that some critical voices in the Russian press have claimed.

"The Politburo's decisions were binding. They were supposed to be put into effect automatically, while the Security Council is an advisory body whose resolutions can only be put into action by presidential decree. That is an important difference."

Just before his appointment as secretary of the Security Council at the end of September 1993, Oleg Lobov visited France and the United States in order to get inspiration and ideas for the Russian security model. Among the people he met was Bill Clinton's security adviser, Anthony Lake, and he was allowed to see the Situation Room in the White House, where since the days of John F. Kennedy, information from all the relevant government departments and U.S. embassies

abroad has been collated in the form of daily reports for the president.

"We also have a situation room, where we collect information from the intelligence service and the other powerful government ministries in a database. It also contains statistics and important information on the banking sector and other strategically important issues," said Lobov, who unlike his U.S. counterparts is content to report to President Yeltsin once a week.

"The system in the United States is more developed than ours. They also have more personnel at their disposal."

A Tragedy

According to Lobov, the Security Council has 160 people employed on a permanent basis, while 300-350 experts are involved in contract work from time to time. Their job is to supply President Yeltsin with the necessary background information with which to conduct a broad-based security policy. Lobov has three deputies who are responsible for military, economic, and public security respectively. The Security Council normally meets once a month with one major issue on the agenda. In crisis situations — such as during the war in Chechnya — the council holds weekly meetings.

You are often described as a hawk. Is that correct?

"I am not going to try to justify the war in Chechnya. It is a tragedy for both the Chechen and the Russian peoples. But it is difficult to imagine the extent of the tragedy, if things had simply been allowed to develop without military intervention. At that point there was already a full-blown civil war in progress in Chechnya. Peaceful demonstrations were being fired upon. I believe that the tragedy should be dated from the spring of 1991, when Dudayev came to power rather than from 29 November of last year, when it was decided to send troops in."

Many people in the West think that the sudden adoption of the Russian military doctrine in November 1993 was a repayment to the military for their help to Yeltsin in October 1993. Is that correct?

"I assumed the post of secretary of the Security Council in September 1993 — in other words before the storming of the White House. I was given a month by the president to get the military doctrine ready for adoption. At that point it existed in a rough draft after having been worked on for a year, but it had not been adopted, because certain things had not been finally coordinated among the various ministries.

"I summoned the parties involved to a series of brainstorming sessions in order to get the last things in place,

and we succeeded. The meeting of the Security Council at the beginning of November was very short, because by that time the document had already been approved and signed. So it was not a concession to the military. The document had been a year in the making and lacked only the final touches when I became involved."

Security Service Organizational Changes Formalized

MM2009151195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Sep 95 p 3

[Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 937, signed by President Yeltsin in Moscow on 14 September: "On Amendments to Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 633 of 23 June 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. Paragraph 4 of Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 633 "On Priority Measures to Implement the Federal Law 'On Federal Security Service Organs in the Russian Federation'" of 23 June 1995 (as amended by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 756 of 24 July 1995) make read:

"4. The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation shall have eight deputy directors, including a first deputy director who is chief of the Antiterrorist Center, a first deputy director and deputy director who is chief of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation's Moscow City and Moscow Oblast Directorate, a 12-man collegium, and 1,520 staff at the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation administrative apparatus."

2. Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 756 "On Amendments to Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 633 of 23 June 1995" of 24 July 1995 shall be deemed to have lapsed.

3. This edict comes into force from the day it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 14 September 1995
No. 937

Directive Approves Krasnodar-Novorossiysk Pipeline

MM2109095295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 6

[Russian Federation Government Directive No. 1244 signed by Russian Federation Government Chairman V. Chernomyrdin in Moscow on 6 September]

[FBIS Translated Text] 1. The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy, with the participation of the "Rosneft" state enterprise (hereinafter, "Rosneft" enterprise) and the "Transneft" oil transport joint-stock company (here-

inafter, "Transneft" company) and in conjunction with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (hereinafter, the Consortium), is to take steps to implement in accordance with accords reached between the Russian Federation government, Republic of Kazakhstan government, and government of the Sultanate of Oman phase 1 of the Consortium plan, which envisages the construction of a pipeline from an area near the city of Tikhoretsk, Krasnodar Kray, to a terminal in the vicinity of the city of Novorossiysk with deep-water [vynosnyye] mooring facilities.

2. The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy in conjunction with the Russian Finance Ministry and "Rosneft" enterprise is to hold talks with the Consortium and agree before 15 September on a document in a form acceptable to international financial institutions guaranteeing the supply of at least nine million tons of crude oil per year through the Consortium's system of oil pipelines with payment at market rates.

The "Rosneft" enterprise is to hold talks with the Consortium and agree before 15 September on the terms of an agreement guaranteeing the transportation of the aforementioned amounts of oil.

3. The Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Russian Finance Ministry with the participation of the "Rosneft" enterprise are to hold talks with the Republic of Kazakhstan Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry and agree before 15 September 1995 on a document in a form acceptable to the Russian Federation and Republic of Kazakhstan whereby the republic of Kazakhstan government will guarantee the supply of at least 4.5 million tonnes of oil per year through the Consortium's system of pipelines with payment at the market rate in support of the guarantees mentioned in point 2 of this directive.

4. The "Transneft" company is to hold talks with the Consortium and those supplying the Consortium's system of pipelines and prepare before 15 September an agreement on connecting the Consortium's and "Transneft" company's systems to transfer up to 15 million tonnes of oil per year to the point where the Consortium's system of pipelines begins.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation government

Daily: Government Has 'Little Chance' With Draft Budget

MM2009082795 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 19 Sep 95 pp i-ii

[Article by Aleksandr Deykin: "Government Has Little Chance of Getting Draft '96 Budget Through State Duma"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The at first sight seemingly well-constructed draft federal budget for 1996 conceals a lot of tricks in its tables. In the income sphere you are struck by the retention of the former overall revenue structure and the slightly altered expenditure structure. The basis for next year's proposed economic and budget policy remains "tough."

The expected share of federal budget income in GDP comes to around 13.5 percent in 1995. The old figure in the budget, however, used to be 11.1 percent (175.2 trillion rubles [R]) — the entire difference of 2.4 percent of GDP will go into government "coffers." Expenditure's share of GDP should be 17.3 percent, thus the federal budget deficit will be equivalent to 3.7 percent of GDP. This is far less than our promises to the IMF and tangibly less even than the approximate 4 percent planned for the next "year of stabilization."

There could be two amendments to bring the figures into line with "reality" by the end of the year — first, the underfulfillment of the estimated plans for revenue [nedovypolneniye raschetnykh planov po dokhodam]; second, the underfulfillment of the expenditure plan. The actual fulfillment of both sides of the budget in the first half-year (see "Financial IZVESTIYA," 12 September) fully confirms both possibilities.

But even a fulfilled revenue plan will by no means be indisputable proof of financial prosperity. In the opinion of Mikhail Zadornov, chairman of the State Duma Budget Committee, this year the government expects higher inflation to automatically reduce the budget deficit. Incidentally, there will be drastic if selective cuts in spending.

The same plan, Mikhail Zadornov believes, is to be found, with some "creative reworking," underpinning the draft '96 budget. Its "inflation uplift" is supplemented by a number of overstated expenditure projections.

Indeed, revenue's predicted share of GDP next year has already been set at 15.2 percent on the basis of existing legislation, and at 15.8 percent provided that the additions and amendments to the tax laws proposed by the government are passed. These would, in particular, increase VAT to 21 percent and introduce a tax on bank deposits. These proposals, in Zadornov's opinion,

certainly would not meet with understanding from the body of deputies.

But taxes will nonetheless be collected in the nominal amounts required — as a result of the actual level of inflation exceeding the planned level. This is very easily done, since the main version of the budget makes provision for approximately 1-percent price growth a month on average, while the second version allows for average monthly rates of 2 percent. It would be more realistic, Zadornov believes, to work on the basis of anticipated average monthly inflation of 3-5 percent. Since the Finance Ministry has already carried out similar calculations, the government already knows about the possible revenue surplus, and about the degree of real severity with which the plan to finance ratified spending will be implemented.

At the same time, the chairman of the State Duma Budget Committee stresses, there are still calls for tax relief — particularly for the oil companies — and for subsidies that are not envisaged under the budget. The "toughness" of current budgetary policy is selective when it comes to various regions as well — that much is clear if only from the fact that a quarter of the arrears as of early August were accounted for by one autonomous okrug (we are talking about R5 trillion).

The policy of subjectivism in the actual distribution of funds by the president and the premier continues. Under such circumstances, Mikhail Zadornov believes, there is no point in counting on an upsurge in investment.

The head of the Duma Budget Committee believes that the expenditure line-items feature hardly any substantial changes, with the exception of a huge increase in spending on servicing the state debt, and a very considerable increase in spending on state administration and law-enforcement activity. But "budget-sector workers" and the interests of employees have been left outside the sphere of prosperity. Moreover, the proposed draft takes no account of the requirements of laws already passed or "in the pipeline" relating to improving the position of veterans and invalids, increasing the minimum wage, restoring savings taken from the population, and so forth.

There is an obvious need to substantially amend the budget draft law, without which it will have little chance of getting through the State Duma. The principle on which the federal budget is drawn up is also of paramount importance. We are talking, first, of preparing budget projections for at least three years in advance. Second, there would be normal controls over the actual expenditure of funds under the ratified budget. Third, the law on budget classification, which could make the budget more open and accessible to effective

control, would be called upon to play an important role. Finally, we need a law on the budgetary process

and the budget system, which would make the budget mechanism totally controllable.

Federal Budget Expenditure for 1996 (draft)

	Ratified Plan for 1995 (trillions of rubles)	Draft for 1996 (trillions of rubles)	Proportion of GDP (percentage)	
			1995	1996
			plan	draft
State Administration	4.5	7.8	0.29	0.37
International activity	21.0	28.0	1.33	1.33
National defense	50.9	79.0	3.22	3.76
Law-enforcement activity and the safeguarding of security	17.2	39.7	1.09	1.89
Fundamental research and the promotion of scientific and technical progress	6.5	11.1	0.41	0.53
Industry, power generation, and construction	31.2	43.2	1.98	2.06
Agriculture and fisheries	9.4	13.1	0.59	0.62
Protection of the environment and natural resources, hydrometeorology, cartography, and geodesy	1.5	2.1	0.09	0.10
Transportation, communications, and computers	0.6	1.0	0.03	0.05
Development of market infrastructure	0.01			
Prevention and elimination of the consequences of natural disasters and accidents	2.5	5.8	0.16	0.28
Education	9.5	15.2	0.60	0.72
Culture and art	1.6	2.3	0.10	0.11
The mass media	1.8	2.4	0.11	0.11
Health care and physical fitness	4.6	7.4	0.29	0.35
Social policy	4.5	11.9	0.28	0.57
Servicing of state debt	22.9	54.11	1.45	2.58
Replenishment of state stocks and reserves	10.2	10.0	0.65	0.48

	Ratified Plan for 1995 (trillions of rubles)	Draft for 1996 (trillions of rubles)	Proportion of GDP (percentage)	
Other expenditure	36.3	65.5	2.30	3.12
Expenditure of targeted budget funds	11.9	13.1	0.75	0.63
Total expenditure	248.3	414.4	15.72	19.73

Nuclear Issues

Commander Denies Increased Radiation at Barents Bases

LD2009211095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1912 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Vasilii Belousov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MURMANSK, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Northern fleet commander Admiral Oleg Yerofeyev denied foreign media reports about elevated levels of radiation at the nuclear submarine bases in the Barents Sea.

The statement followed reports carried by several Western radio stations which quoted him as allegedly saying that the radiation level in places where nuclear submarines are stationed in the Barents Sea has increased.

Yerofeyev stressed that he had not made any such statements to either foreign or Russian journalists.

Moreover, the actual level of radiation in the Barents and Kara seas is lower than that in the Baltic of Black seas, he said, referring to the results of research conducted by international expeditions in the northern seas last summer.

Federal Assembly

Communists Press Impeachment, Hope for Duma Support

MK2109093195 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Unattributed POSTFACTUM report: "The Communists Continue To Raise Signatures in Favor of Presidential Impeachment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] faction will submit to the Duma's first session deputies' signatures in support of a motion to start impeachment proceedings against the president. The Communists — the initiators of the signature-raising drive — intend to re-register the signature lists and not only to confirm the old signatures that were collected in the summer, but also to raise new ones. Deputy Duma Chairman Gennadiy Seleznev be-

lieves new signatures can be raised now that the president "has ignored the Duma emergency session and vetoed the Bosnia bill," in connection with which "the deputies have come by additional arguments" in favor of starting the impeachment process. As for other deputies' support for the Communists' initiative, Seleznev noted that "Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who in the summer announced the withdrawal of his faction's signatures owing to Yeltsin's illness, has never submitted a written statement about it," and therefore the deputy speaker expressed the hope that the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia will also favor impeachment. Gennadiy Seleznev observed, however, that "the impeachment process will be very difficult to pursue." At the same time, he thinks it quite realistic for "requisite amendments to the Constitution simplifying this process" to be made at the fall session.

Regional Affairs

Passenger Bus Hijacked in Dagestan; 18 Held Hostage

AU2109081195 Paris AFP in English
0754 GMT 21 Sep 95

[Report by Sebastian Smith]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, Sept 21 (AFP) — Two men hijacked a bus, took 18 people hostage and demanded at least \$1.5 million and a helicopter in the Russian Caucasus republic of Dagestan, officials said Thursday [21 September].

The hostage-takers, who were armed with a pistol and a submachine gun, had not yet threatened the lives of any of their hostages, a Federal Security Service (FSB) spokesman in Moscow told AFP.

But they were threatening to raise the ransom to two million dollars if their demands for the money and helicopter were not met by the evening, the spokesman said. [passage omitted]

The gunmen, who appeared to be led by a Chechen called Roman, seized the long-distance bus at the terminal in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala late Wednesday, police said. [passage omitted]

Negotiations were held all night and the hostage-takers said they needed the 1.5 million dollars to help drug-addicted friends get treatment, police were quoted as saying. No political demands had been made, the FSB official said.

It was not known where the gunmen wanted to flee in the helicopter.

The gunmen also proposed releasing two women and the children in exchange for two pistols, police said. One woman was released late Wednesday. [passage omitted]

A bag found at the Makhachkala bus terminal, which had earlier been believed to be carrying a bomb, was found to hold a grenade, a pistol, a knife and two masks, police said. It was earlier reported the gunmen had a Kalashnikov assault rifle, but the FSB official denied this.

Dagestan's Prime Minister Abdurazak Mirzabekov was taking part in the negotiations. [passage omitted]

Commandos Storm Bus, Release Hostages

AU2109104595 Paris AFP in English
1024 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Moscow, Sept 21 (AFP) — Russian commandos stormed a hijacked bus in the Russian Caucasus republic of Dagestan and freed all 18 hostages Thursday [21 September], the Federal Security Service (FSB) said.

Two gunmen were arrested, the FSB spokesman told AFP.

There were minor injuries among the hostages, INTER-FAX news agency said, although the FSB spokesman said there had been no victims.

The assault was carried out at 1:00 p.m. (0900 GMT) by troops from the Moscow-based anti-terrorist centre, the spokesman said. [passage omitted]

Further on Arrest, Hostage Release

LD2109124595 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
1100 GMT 21 Sep 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The two terrorists who hijacked a bus at the bus station in Makhachkala on Wednesday evening and held its passengers for 18 hours have been apprehended. This was announced at 1410 hours Moscow time by the public relations center of the Federal Security Service.

The operation to free the hostages was carried out jointly by special subunits of the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service.

[Unidentified correspondent] The dramatic situation in Makhachkala caused by the hijack of a regular bus to Mineralnyye Vody has finally been defused. It was especially tense in the afternoon when a helicopter landed near the bus station, because the provision of a helicopter was one of the demands made by the bandits.

At 1245 hours Colonel (Gadzhi Magomedov), head of the city department of internal affairs, delivered \$1.5 million to the bandits, as had been previously agreed. In exchange the terrorists released three women and two children. After that the Alpha assault team took charge. The storming took literally a few seconds.

Who are these terrorists? The law enforcement bodies will give the answer. [video shows hostages releasing women, helicopter arriving, troops storming bus and manhandling hijackers]

Security Tightened Due to Crisis

LD2109085195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0832 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian police tightened security in Northern Caucasus, and in Chechnya in particular, after terrorists seized hostages in the Dagestani capital of Makhachkala.

"The Interior bodies adopted measures to avert terrorist actions similar to the one in Makhachkala in other regions of the North Caucasus", spokesman of the Interior Ministry Vladimir Vorozhtsov told TASS Thursday.

He added that deputy Interior Minister Vladimir Kolesnikov had ordered additional security measures in Chechnya which borders on Dagestan "as it is not yet clear which place the incident in Makhachkala occupies in the chain of the recent terrorist acts".

On Wednesday [20 September] an assassination attempt was staged on presidential envoy in Chechnya Oleg Lobov, but he was not harmed when an explosive device went off close to his car. Later Wednesday an oil tank was exploded at the Groznyy oil processing plant.

A Russian commando told TASS that it was quite possible that the Makhachkala terror was only a part of a large-scale terrorist operation.

The terrorists are holding 18 hostages at the bus terminal in Makhachkala and demand 1.5 million US dollars, two pistols and a helicopter.

Federal Troops Propose Revised Disarmament Process

MM2009163695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Sep 95 pp 1-2

[Statement by Command of Federal Troops United Grouping in Chechen Republic, dated 19 September: "Guns and Machine Guns Will Fall Silent Forever Only If They Are Turned Into Scrap Metal. The Russian Side Proposes Embarking on the Last Act of the Chechen War Without Delay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To A.A. Maskhadov, cochairman of the Special Oversight Commission

Mr. S. Mesares, military observer for the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]

In analyzing the progress in fulfilling the Agreement on the bloc of military questions, the Federal Troop Command draws the following conclusions:

1. Point "A" of the Agreement is not being fulfilled on the part of Dudayev's representatives.

Despite the Dudayev side's repeated statements to the effect that it is in full control of the actions of its field commanders and is able to influence the disarmament process, the federal troops are continuing to be shot at every day. Thus, during the period from 1 through 18 September the federal troops were subjected to fire from various kinds of weapons 408 times. As a result, 26 servicemen died, and 153 were injured.

Some 40 percent of the shooting comes from the direction of the population centers of Samashki, Orekhovo, Bamut, and Staryy Achkhoy, and 45 percent of the shooting is at the city of Grozny (commandant's offices, posts, [blokposty], checkpoints, and places where troops are stationed temporarily).

2. Dudayev's side is not fulfilling points in the Agreement, namely:

a) data has not been provided on the effective combat and numerical strength of the illegal armed formations and militia or their armament, according to appendix 1-2 (the mechanism for implementing the Agreement);

b) the Russian side has not been given data on the locations of armed illegal formations.

3. A schedule for the disarmament of illegal armed formations has been submitted, but analysis of it shows that disarmament is to apply primarily to those regions that are under the control of the federal troops and least of all to those regions which are under the control of illegal armed formations — which requires revision.

4. In violation of the Agreement, Dudayev's side is carrying out work to create detachments to guard population centers without control on the part of the Special Oversight Commission and the OSCE mission. Since 24 August such detachments have been created unilaterally in the population centers of Sernovodsk, Nizhniy Gerzel, Gerzel-Aul, Koshkeldy, Roshni-Chu, Gekhi-Chu, Alkhan-Kala, Tashkaly, Kadi-Yurt, Novogroznskiy, Assinovskaya, Tangi, Kulary, Shalazhi, Stepnoye, Azamat-Yurt, and others. Thus, they are trying to establish Dudayev's regime by force of arms by their actions.

Commandants are being appointed in population centers from among Dudayev's supporters. Thus, in Shalinskiy Rayon Aslambek Abdulkhadzhiyev has been appointed commandant of the city of Shali. Here, too, is Abu Movsayev, former section chief of Ichkeria's State Security Department. They participated in the terrorist act in Budennovsk. Although, in accordance with the agreement, Dudayev's side pledged to assist the Russian side in seeking and detaining Shamil Basayev's group. Thus, not only has Dudayev's side not taken measures to detain it, but with its help gang members of Basayev's group are being appointed to various posts in local organs of power.

For the purpose of extending their influence in the flat part of the country, which is controlled by federal troops, gunmen have arrived in population centers in the guise of militiamen allegedly to conduct disarmament. They have no intention of laying down their arms and are carrying out agitation work aimed at supporting Dudayev's regime. In this connection the crime situation in these regions has worsened, cases of hijacking of large trucks have become more frequent, and considerable growth in the numbers of robberies and thefts has been noted.

Simultaneously with the commencement of work by the Special Oversight Commission the local population in Nadterechnyy, Shelkovskiy, and Naurskiy Rayons has considerably stepped up rallying activity directed against the federal troops and federal organs of executive power in the provinces.

5. According to Point "B" of the Agreement on the bloc of military questions, Dudayev's side is not fulfilling the schedule for the disarmament of illegal armed formations in keeping with certain stages. At the first stage the disarmament of illegal armed formations is to take place under the command of the field commanders. But illegal armed formations are still occupying the regions where they are based, carrying out changes of combat position, replenishing stocks with military hardware, and creating weapon and ammunition storage bases. Not a single detachment has been fully disbanded.

In accordance with the disarmament plan, Dudayev's side was to have submitted heavy armament to members of the Special Oversight Commission before 10 September, but this was not fulfilled. Moreover, movements of armored hardware of the illegal armed formations are being noted on a daily basis in the rayon population centers of Bamut, Chechen-Aul, Argun, Ishkhoy-Yurt, Staryy Achkhoy, Orekhovo, Dargo, Yalkhoy-Mokhk, Morzoy-Mokhk, Guni, and others.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE DEMANDS:

1. In accordance with the Agreement the first stage of the disarmament of the illegal armed formations must be carried out by Dudayev's side by 27 September. The field commanders and front commanders must lay down their arms in the places determined by the Russian side with the compilation of lists and the counting of numbers.

On 28 September representatives from the Russian side with the direct monitoring of the Special Oversight Commission and the OSCE mission will receive the surrendered weapons.

From 30 September the implementation of the second stage of the disarmament of the militia detachments will take place in accordance with a similar procedure.

The quantity of surrendered weapons for the illegal armed formations should be within the following limits:

- a) for detachments and subunits under the leadership of field commanders and front commanders 25,000-30,000 units;
- b) for militia detachments 10,000-15,000 units.

The third stage. The buying back of weapons from the population will be carried out in individual cases after the disarmament of the illegal armed formations and militia detachments.

2. The surrender of heavy equipment and arms and their acceptance by the Russian side must be implemented 20 September.

The points where heavy equipment and arms are concentrated are:

- a) Shalinskiy training center.
 - b) Achkhoy-Martan — the 24th checkpoint.
 - c) The Eastern grouping — the region of the Chapayevo population center.
3. By 25 October in the population centers where so-called self-defense detachments have been illegally created they must be disarmed and disbanded and the commandants must be recalled from the population centers

where they were unilaterally appointed in violation of the Agreement.

The Russian side warns that in population centers where Chechen Republic Internal Affairs Ministry internal affairs organs have been created detachments for guarding the population centers will not be created. In population centers where such detachments are selected and approved in accordance with the Agreement in the future when organs of law and order are created they will also be disbanded.

In cases of the violation of the Agreement for the bloc of military issues and the nonfulfillment of the schedule for disarmament within the set deadline, the Russian side retains the right unilaterally, using force, to disarm the illegal armed formations and militia detachments.

The withdrawal of troops from the territory of the Chechen Republic will be completed in accordance with the Agreement after the complete disarmament of the illegal armed formations and militia detachments.

THE RUSSIAN SIDE PROPOSES:

To revise the schedule for the disarmament of illegal armed formations rayon by rayon. The disarmament of illegal armed formations is to be undertaken on the territory controlled by Dudayev's side directly under the observation of members of the Special Oversight Commission from the Dudayev delegation's side and on the territory controlled by the federal troops by members of the Special Oversight Commission on the Russian side.

[signed] Command of the United Grouping of Federal Troops in the Chechen Republic, 19 September 1995.

Reportage on Chechen Terrorism, Attack on Oleg Lobov

Another Oil Storage Tank Blown Up

LD2109115395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1034 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYY, Sept 21 (INTERFAX) — One of the oil storages near Karpinskiy Hill in Grozny was blown up on Thursday morning. A spokesman for the Chechen Interior Ministry told INTERFAX that the storage was badly damaged.

This is the second act of terrorism on oil storages in the last 48 hours: earlier on Wednesday unidentified persons blasted another oil storage.

'Terrorist Act' Against Lobov Reported

LD2009204995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1851 GMT 20 Sep 95

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A bridge was blasted near Grozny at 8:45 Wednesday when Secretary of Russia's Security Council, the president's special envoy in Chechnya Oleg Lobov; Prime Minister of Chechnya's National Revival Government Salambek Khadzhiev and Chairman of the National Accord Committee Umar Avturkhanov were moving on it on cars.

Oleg Lobov informed the Security Council that no one among those accompanying him had been seriously injured.

The bridge, located several kilometers from Severnyy airport, was almost completely ruined.

Witnesses said that the incident had been caused by a mine planted on the bridge.

This version has been confirmed by the Security Council office.

Representatives of a number of power bodies in Moscow and Grozny do not doubt that a terrorist act had been committed against Lobov.

Competent military sources told INTERFAX that two remote control panels and two explosive devices had been found near the bridge.

The security of the participants in the talks in Grozny "must be reconsidered following the terrorist act against Oleg Lobov," a high-ranking representative of a Russian power body told INTERFAX.

Commenting on the incident, some of Russia's statesmen, well-acquainted with Lobov, said that "Lobov has always disregarded security measures." They unanimously described him as a "courageous, sober-minded and cold-blooded person."

The terrorist act against Lobov is most probably connected with the federal side's tough statements during the talks with Dudayev's delegates," a representative of the Federal Security Service told INTERFAX. In his opinion, the explosion is an attempt to intimidate and demonstrate force."

Observers note that the incident had coincided with the Russian and Chechen sides' sharp statements on prospects for political settlement of the conflict. Earlier, the joint federal command had warned the Chechens that the Russian soldiers would not leave Chechnya before

the Dudayev supporters' complete disarmament. The Dudayev side, in its turn, accused Moscow of foiling the peace talks.

Some representatives of the Chechen side think that combat operations may be resumed as the meeting of the Special Observer Commission (SOC) was foiled for a second time.

One of the most radical Dudayev supporters said that the second failure of the SOC meeting, given the federal command's ultimatum of September 19, may actually mean the declaration of war.

The heavy weapons prepared by the Chechen side for surrender to the SOC, were moved back to the positions, chief of the Dudayev forces' headquarters Aslan Maskhadov told INTERFAX Wednesday.

Lobov Comments on Bombing

LD2009155095 Moscow NTV in Russian
1500 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] Only toward the end of the day was Oleg Lobov, the Russian president's representative in Chechnya, able to give a brief interview to journalists and comment on what has happened.

[Begin Lobov recording] This is a most regrettable incident, and wholly innocent people suffered, but, fortunately, no one was killed. All in all, it was an act of terrorism, aimed, I think, at wrecking the negotiations and wrecking the peace process. [end recording]

Lobov Sees Attack as 'Weakness'

LD2109121895 Moscow NTV in Russian
2000 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Segodnya v Polnoch" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] A car carrying Oleg Lobov, the president's representative in Chechnya, was attacked yesterday. The presumed target of the attack gave a political interpretation of what happened: [video shows Oleg Lobov speaking to camera]

[Begin Lobov recording] I think that this is, in fact, weakness, a demonstration of weakness on the part of the confrontational side, the side which does not support a peaceful resolution. I think that it is the work of immoderate extremists who do not understand that there is no return to widescale military actions. There might be some individual, local cases — and force has to be used in individual cases — but this does not depend on and is not connected with today's event. [end recording]

Yeltsin Condemns Attack

LD2009164595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1631 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin condemned Wednesday's [20 September] terrorist attack against his personal envoy in Chechnya Oleg Lobov.

According to Yeltsin's press service "the President expressed his deep concern over the act, organisers of which definitely aspired to aggravate the situation in the Chechen Republic, to wreck the implementation of the Agreement on a package of military issues and efforts to achieve the political accord in the republic."

SOC Meets; Maskhadov Regrets Attack

LD2109102295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1001 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Sep 21 (ITAR-TASS) — "The Chechen side regrets the Wednesday incident, linked with the attempt on the life of Oleg Lobov, the Russian President's Plenipotentiary Representative in the Chechen Republic and Secretary of the Russian Security Council," Chief of Staff of Dudayev's armed units Aslan Maskhadov told a regular meeting of the Special Observers Commission [SOC], which opened here today. He also expressed the Chechen side's readiness to continue the dialogue on the military package of problems. Regret in connection with the attempt on Lobov's life was also expressed by representatives of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission, attending the meeting.

Journalists were told here by Ivan Isyutin, representative of the press centre of the Command of the Joint Group of Federal Troops in Chechnya, that the talks were proceeding in a businesslike and calm atmosphere. The attention of its participants is focused on the recent statement by the Command of the Joint Group of Federal Troops, which calls attention to the unsatisfactory implementation of the agreement on the disarmament of unlawful armed units and the surrender of weapons in Chechnya.

Isyutin said that Maskhadov resented the tone of the statement, which calls in question the Chechen side's readiness to take part in the disarmament process. According to the representative of the press centre, Maskhadov handed a reply to this statement to Lieutenant-General Anatoliy Romanov, Commander of the Joint Group of Federal Troops in Chechnya. A break was made in the work of the Commission at

the request of Romanov in order to study the Chechen document.

Chechens Suggest Joint Investigation

LD2009190195 Moscow INFORMATSIONNOYE
AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian
1822 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Chechen delegation at the talks in Grozny categorically and unambiguously condemns the act of terrorism against Oleg Lobov, plenipotentiary representative of the Russian president in Chechnya, Movladi Udugov, press minister in the Dzhokhar Dudayev government, told Moscow Echo radio station.

He said that "the Chechen side considers this action to have been planned and carried out by those forces in Moscow and Grozny that want to wreck the peace process in the Chechen Republic."

"Even indirect attempts to blame the Chechen side for the terrorist act are the most crude and totally unfounded insinuation," Udugov considers.

"Nevertheless, on 20 September the Chechen delegation was practically blockaded in Grozny, deprived of its escort, and was forced to remain in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission compound for several hours," Udugov said.

The Chechen side insists on the peace process and on fulfilling the package of military accords, and proposes a joint investigation of the event, Udugov declared.

Yeltsin Aide on Negotiations, Terrorism

LD2109141295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1338 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Tamara Ivanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Keeping negotiations in Chechnya on the track is a key task now, for "cessation of dialogue may badly exacerbate the situation", said Russian national security presidential aide Yuriy Baturin.

He said in an interview with ITAR-TASS today that the Wednesday bid to assassinate presidential envoy to Chechnya Oleg Lobov was an obvious attempt to precipitate destabilisation in Chechnya.

In his forecast of future developments in Chechnya, Baturin said "such actions, however sadly it is, will take place in the future, (but) they are not likely to lead to a new flare of the war in Chechnya".

Terrorist acts maintain the situation in Chechnya in "a smouldering condition", he said.

A delegation including Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, Arkadiy Volskiy and Doku Zavgayev came to Grozny today to continue negotiations with Dudayev's representatives.

Media reports from Grozny stress that Zavgayev, who is the former chairman of Chechnya's Supreme Soviet disbanded by Dudayev in 1991, for the first time attends the Grozny peace talks.

Volskiy told reporters that the delegation was concerned with serial terrorist acts which were staged in Chechnya on Wednesday and with unceasing rebel attacks on federal troops.

He said the delegation had no specific instructions of Moscow, and was to offer moves for settlement of the Chechnya crisis in progress of the visit.

The delegation is expected to meet the joint Russian-Chechen commission overseeing the July 30 military accord later on Thursday.

Ilyukhin: Attack Aimed at Peace Talks

LD2009142895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The terrorist act staged against Secretary of the Russian Security Council and Presidential Representative in Chechnya Oleg Lobov this morning in Grozny aims to break peace talks in Chechnya, Chairman of the Duma's Security Committee Viktor Ilyukhin told INTERFAX.

In his opinion, both Moscow and Chechnya have forces who need the war, which is currently passive.

The Committee Chairman fears the terrorist act may result in Chechen settlement by force. Much depends on restraint of the Russian side, he said.

The negotiations held in Chechnya by Arkadiy Volskiy (deputy head of the Russian delegation to Grozny talks — IF) were unsatisfactory. "The negotiations were not profound. The sides did not agree on common notions and had no mechanism to implement the talks' results. It is not excluded Chechnya is returning to a large war after unsuccessful talks," said Ilyukhin.

Duma Deputy on Talks, Lobov Attack

LD2009143295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1400 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — A senior member of the Russian parliament suggested on Wednesday [20 September] that President Boris Yeltsin's personal envoy to Chechnya meet Chechen separatist leader Dzhokhar Dudayev "to make the peace negotiations in Chechnya irreversible."

Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the Defense Committee of the State Duma, the lower house of parliament, made the suggestion as he commented in an interview with INTERFAX on what Russian authorities have qualified as an attempt on the life of the envoy, Russian Security Council chief Oleg Lobov.

Yushenkov said the bomb that on Wednesday blew up a bridge that lay on the way of a motorcade carrying Lobov, head of the region's Moscow-appointed government Salambek Khadzhiyev, and leader of the pro-Russian National Accord Council Umar Avturkhanov, "was a provocation that may have been staged not by some of Dudayev's fighters but by those Russian forces which are interested in wrecking the peace negotiations."

The talks may still run up against "quite a few obstacles, including terrorist acts both on the territory of Chechnya and outside it," Yushenkov said.

"One shouldn't yield to one's first emotional reaction to the terrorist act but should patiently move along the path of further settlement of the Chechen conflict by peaceful means," Yushenkov said.

Russian Muslims Condemn 'Terrorism'

LD2009190895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1615 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Dmitriy Zlodorev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian Union of Moslems sharply denounced the act of terrorism in Grozny on Wednesday morning when a big car bomb exploded as President Boris Yeltsin's envoy Oleg Lobov in Chechnya was passing nearby.

"Such acts can undermine the talks and cause further bloodshed," secretary general of the Union Mukaddas Bibarsov told a news conference.

"The Moslems receive representation in Russia's high ruling bodies," said Mahmud Esambayev, a famous cultural personality and Duma candidate from the Russian Moslem Union.

"I always try to sow good. He who seeds evil and sheds the blood of the innocent, will drown in the tears someday," Esambayev said.

He told TASS that during the 35 years of his being a member of the Supreme Soviet of the former USSR, he had done many good things. Thus, kindergartens, and theatres had been built at his initiative; many people had received flats.

"Now I am trying to put an end to discord among people so that a nation do not look down at another nation," he said.

The Russian Union of Moslems, created last May, supports the idea of restoring social justice and calls for the strict observation of the principle of the peoples' equality and the protection of the rights of national minorities.

The Union is hoping that not only Moslems, but also those who sympathize with Islam, will support it in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

NTV Speculates on Aim of Attack

LD2009194395 Moscow NTV in Russian
1800 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The competent bodies that have started investigating the terrorist act [bomb blast in Chechnya] suggest that no hasty conclusions should be drawn on who the target was and what the unknown terrorists wanted to achieve. One way or another, though, many people could find the person of Lobov inimicable. Just last Monday [18 September] Lobov announced that a government resolution on the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from the republic had already been drawn up and submitted to be coordinated at the Russian Defense Ministry, Internal Affairs Ministry, and Finance Ministry. This document, Lobov believed, could be signed by the prime minister in the next few days. This report could probably have come as bad news to those who are in favor of continuing the war in Chechnya.

Reportage on Chechen Negotiations, Military Situation

Heavy Weapons 'Moved Back to Positions'

LD2009143395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Chechen heavy weapons prepared for surrender to the Special Observer Commission were moved back to positions, chief of the Dudayev forces' headquarters and co-chairman of the Special Observer Commission Aslan Maskhadov told INTERFAX.

He said he had to issue such an order after "the Russian military presented an ultimatum on the unilateral disarmament of Dudayev formations," and after "the Commission meeting scheduled for Wednesday was foiled again."

"The Russian side is imposing force and war on us, demanding that we surrender 50,000 weapons which we simply don't have," he said.

He also alleged that the Russian troops continued shelling attacks and raids. On Tuesday, said Maskhadov, federal troops shelled the village of Samashki killing three people and ruining several houses.

He stated that he had informed the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission that the Russian side had violated the military agreements.

He also announced that he would not meet with the Russian president's envoy Oleg Lobov "in his office and on the conditions proposed by the Russian side." He noted at the same time that he would meet with Lobov in the OSCE mission and that he insisted on a meeting with Commander of the Joint Federal Grouping and Co-Chairman of the Special Observer Commission General Anatoliy Romanov, who, to quote Maskhadov, "has not turned up at Commission meetings for a whole week and does not wish to maintain any contacts."

In answer to the question about possible resumption of large-scale combat operations by the federal troops, Maskhadov said: "I would not be surprised if Russia delivered a nuclear strike on Chechnya."

He said that from the outset he had insisted on the disarmament of illegal armed units led by Bislan Gantemirov and Ruslan Labazanov, who had actually been made Chechnya's current leaders.

In his opinion, these units constitute a third force which is "staging provocations".

"I have insisted from the start that an investigation body be attached to the Special Observer Commission to investigate such incidents," said Maskhadov.

Romanov: Troops on 'Combat Alert'

LD2009175695 Moscow NTV in Russian
1500 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the joint military group of Defense Ministry and Internal Affairs Ministry forces in Chechnya, held a news conference in Grozny today. He asserted that both acts [attempted assassination of Oleg Lobov and blast at Grozny oil refinery] were aimed at wrecking the negotiating process, and were perhaps Dudayev's supporters' response to yesterday's statement by the federal authorities to the effect that the disarmament of the fighters must be completed by 30 September. Everything that has been done by Dudayev's supporters until now, Romanov believes, can be described

as mere show. In fact, the illegal armed bands are stepping up their activity. In many settlements, so-called self-defense detachments are being created, which answer to Dudayev alone.

The latest round of negotiations did not take place today and the members of the Chechen delegation, headed by Aslan Maskhadov, who arrived for the talks, left the building where the negotiations are held threatening to resume hostilities, Romanov reported. According to some reports, Aslan Maskhadov today issued the order to put his formations on combat alert.

No one in Chechnya today will take it upon themselves to predict how events may develop, but it is wholly probable that both today's acts of terrorism could usher in new armed clashes.

Military Accord Dialogue To Continue

LD2109142395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1202 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia, Chechnya have reiterated their intention at a regular session of the observer commission today to continue a dialogue on a military block of issues of Chechen settlement. This is the main result of today's talks held at the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission, said head of the OSCE mission in Grozny Sándor Szeresi [Mesares]. He pointed out that participants in the talks, including co-chairmen of the Observer commission Anatoliy Romanov and Aslan Maskhadov, had come out in favour of continuing efforts to find a mechanism for the realization of an agreement on peace settlement in Chechnya.

The OSCE official said that during the meeting the sides again raised the problem of specifying the exact number of people forcibly held captive. The sides agreed that this problem should be resolved as soon as possible, Szeresi said. He pointed out that the sides had discussed a terrorist act committed on Wednesday against Russia's plenipotentiary representative in Chechnya, secretary of Russia's Security Council Oleg Lobov. The sides declared that such acts were inadmissible and suggested taking measures to rule out such acts in future.

"The Chechen side regrets Wednesday's incident connected with an attempt on Lobov's life," said chief of staff of Dudayev's armed formations Aslan Maskhadov. He expressed readiness to continue a dialogue with the Russian side on a military accord.

A spokesman for the command of joint federal troops in Chechnya, Ivan Isyutin, said that the talks continued in a

businesslike and calm atmosphere. Participants focused attention on a recent statement made by the command of joint federal troops indicating that agreements on the disarmament of illegal armed formations and surrender of weapons in Chechnya were not being realised in a sufficient degree.

The observer commission intends to hold its next session on Sunday.

Chechens See Elements of 'Emergency'

LD2109115295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1034 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Sep 21 (INTERFAX) — The Chief of Staff of the Chechen Interior Ministry Akhmed Dakayev told INTERFAX on Thursday that it is necessary to introduce "elements of state of emergency" in the republic.

A bridge was blown up in the Chechen capital on Wednesday morning as a government convoy with Russian president's envoy in Chechnya Oleg Lobov was crossing it.

This act of terrorism, said Dakayev, "is a sign of sharp aggravation in the crime situation in the republic, which has deteriorated in the past few months."

Dakayev linked the increase in the number of crimes in Chechnya, which were registered in August and September, with talks on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The intensification of negotiations, he said, "has helped the legalization of many militants and other criminal elements."

Out of 157 attacks in the republic over the first eight months of this year, Dakayev said, 127 occurred during negotiations between the federal authorities and Dudayev supporters.

According to Dakayev, the republic's Interior Ministry "asked a month ago that the territorial department (of the federal authorities in Chechnya — IF), the republic's government and the command of federal troops introduce elements of state of emergency in Chechnya. No positive answer came, however."

Dakayev said that looting has become more frequent. Victims of looting include organizations and persons who are engaged in restoration work in Chechnya.

'Total Resistance' to Russians Vowed

LD2109113695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1034 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, Sept 21 (INTERFAX) — If the Russian side resumes combat operations,

"the Chechen side will urge the population of Chechnya to offer the Russian occupation troops total resistance," Dzhokhar Dudayev's spokesman Movladi Udugov told INTERFAX in Grozny Thursday.

He also said that the Chechen representatives to the talks in Grozny Aslan Maskhadov and Khoj-Ahmed Yarikhanov had informed the OSCE mission in Chechnya of these plans.

Udugov noted that "concurrently, the Chechen side and personally General Maskhadov have reaffirmed their readiness to implement all provisions of the military agreement."

He also announced that the Chechen side had urged Moscow "to stop presenting ultimatums, dropping bombs and carrying out combat operations in Chechnya, and implement all points of the military agreement."

The Special Observer Commission "might guarantee the implementation of the military agreement if it worked in earnest and did not remain a formal body," said Udugov. "The work of the Special Observer Commission is being hindered by Russian representatives," he said.

Security Council Discusses Chechnya

LD2009201895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1807 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — The Special Interregional Commission under the Russian Security Council discussed the progress of settlement in Chechnya and particularly that of peace talks Wednesday [20 September]. Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai presided over the meeting.

The commission described as unacceptable "Chechnya's dual status model" used at the talks, because Chechnya is legally a part of Russia and will become an equal member of the federation, it said.

The commission pointed out the importance of the generalization of federal bodies' experience gained in Chechnya to prevent regional conflicts and crises endangering Russia's national security.

The commission also considered the guidelines of state regional policy and the implementation of government decisions on support of the Cossacks.

Military Seen Obstructing Withdrawal

MK2009120895 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
20 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk: "In Chechnya, a 'Cold Spell' Has Set In"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sluggish course of the Russian-Chechen negotiations in Grozny was suddenly interrupted this week: The joint command of federal forces delivered a salvo of statements/ultimatums against the enemy. In an address to residents of the Chechen capital, they stressed the "sharp aggravation of the situation in Grozny." The Chechen side at the negotiations was presented with a statement that accuses it of "failing to implement the agreement on the military block of questions" and condemns "instances of appointing criminals on the Russia-wide wanted list as leaders in a number of the republic's populated areas." Finally, the army command has officially told the OSCE observer group in Chechnya that if the Chechen side does not fulfill the schedule for the surrender of weapons and combat hardware, the federal troops will conduct disarmament "on a unilateral basis." Furthermore, as though in passing, a session of the Special Observer Commission on the implementation of the military agreement on Chechnya, scheduled for yesterday, was canceled. It was canceled because Lieutenant General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the joint federal force contingent in Chechnya and cochairman of the observer commission, failed to show up, as did Major General Pavel Maslov, first deputy commander of the joint forces, who usually stands in for him. Both of them, according to their subordinates, could not arrive in Grozny from Mozdok owing to "non-flying weather."

It is noteworthy that the aggravation at the negotiations cannot in any way be linked to the general situation in the conflict zone. As the federal command press center itself reported yesterday, in the past 24 hours not a single army serviceman has been killed in Chechnya — which, to put it mildly, is not very characteristic. True, the military tries to attribute the decline in the number of armed attacks on federal troop positions to "the cold spell that has set in in the majority of Chechnya districts at night." Even so, the fact remains: There has been less shooting in the conflict zone. Why then should the command come out with a tough ultimatum over the fact that "in the past five days, three servicemen have been killed in Grozny," if earlier even greater losses within just one day were not particularly taken into account?

Any ultimatum is issued either for it to be fulfilled or with a totally opposite end in view. Proceeding from this premise, the demands made also vary: They are either feasible or infeasible. It is not hard to figure out

to which category the 19 September demands for the Chechnya side to surrender all heavy weapons before 20 September belong. Commenting on the demand for "illegal armed formations to turn over 25,000-30,000 weapons" (plus another 10,000-15,000 by self-defense detachments), Aslan Maskhadov, who represents the Chechen side at the negotiations, had to joke grimly that with such an amount of arms he "would have reached the English Channel."

A key to understanding all these oddities is a single phrase from the statement by the federal command to Shandor Messarosh [name as transliterated], head of the OSCE observer group in Chechnya: "The withdrawal of federal troops from Chechnya will be completed only after full disarmament of Chechen armed formations." Meanwhile, Oleg Lobov, Russian presidential representative in Chechnya, said the day before yesterday that a government decree on the pullout of Russian troops from the republic has already been prepared and sent for coordination to the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, the Internal Affairs Ministry, and the Finance Ministry. This document, in Lobov's opinion, "could be signed by the prime minister in the next few days." Therefore, time is running out for those who need this war....

Apropos [word printed in English], it was hardly accidental that Colonel General Anatoliy Kvashnin, North Caucasus Military District commander, was present at yesterday's meeting in Sochi between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev which "discussed in detail the situation in the Chechen Republic."

OMON Units Sent From Far East

LD2109115195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1137 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Dmitriy Kashirin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — A total of 52 OMON [special purpose militia detachment] servicemen from the Maritime region have been dispatched today to the area of the Chechen conflict. The press service of the regional Interior department told ITAR-TASS that the Maritime OMON troops had been thoroughly trained before going to the North Caucasian region. Some of these servicemen have the necessary expertise of operating under combat conditions. It is not immediately clear in what Chechen area the joint OMON unit will be deployed. Over hundred of militiamen have been sent to the area of conflict from the Maritime region by now.

Another group of 50 OMON servicemen was airlifted to Chechnya from Komsomolsk-on-Amur today to replace

their fellow-servicemen from Khabarovsk. The majority of those sent to Chechnya for 45 days have already been there in May. All of them have undergone special training taking into account tasks they were instructed to fulfill in Chechnya.

Romanov Interviewed on Chechnya

MK2009114595 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Ilya Bulavinov on interview with Lieutenant General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the Internal Affairs Ministry's Interior Troops and commander of the Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya: "Interior Troops Request Assistance From Private Capital;" in Moscow between 14 and 18 September — followed by commentary by KOMMERSANT-DAILY Political Department]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Thursday [14 September], Lieutenant General Anatoliy Romanov, commander of the Internal Affairs Ministry's Interior Troops and commander of the Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya, returned from Chechnya to Moscow for just a few days to hold consultations on further steps in the Chechen settlement and to hold a meeting of the Interior Troops' Military Council. Yesterday he was already back in Grozny, but before that he found time to meet with a number of journalists, among whom was KOMMERSANT-DAILY special correspondent Ilya Bulavinov.

Chechnya: The Irreconcilable Will Always Be Irreconcilable

We are in a very complex situation. To start a war is easy; it is ending it that is difficult. Many people are criticizing us, but quelling this hotbed is like putting out a taiga fire. This costs us immense efforts. There are many dissenters — not among servicemen, but among the locals. This is, above all, the criminal element that backed Dudayev and now sees that things are evolving peacefully and that the fighting will be ended.

My subordinates have analyzed the rallies occurring in Chechnya — how regular they are, the number of participants, the areas where they are held most often. What conclusions did they draw? The number of participants in rayon centers does not exceed 200 people. The minimum is 30-40 people. The maximum number of rally participants in Grozny does not exceed 3,500-4,000 people. These figures indicate the number of Dudayev's supporters. If we look at who takes part in them, we'll see the same people. First they hold rallies in Shali, then in Achkhoy-Martan. They keep shuttling like that, creating the impression of rallies. The troops

have not been ordered to stop the rallies. This is not our function anyway. There are local authorities, agencies of the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry. It is they who should regulate this process.

We analyzed the situation in the illegal armed formations. Most field commanders fought for the idea of independence. Now they are switching to a peaceful way of life. These are, first of all, Maskhadov's supporters. There are also the irreconcilables. These are the criminal element among the fighters. They will always be irreconcilable. They will have to be dealt with for a long time to come, and it will be very difficult to disarm them. They will be sitting out in the mountains, knowing the conditions of the terrain, having the possibility to migrate, to plunder, and to shift the blame to the federal troops. This is how it will be until we take appropriate, consistent measures. This does not mean that because of them we will launch large-scale combat operations once again. Of course not.

Why the Military Package Accord Is Not Being Implemented

People were fearful of turning in weapons — the psychological barrier of distrust has not been overcome. But we are approaching this point. If formerly guns roared and bombs fell, now even a single shot echoes all around Chechnya. Confidence in the federal authorities is already emerging. But there are also other reasons for the delay — fears that the process of disarming criminal detachments will drag on. These detachments are feared. Many commanders say, "We are not sure that Basayev, Geliskhanov, and Khamzatov will surrender their weapons tomorrow like us, instead of directing them against us." Dudayev is currently betting it all on the criminal elements. At this stage, a swift process of surrendering weapons is disadvantageous for him. He is not backed by the masses. This was also confirmed by the results of public-opinion polls conducted by the territorial administration.

One cannot simply say, "Take 50,000 guns and surrender them." One should investigate who holds them. We are trying to use every opportunity and any method to collect weapons. Take, for instance, [Ruslan] Labazanov. He was told, "Ruslan, enough is enough; the game is over. Both sides must disarm. Stop hiding!" He suggested that in the areas under his control the disarmament be given a religious tinge — weapons through mosques.

In addition, the agreement on the package of military matters is general in nature. The delay in implementing it is due to the fact that we have been working out a mechanism for implementing it. Only outsiders could think that a Chechen must leave his home with a

submachine gun raised in his right hand, approach the surrender post, and lay down the weapon. There will be nothing like that; you must account for local specifics. Now the whole package of documents has been worked out and we will actively embark on the surrender of weapons and on disarmament.

There are other reasons as well. The process of settling this crisis includes a mix of political, ideological, economic, and military-technical measures. Unless the military-technical measures are underpinned by ideological and political ones, the process will drag out. In my opinion, this is one of the key reasons today. [sentence as published] As soon as a settlement by political methods is given priority by decision of the Security Council, we will sort out all other objectives and put military matters last.

Self-Defense Detachments Are Not Forever

Under the agreement, community protection detachments are only to be set up where there are no law-enforcement agencies. After the agreement was signed, Dudayev by his edict and a decision of the State Defense Council created a new interpretation of how the accord should be implemented. In Dudayev's theory, all formations not mentioned in the law "On Defense" are subject to disarmament — the Chechen law, not the Russian — that is, the entire group of federal troops. As regards self-defense detachments, they also adopted their own interpretation — these should be formed in all communities and exist "until elections are finished." We are not going to accept that. Where new federal agencies have been formed and where there are law-enforcement agencies, the creation of any extra institutions is out of the question.

The final aim of the disarmament is to prepare the ground for a free, democratic election. Such an election is expected to be held in the absence in the republic of any armed formations unprovided for in the law. If we carry out the disarmament and proceed with the election with the self-defense detachments intact, can we say that it will be free? Of course not. Should we put a tank next to the ballot box so as to counterbalance a detachment? Society must be freed from violence and even the signs of it.

Why They Can't Catch Dudayev

My reasoning proceeds from a professional point of view. They should be deprived of a support base in the first place. Today, Dudayev has a support base in certain social sectors where he lives. There he replenishes his logistic and personnel resources. Only after gradually depriving him of that, stripping him "naked," should

one embark on this operation. I cannot say when. Let us leave this for the professionals to decide.

The "Chechnya Syndrome" Will Be More Fearsome Than the "Afghanistan" Syndrome

We analyzed the situation that has come about. Can the "Afghanistan syndrome" repeat itself? Yes, it can. Only the "Chechnya syndrome" will be even more fearsome. What happened is that the political situation was projected onto a soldier's actions. A soldier's actions cannot be assessed in political terms. This has an immense impact on his consciousness. It is not he who should be assessed. We fulfill our duty.

We have drawn up a program for rehabilitating servicemen returning from Chechnya. What we have in mind first of all is normal rest. I myself started at home at the sound of the hair dryer being switched on by my wife in the morning — it buzzes just like a helicopter at take-off. I thought that somebody else had been wounded or killed, and they were going to take him out to the hospital. Everything is restricted by the availability of funds, though. We are bending over backwards trying to figure out where to find them. Currently we lack nearly 90 billion rubles to resolve urgent problems in September alone. We are doing all that depends on the command, but the legislation provides meager sums. Maybe businessmen can help us. We would give them addresses of specific families and guys who were left disabled. If we could organize such joint work, we would be very grateful.

[Article includes the following boxed commentary by the Political Department]

General Romanov gives the impression of a person who really knows what should be done in Chechnya and how. He is building peace with his own hands; he knows how it can be created and what should be done to resolve a specific problem. Moreover, he attends to what is, generally speaking, not his business: It is politicians who usually negotiate peace; hence, evidently, Romanov's chagrin at the apparent inadequacy of political and economic measures to resolve the crisis.

On the other hand, military matters must inevitably take priority at this stage. It is foolish to build houses and restore factories if the possibility remains that they could be bombed again in a month. Romanov says that large-scale combat operations will not be resumed, but too much does not depend on him both in Chechnya and in Moscow. He may well be unaware of what role has been assigned to the Chechen factor in Moscow. Currently, peacemaking is the hobby horse, but what will happen after the December election and what plans

various politicians pin on the presidential election is not quite clear yet.

Meanwhile, there is no realistic way out of the Chechnya impasse in sight. It is unlikely that only out-and-out bandits will refuse to surrender arms or that the road to peace will be cleared once they are removed. (As a matter of fact, discrepancies in the figures cited by Moscow officials when estimating the quantity of weapons that have yet to be turned in are at least disquieting: While Oleg Lobov, Security Council secretary and Yeltsin's plenipotentiary in Chechnya, talks about 70,000 guns, Internal Affairs Minister Anatoliy Kulikov puts the figure at 50,000-55,000.) Confidence in the federal authorities in Chechnya is unlikely to be restored at all in the foreseeable future. No economic miracle based on financial injections from Moscow has occurred — something that was intended to show to people "who have not received wages for years" the benefits of a new life and thus to win their support for Moscow's actions — nor will it occur, because there are neither the funds required for that nor a clear conception for implementing this plan. For the time being, people are happy the shooting is over, but winter is just around the corner. Those who have no shelter or normal means of subsistence will make up a new criminal element. If formerly the blame for everything could be laid on Dudayev, now responsibility rests with the federal authorities, and any discontent will be inevitably directed against the new authorities.

Undoubtedly, the irreconcilables can easily exploit all that. Strangely enough, there have been no attempts to play on existing differences among them, let alone to initiate new ones. Possibly they have now all rallied around Dudayev, whom Moscow appears to have already written off and with whom it is not going to talk. He cannot be simply dismissed — whatever the number of his supporters, his influence on the situation is tangible. The problem could have been resolved by simply removing the rebellious president four years ago. Now Basayev, Geliskhanov, and Khamzatov are already prepared to take his place. If they manage to reach agreement among themselves on distributing power and spheres of influence, the elimination of Dudayev will only strengthen the irreconcilables' resolve and increase the number of their supporters.

At any rate, a solution to the crisis (if it is solvable at all) cannot be limited only to weapons collection. Pinning all hopes on elections also looks strange — it is not clear that they can achieve anything at all. Now it is the Security Council staff that has received the task of drawing up a policy for a Chechen settlement. Yet another state agency has begun generating yet another plan. What remains unchanged is the lack of

a coherently formulated and calculated state program that would include all aspects — from military and ideological to economic and organizational ones.

Zavgayev Joins Russian Delegation

LD2109115095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1127 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNY, September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The Soviet-era Chechen top communist, who was ousted by General Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1991, has joined peace talks in the rebel republic.

Doku Zavgayev, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia arrived on Thursday in the Chechen capital as a member of the Russian negotiation team on a par with Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov and Chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Arkadiy Volskiy.

It is expected that already on Thursday, the negotiators will meet representatives of federal troops in Chechnya, Dudayev's supporters and the staff of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission in Grozny mediating the talks.

Volskiy told reporters that the Russian negotiators "are concerned about the aggravation of the situation in the republic", a series of terrorists acts and endless attacks of separatist fighters. According to Volskiy, the delegation has no "concrete directives from Moscow concerning the crisis settlement" and will act according to the situation.

Last week, Zavgayev told reporters that he did not "rule out the possibility of involving Dzhokhar Dudayev into the process of restoring peace in Chechnya to such an extent in which he can promote the normalisation of the situation in the republic".

"I am ready to brush aside all personal emotions, to step on my own pride and to look for the ways of a peaceful settlement with anyone who wishes", Zavgayev said.

According to Zavgayev, "after all that happened with Chechnya" it should have bigger rights than any other region of Russia. He even said that the variant of the Moscow-Tatarstan share-power deal is not acceptable for Chechnya.

The deal does not grant Tatarstan the right to independently engage in foreign relations.

Zavgayev announced that the Our Home is Russia election bloc of premier Viktor Chernomyrdin proposed to him to run for the State Duma in a Chechen constituency and that he had accepted the proposal.

Yeltsin Wants Chechnya Restoration 'In Full'

MM2109085695 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 Sep 95 pp 1, 2

[Report by special correspondent Vladimir Yanchenkov: "Peace Offensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Grozny — Oleg Lobov has spoken of major new steps to restore normal life in the republic — steps which President B. Yeltsin recommends taking without delay.

Oleg Lobov, secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council and the Russian Federation president's plenipotentiary representative in the Chechen Republic, returned to Grozny 18 September to direct the restoration of the economy and the social sphere.

In the evening of the same day he met with representatives of the Russian and foreign mass media accredited to the territorial administration press center.

Oleg Lobov briefed the journalists on the problems discussed last week in Sochi, where he was received by the Russian president.

The Security Council secretary pointed out that Boris Nikolayevich had supported the idea of forming military construction detachments from local young people of draft age. These subunits, in which draftees will perform alternative service, would be entrusted with building highways and housing and fulfilling various jobs as part of the railroad troops. The president had already issued the appropriate instructions.

After hearing information on the progress of reconstruction work as a whole and on the difficulties in this matter, particularly with funding, the president had asked that the government be informed of his insistence that the program envisaged for the restoration of Chechnya's economy and social sphere be implemented in full.

Speaking about the problems of compensation payments for lost property and for loss of accommodation, Yeltsin had emphasized that the Russian Government would do everything to ensure that this action is carried out as quickly as possible. The president had also reported that he would ask the St. Petersburg leadership to give effective assistance in rebuilding Grozny University.

The president's plenipotentiary representative pointed out that Boris Nikolayevich was concerned about unsatisfactory progress with the surrender of weapons in the Chechen Republic. He believed that not only the military but also politicians must have their weighty say in this matter. He was pinning particular hopes on the holding of a "roundtable," in which representatives of all Chechnya's political and public movements and the

republic's most authoritative leaders would participate. In the president's opinion, this would help to create conditions for holding internal elections in Chechnya.

Oleg Lobov also briefed the journalists on the decisions adopted at the Moscow conference of leaders of ministries and departments, in which Oleg Soskovets and Anatoliy Chubays also participated. In particular, a schedule for funding the restoration of Chechnya's economy and social sphere had been approved. The funds allocated to these ends had been increased sharply — by over 150 percent in total. Whereas 20 billion rubles [R] were allocated to the Agro-Industrial Construction Administration in August, for example, in September it is 10 times as much. The Ministry of Construction, which received R150 billion in August, has been allocated R397 billion in September, according to the schedule.

The president's plenipotentiary representative said that September is to see a start on fulfilling the president's edict on compensation payments, although there is still no document regulating the mechanism for making these payments. Under an accord with the Russian Government there is already a decision by a state commission which states, in particular: For the purposes of reducing social tension among the population of the Chechen Republic, the Russian Federation Federal Employment Service is to begin paying allowances without delay to employees of enterprises temporarily not operating out of the vestigial assets of the state employment fund.

Major decisions have also been adopted on taxes. If we are talking, let us say, about teachers or other employees of state establishments, everything is clear, and income tax is levied on them. But what about the other organizations that have been involved? Rostov Agro-Industrial Construction Administration, for example. Its office is in Rostov-na-Donu, but the work is being done in Chechnya, and taxes are being paid to Rostov, where the office is located. This is wrong. We have agreed, Oleg Lobov said, that all the organizations involved in working in the republic — the various mobile mechanized columns, construction administrations, etc — must open accounts in Groznyy, so that taxes come into the republic's budget.

Oleg Lobov also pointed out that the Russian president supported the idea of drawing up a special program to develop Chechnya's mountain regions.

The Russian president's statement on some fundamental questions connected with problems of a peace settlement in the Chechen Republic will be made public, the Security Council secretary announced, in the very near future.

Answering journalists' questions, Oleg Lobov emphasized that the negotiating process must be continued and that political ways to resolve the crisis peacefully must be sought.

Restoration, Rescue Service To Be Formed

*LD2009120795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1033 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — A working trip to Chechnya by Russian Minister for Emergency Situations Sergey Shoygu has resulted in the decision to form a restoration department in the Chechen Ministry for Emergency Situations.

Sources at the Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations told INTERFAX the new department will provide for priority restorations in Chechnya, prepare the republic for winter and ensure the functioning of vital facilities.

Shoygu has also decided to form a Chechen Rescue Service with a strength of up to 40 people.

The Russian Ministry will render comprehensive assistance to its Chechen colleagues, including supplies of rescue equipment, vehicles and other machinery.

Economic Rehabilitation Effort Questioned

*MK2109072595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
19 Sep 95 p 2*

[Analysis by Aleksandr Bekker: "Chechnya Is Becoming an Economic Black Hole"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Sunday [17 September] [First Deputy Premier] Anatoliy Chubays stated that the government would ask the Duma to approve additional expenditures for the restoration of Chechnya's economy in the amount of 5 trillion rubles [R]. This puts the problem of reanimating the republic's economy on a fundamentally different plane. Until now, expenditures have been made, at any rate officially, within the budgets of appropriate ministries and departments: the Ministry of Construction, the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Railroads, and so forth. Now, if the deputies approve the White House request, Chechnya will be given a separate heading in the federal budget. Moreover, according to the Finance Ministry, R2.4 trillion have been sent to the republic this year, and the plea for another R5 trillion in the next three months means that the financial dam is already being eroded: Money calls for more money, and Chechnya is turning into a black hole for the economy.

Chubays's statement followed two days after a session of the State Commission on the Rehabilitation of

Chechnya. Its chairman, Oleg Soskovets; the presidential plenipotentiary in the republic, Oleg Lobov; leaders of Chechnya; and heads of Moscow departments castigated the Finance Ministry for delaying wage payments to local workers and shift operators from various regions. Those present cornered the department in Ilyinka Street, forcing it to find capital investments to rehabilitate the energy, oil, and construction sectors and to pay benefits to residents affected by the war. First Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov tried to appeal to common sense: "Everything has been financed according to schedule; the budget is not made of rubber." The intensity of criticism, however, was such that one participant in the session thought the official should be given a lesson and shouted, "Petrov should be sent to Chechnya!"

An amazing metamorphosis occurred. Big shots in the Kremlin and the White House, who upheld the "surgical option" for Chechnya in winter, which left the republic's economy in ruins, are today in the front ranks of the resuscitators. Mr. Soskovets is talking about the people's needs in the face of the coming winter and is promising to throw the Finance Ministry "to be torn to pieces by those departments" that have been doing their work in Chechnya. Mr. Lobov is demanding that the approach to funding be revised: "to proceed not from the capabilities" of the budget, but "from the needs of the republic." Who is stopping this? Panskov, of course, who sabotages the brilliant plans of the high-level restorers.

All this, I suppose, has nothing to do with the far from imaginary sufferings of the population. As I wrote in March and as I am also convinced now, the funds remitted to Chechnya are being stolen, and the scale of the theft will grow as funding is expanded. Without extolling the planned economy, I will note that at that time, there existed Uniform Construction Norms and Rates and Tariffs for Assembly and Installation Work. Although they did not prevent padded performance reports, there were still some restraints and possibilities for oversight. Now there is no Department for the Fight Against the Theft of Socialist Property, and the party and state control system is dead. There is no oversight, and it is impossible to verify to what extent work volumes correspond to monetary inputs.

The Economics Ministry's idea to monitor and regulate the monetary flow into the republic has been safely sunk. Instead, Mr. Soskovets's proposal on authorized banks and rehabilitation credits backed up by government guarantees has led to a criminal case. In June, a Federal Security Service spokesman told a session of the Standing Commission on Nonpayment that after receiving R500 billion, two (unidentified) commercial banks simply "disappeared into thin air." Judging by

the fact that no further information on the matter was made public, the case was hushed up.

The rehabilitation of Chechnya's economy in the context of quasi-peace often turns into an absurdity. The Fuel and Energy Ministry restored eight substations, and then six of them were blown up again. The Russian army destroyed the region's only cement plant by bombing — without need, in May, when there were no hostilities in nearby areas. Soldiers, competing in marksmanship, have often destroyed power transmission lines; the warriors' shooting abilities did not bother the Fuel and Energy Ministry until the line was brought back into operation.

I will repeat: The war-weary residents are absolutely not to blame for the fact that the republic is becoming a hole sucking in trillions of rubles. They started going back to their homes, taking Moscow's statements about intensive rehabilitation programs at face value. As a result, a cauldron of 400,000 unemployed has emerged in Chechnya, and the first deputy premier's state commission is very concerned that it could now explode. Naturally, to reduce the pressure in the cauldron even a little, money is needed. You can understand the departments: They are interested in expanding their work volumes and having their funding increased. So a vicious circle is formed. Mr. Petrov said on 14 September that substantial sums are being spent by departments in dubious ways, and therefore a detailed check is needed. Mr. Soskovets observed, as though in passing: "There is not much to check there," meaning that not much money is going to Chechnya.

It is generally believed that state enterprise directors fit poorly into a market economy. Their ouster is the business of the Federal Administration on Insolvency/Bankruptcy. There is no agency assessing the bankruptcy of top state officials, however, because there are no criteria. As a result, an official who a year ago headed a state commission that tried to find traces of subversive work by commercial banks on "Black Tuesday" is today the president's viceroy in Chechnya and is demanding that its economy be rehabilitated at any price. Mr. Lobov seems to be a past master of the "must do!" administration principle, seeking to act in Transcaucasia in the same manner as in Sverdlovsk, where he worked to implement a youth housing program and a "from-the-field-to-the-store" scheme, and also organized the procurement of coniferous meal.

If people in the Kremlin and in the White House believe that Grozny oil and its oil refineries will justify any current expenditures, then 2.5-3 million tonnes of raw materials and lubricants is too high a price to pay. If the intention is to ensure that Kazakhstan's Tengiz

oil passes through Russia under the Caspian Pipeline Consortium project, it will go via a new pipeline bypassing Chechnya through Tikhoretsk. What is left then is the passage of early oil [as published] from the Azerbaijan shelf, which indeed has no way of bypassing the existing line in Chechnya. However, even if Baku and U.S. oil companies developing the deposit decide the question in Russia's favor, a single explosion of the pipeline by Chechen combatants is enough to put an end to the transportation of late oil [as published] through Russia.

It is hard to judge whether Mr. Soskovets factored in these circumstances, but he is also demanding more funds for Chechnya without reckoning with anything — neither the fact that arrears to the federal budget already have exceeded 28 trillion rubles, nor the fact that the budget itself, owing 2 trillion rubles to the Pension Fund, is forced to sell gold. Neither is he stopped by the fact that a budget collapsing on the threshold of the election could call future reform into question. At one time Mr. Soskovets took offense in public when he was not ranked among organic marketeers, recalling his shock work at the Karaganda Metal Plant. It seems that the first deputy premier's outlook has since then been backed up by the slogan "Our strength is in the melts." ["Nasha sila — v plavkakh" — facetious slogan of Soviet smelters based on play on words: "plavki" means "melts" and also "swimming trunks"]

Reportage on, Comments By Chernomyrdin While in Komi

No Retaliation to Chechen 'Provocation'

LD2009131095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1253 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Viktor Makarov and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SYKTYVKAR, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian government will not take active combat operations after the provocation committed by separatist leader Dudayev's rebels in Groznyy on Wednesday, Russian premier Viktor Chernomyrdin who is now on a working trip in the Komi Republic, said in an interview with reporters.

Remnants of illegal detachments constantly engineer provocations, the premier noted. A search and punishment of those guilty as well as examination of reasons due to which rebels managed to engineer the terrorist act are business of federal authorities in Chechnya as well as the military.

There are now enough representatives from authorities as well as civil and military specialists there to investigate this incident. Those who are charged with this

work will examine this case on the spot, Chernomyrdin said.

Terrorist Attack, Economy Discussed

LD2009202795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1807 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SYKTYVKAR, September 20 (INTERFAX) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said that a thorough investigation must be held into the terrorist attack on Oleg Lobov, Russian Security Council secretary and presidential envoy in Chechnya, and the culprits brought to trial.

Chernomyrdin told journalists in Syktyvkar, the capital of Russia's Komi Republic where he stays on a two-day working visit, that the government's position on Chechnya is summarized in his formula "we will not go to war."

Chernomyrdin confirmed the government's intention to maintain the currency peg until the end of the year and to narrow it in 1996. He emphasized that the government had for a long time been preparing for the introduction of a peg which showed the way for the Russian economy to develop. Chernomyrdin admitted that the peg was to a certain extent harmful to the exporting industries but added that export duties had been reduced.

Chernomyrdin said that the government is trying hard to attract foreign investors, notably for the development of the Timan-Pechora oil field. He said that foreign investors are still reluctant to invest in the Russian economy, partly because of the unstable political situation.

According to Chernomyrdin, specific projects for use of the Timan-Pechora oil field will be discussed in Naryan-Mar, the seat of the Nenets Autonomous Area administration, during a conference Thursday which will also discuss the Northern Gate project of pumping the Timan-Pechora oil to a terminal on the White Sea coast.

Timber, Housing Problems Discussed

LD2009182095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1526 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By Gennadiy Yezhov and Viktor Makarov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SYKTYVKAR, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, currently on a visit to the Komi Republic, signed on Wednesday [20 September] an order on the Russian government's guarantees of a 54 million-U.S. dollar credit which the Syktyvkar timber-industrial complex agreed to receive from the U.S. Export-Import bank.

During his visit to the timber-industrial complex in the Komi capital he discussed with its administration problems of the timber branch.

This complex managed to survive at the difficult period of the transition to market relations and now is steadily increasing production volumes.

The meeting focused on the necessity of the reconstruction of the timber-industrial complex with the aim of raising its production which Russia needs badly.

The implementation of this project will require an estimated 237 million U.S. dollars. Taking into consideration the fact that the U.S. Export-Import bank agreed to grant a 54 million-U.S. dollar credit to the complex, Viktor Chernomyrdin charged the appropriate ministries and departments to study sources, ways and methods of obtaining the rest of the sum necessary for the reconstruction of the timber-industrial complex.

He stressed it was necessary that as a result of the reconstruction of the complex, it should not only increase the volume of production but produce competitive products which consumers would need, first of all consumers in Russia.

Participants in the meeting spoke on the need to give preferential credits to the timber industry just as to the agriculture because the preparation and transportation of wood from the taiga is of a seasonal character.

They also urged to deduct all northern increments, coefficients and preferences from production costs.

The Russian premier admitted the correctness of the raised questions and informed that all problems of the timber industry would be discussed at a meeting in Moscow next week.

Social problems were discussed at a meeting of the Russian prime minister with workers of the timber industrial complex. One of their main problems concerns housing.

Viktor Chernomyrdin informed that the Russian government was working out a special programme "One's own house". This programme envisages the widening of granted land plots for the building of individual dwelling houses.

With that end in view, first of all the unused land will be distributed for these purposes. The programme also provides for the extension of loans and credits to individual persons for building their own houses.

The Russian premier stressed that the implementation of this programme would make it necessary for enterprises to use more actively their own funds for building houses for their workers.

The settlement of social problems will require large funds which the federal budget does not have at present. Therefore they should be spent rationally. Today the government has no possibility to help those enterprises which are in a position to manufacture products which are in great demand. This will necessitate reducing expenses where it is possible, including expenditure for the Armed Forces, Viktor Chernomyrdin pointed out.

Decision Expected on Timano-Pechora Zone

*LD2009163795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SYKTYVKAR, THE KOMI REPUBLIC, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Komi heads expect Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's Syktyvkar visit to result in decisions on the mechanism and development of the Timano-Pechora oil and gas zone, Komi leader Yuriy Spiridonov told INTERFAX Wednesday.

The Prime Minister started his Komi tour on September 20 with a visit to the Syktyvkar timber plant. However, the priority of the two-day trip is to acquaint Chernomyrdin with problems of the fuel and energy complex, said sources in the Russian government.

According to Spiridonov, Komi leaders are concerned with the fact that "control over oil and gas facilities in Russia's largest oil and gas zone of Timano-Pechora is being taken by various companies at a time when a presidential decree has formed the KomiTek joint stock company specially for development of the region."

"Western concerns are opening firms for development of the Timano-Pechora deposits, and we are passively watching them do so," said the Komi leader. According to him, the Komi Republic and Russia "have a huge potential which is enough for development of the Timano-Pechora fields." (An international consortium - Timan Pechora Company - was formed in April 1994 for oil and gas development).

Komi leaders are strongly against the so-called northern variant of Timano-Pechora oil transportation via the oil tanker terminal on the White Sea Coast. If the northern variant is used, "all the oil will go past Russia, and oil refineries from Komi to Moscow will remain idle. This is what we have today," said Spiridonov. A number of Western companies consider the northern variant of oil transportation to be a major condition for their investments in the region.

Some government experts do not share the opinion of Komi leadership and think that participation of Western investors is an essential condition for efficient exploitation of the Timano-Pechora zone.

Chernomyrdin will arrive in the administrative center of the Nenets Autonomous District of Naryan Mar Wednesday to chair a conference of leaders of the Arkhangelsk region, the Nenets Autonomous District and the Arkhangelskgeologiya joint stock company and discuss problems of the fuel and energy complex. He will come to Usinsk by helicopter Thursday afternoon and visit a base of the KomiArcticOil Russian-British joint venture.

When in Usinsk, the Prime Minister will visit the location of the 1994 oil spill caused by a pipeline accident. At that time from 14,000 to 75,000 tonnes of oil were spilled, according to different estimations. In Spiridonov's opinion, it will take one more month to finalize the oil spill clean-up, which is being carried out by an Australian-American consortium within the framework of an IMF credit.

Chernomyrdin is also expected to meet General Directors of the Komineft, Severgazprom and Kominergo joint stock companies in Usinsk. The meeting will focus on the state of the Timano-Pechora oil and gas zone and foreign investments.

Electricity Turned Off at Far East Radio Centers

LD2009161395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1100 GMT 20 Sep 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Marina Barinova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Sep (ITAR-TASS) — By order of the director of northern electricity networks, the power was completely switched off today at the Komsomolsk radio center, which provides Russia's Radio, Mayak, and other programs to Khabarovsk Territory and the Far East. An ITAR-TASS correspondent was told this by Mikhail Yelizarov, deputy federal minister of communications. "Until debts are cleared," he said, "electricity supplies to the Selizharovo radio and television station in Tver region have been curtailed. A third of the region's population has been denied of the chance to watch television programs and listen to the radio."

In Mikhail Yelizarov's opinion, the main reason preventing regular electricity supplies is the television and radio companies' lack of funds to pay for technical means of communication.

Production Halves at Krasnoyarsk Military Plants

MM2109135095 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 21 Sep 95 p 2

[PRAYM report: "Krasnoyarsk Military-Industrial Complex Production Falls"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Total production for all the 17 military-industrial complex enterprises in Krasnoyarsk Krai that are subordinate to the State Committee for the Defense Sectors of Industry over the first eight months of the year was 46.1 percent down on the same period last year. At the seven biggest plants military production was down 80 percent on average, while civil production was 20 percent down.

Rear Admiral on Kaliningrad's Reduced Military Role

BR2109144695 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 20 Sep 95 p 7

[Report by Elisabeth Crona: "The Balts Want Kaliningrad To Be Disarmed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kaliningrad — "We have cut by half our military personnel since 1990. Now there are only 40,000 troops here and 150 ships of different sizes. After all, our mission is not global anymore."

The deputy commander of Russia's Baltic Sea Fleet, Rear Admiral Viktor Kravchenko, stressed in all manner of ways that the military threat from Kaliningrad has decreased. With a dapper Western look and what at least appears to be friendly openness, he is answering questions on a subject that hitherto has been the most forbidden — the situation in Russia's only ice-free port to the west. Leftover From the Cold War

Kaliningrad has been called an anomaly, a leftover from the Cold War, which still frightens the neighbors and whose transit traffic through free Lithuania is the greatest political problem of that Baltic nation.

Early this year Lithuania and Russia reached an agreement on military and civilian transports to Kaliningrad through Lithuania, but still these do not always work.

The rear admiral complained that a couple of times earlier this year the Lithuanians sent back Russian transports on their way to Kaliningrad.

"It was only food and supplies for our soldiers," he said.

Small Russian Enclave

Kravchenko and the politicians of Kaliningrad hint that the Balts, "with whom we cooperated so closely earlier," are now retaliating for 50 years of Soviet occupation.

In the view of Kravchenko and Kaliningrad politicians they are doing so against the small Russian enclave with one million people, far away from the mother country. For their part the Balts regard the area as a constant threat and want Kaliningrad to become a demilitarized free economic zone.

The number of troops in the Kaliningrad area is a much disputed figure.

The Poles believe that it is twice as large as the one Kravchenko stated. "And the Russians have not protested against the Polish figures," says the Lithuanian opposition leader, former President Vytautas Landsbergis.

The politicians in Vilnius pretty much stick to the Polish figures in public statements. But unofficially, civil servants in government offices say that nevertheless the number still perhaps lies between 40,000 and 50,000 troops.

Defend the Territory

When we arrived in Kaliningrad a big maneuver had just come to an end. However, the deputy commander of the Baltic Sea Fleet emphasized that Russia's weak economy means that the exercises at sea becoming ever fewer and shorter.

"We can only have exercises at sea once every six months. And these exercises go on for about a week," he said and added:

"After all, the operational tasks also have become fewer due to the changed world situation.

"We need the number of soldiers that we have to defend the territory. Forty thousand, which includes both navy and army, is about right for today's needs. I cannot say anything about the future. It depends on our president and the decrees we receive."

Regarding the current strategy of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Victor Kravchenko said:

"We do not have any global strategic tasks. Nor is it our aim to keep constant watch in the Baltic Sea and the waters around Denmark.

"People in this area understand that we have cut down our military presence."

Live in Trailers

Nevertheless Kaliningrad has had to accept quite a few of the Russian troops who have been withdrawn from eastern Germany and the Baltic region. Many of them live under difficult conditions in barracks or trailers due to the major housing shortage.

"They live where they can," Victor Kravchenko said. "But we do not have any families on the ships anymore. Everybody will have a place to live by the year 2000.

"We Russians left 30,000 comfortable apartments in the Baltic countries," he added with a bitter grimace.

The military barracks that we visitors saw in Kaliningrad were very dilapidated and run-down. The bulletin boards in the area were crammed with small pieces of paper with proposals and pleas for housing. Questions about the current military threat scenario got bland answers — with one exception. Kravchenko is very critical of the Ukraine:

"Unlike us they have not made any cuts in the number of soldiers and weapons there. I really wish they would do that."

He only shrugged his shoulders at Poland's and the Balts' wish to become NATO members. (This was a few days before President Boris Yeltsin came out strongly against NATO expansion.)

"Russia has after all joined NATO's Partnership for Peace," he said. "Perhaps we could become NATO members some time, too. It depends on the organization's mission. If NATO is for peace, then..."

But the Russian rear admiral strongly dissociated himself from NATO's bombing in Bosnia.

"As a military officer I consider them an evil deed."

Military Area Will Open

A trip to Baltiysk, the Kaliningrad region's well known outer harbor, ran into difficulties. But those responsible in the administration are hoping that Baltiysk, with the exception of the military area, will be opened early next year.

"Now at the end of September we will be discussing the future of Baltiysk," said Kaliningrad Deputy Governor Sergey Buchelnikov. "It is a question of 'new country,' an area where no civilian lived or worked for 45 years."

And on 22-28 July next year there will be a massive celebration of the Russian Navy's 300th anniversary and warships from all over the world will be invited to a parade in the waters off the previously closed area.

Economic Issues

Bank Commission for Treasury Bond Service Abolished

MM2009143295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Velichenkov under "An Interesting Question, of Course" rubric: "What Are the Banks To Do If They Cannot Earn Legally?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Continuing the emission of treasury bonds, the Ministry of Finance has abolished the 3 percent commission to banks and to authorized depositaries for servicing treasury bonds. [passage omitted]

The step that the Ministry of Finance has taken by way of abolishing the 3 percent commission for bank-depositaries places the latter in a difficult position: either start robbing clients on various pretexts or curtail operations to service treasury bonds.

Maybe the latter is just what the Ministry of Finance is seeking? I failed to obtain any information about this from the ministry. It responded by referring to some internal document (not for publication), in accordance with which these events commenced. Finance Ministry staffers had no wish to substantiate their position.

In accordance with the memorandum of the government and the Central Bank of Russia to the IMF, the emission of treasury bonds is to be ended. That organization's experts deemed treasury bonds to be "quasi money" and inflationary, moreover. If this is so, then the treasury bond emission plan has in any case been included in the budget through the end of the year. It is a bit soon to start implementing measures to curtail the market. For the Finance Ministry's bonds are to be in circulation for almost one year more.

But this measure could well lead to complications for the Finance Ministry on the next flotation because of problems finding a depositary and, as a consequence, to the formation of unplanned holes in the budget.

New Banknotes To Be Issued To Combat Counterfeiting

MK2109073795 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 20 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Bills To Be Finally Introduced in September-October"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New 1,000- and 5,000-ruble bills will appear in circulation in the very near future.

We have been told at the Russian Federation Central Bank that these bills, like the 10,000- and 50,000-

ruble bills, will be in the "Cities of Russia" series. Despite their low denomination, the new money will have light-related protection features, that is, the letters RR (Russian Ruble) emerge on the bills when viewed at a certain angle. The 1,000-ruble bill will come out in late September, and the 5,000-ruble bill in early October.

The Central Bank is confident that putting new 1,000- and 5,000-ruble bills into circulation will complete yet another stage in combating counterfeiting. It is virtually impossible today to counterfeit bills that have 19 degrees of protection.

Duma 'Ignorance' on Engine Plant Issue Assailed

MK2109092895 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker: "Petr Mostovoy: Deputies Are Driven by Ignorance. State Committee on the Defense Industry Has Brought 'Rybinskiye Motory' to Bankruptcy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In their letter to Boris Yeltsin, the heads of State Duma committees, Messrs. Glazyev, Burkov, Gusev, and Kalashnikov, have stated that the leadership of the Federal Administration on Insolvency/Bankruptcy of Enterprises (FUDN) is artificially producing the "Rybinskiye Motory" (RM) joint-stock company into bankruptcy. They are convinced that this poses a threat to national security, since the RM equips all civilian aircraft of the Tu [Tupolev] and Il [Ilyushin] series with engines. FUDN General Director Petr Mostovoy has caustically described the deputies' appeal to the president as a "remarkable document" both for its language and its substance. The document, in his view, is couched in terms of an "anonymous letter," because it contains unsubstantiated hints about "dubious structures" and claims of "irreparable damage to the economy." Roughly the same charges were made against the State Committee on the Administration of State Property by the defunct Supreme Soviet when "Ros-telekom" was being privatized in 1992. Since then, the joint-stock company has confidently entered the market and proven its solvency.

As for RM, according to Mr. Mostovoy the FUDN is acting fully in keeping with the law by auctioning its 37 percent block of state-owned shares. The administration head is confident that whoever wins the tender — the Tupolev concern or "Gazprom" — will, first, become an effective owner, and, second, will not curtail either the main production of aircraft engines nor the production of engines for gas-pumping stations. Just as invalid as the deputies' charges, Mr. Mostovoy believes, is the invective by the State Committee on the Defense Industry claiming that the sale of RM's federally-owned

block of shares will lead to the loss of manageability and a partial or total refusal to manufacture aircraft engines for Tu-154, Il-62, and Il-76 aircraft. It is the myopic policy of Viktor Glukhikh's department, which long made RM churn out the obsolete PS-90 aircraft engine, that has brought the enterprise to the verge of bankruptcy. Today, the State Committee on the Defense Industry is suggesting that the production of a new engine be funded from the [federal] budget. "Where is this money to be obtained, and who is really damaging national security?" Mr. Mostovoy queries.

He thinks the authors of the letter to the president are primarily driven by "the ignorance of people who have failed to see what the problems are." Even the Yaroslavl Oblast governor, Mr. Lisitsyn (who takes issue with the FUDN's decision to remove RM's director, Mr. Shelgunov, and to bring in anticrisis management procedures at the enterprise) agrees with the option of auctioning off as soon as possible RM's state-owned block of shares. Such a decision has already been formalized in a government decision and was approved, according to Mr. Mostovoy, by Viktor Chernomyrdin in the middle of last week. As for recognizing RM as an insolvent enterprise and appointing Albina Kalinina as an outside manager there, this question is most likely to be resolved in a dialogue between the president and the premier.

Official Denies Derailing Privatization Program

LD2009153295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Acting chairman of the state property committee Alfred Kokh has said he is prepared to ensure all revenues expected from the privatization scheme by the end of this year.

In a statement at the meeting of the payment and settlements commission, he denied accusations by government opponents of derailing the privatization program.

Kokh hopes to collect 8.7 trillion rubles worth of revenues by implementing a number of projects in the remaining three months. He reckons that the government's share in 6,000 enterprises will be raised by about 1 trillion rubles. A further 3 trillion rubles will be raised by the sale of shares of 136 enterprises to be carried out under the committee's direct control. The same amount should be earned from a tender of high liquidity shares of various state businesses, including the oil sector, which would be used as government securities against credits by commercial banks and investors.

For his part, First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Chubays said whatever measures were needed to meet

budget targets would need to be adopted by the president or prime minister.

Kokh denied opposition and media allegations he had attempted to derail the privatization program. Chubays said that instead, the government would soon be accused of failing to receive planned revenues in time which in itself would mean that the collection of budget revenues was well-established.

'Experts' Optimistic on Russian Inflation, Economy

MK2109093395 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 20 Sep 95 p 3

[Own correspondent's report: "Politics Helps Economy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian economy garnered fairly optimistic assessments at yesterday's news conference by Professors Richard Layard and Peter Oppenheimer, experts of the Russian-European Economic Policy Center. In their unanimous view, inflation by the end of 1995 will be much lower than a year earlier, which is attributable to the low inflationary effect of the rapid increase in the money supply between January and June. This growth, the British experts say, is a consequence of restoring confidence in the ruble and a considerable increase in net international reserves, not of the Central Bank's credit expansion. The professors would not venture a specific forecast regarding inflation, however, being certain at the same time that the current level will decline further early next year. Among the main merits of the economic policy, Messrs. Layard and Oppenheimer mentioned a stable exchange rate and a high refinancing rate. On the whole, while noting a certain economic stabilization in Russia, the experts indicated that it is to some extent linked to the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Decline in GDP Slows; Real Incomes Down

MM2109103195 Moscow IZVESTIYA (Financial Section) in Russian 21 Sep 95 p 1

[INTERFAX report: "GDP Decline Slows"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In January-August 1995 Russian GDP fell by 4 percent on the same period last year to 890 trillion rubles. The country's GDP fell by 12 percent in the first eight months of 1994. This August the Russian State Committee for Statistics recorded GDP growth of 3 percent, compared with an August 1994 decline of 1 percent. The population's real monetary income was 11 percent down on January-August last year (in January-August 1994 it was up 14 percent on the same period of 1993). Workers' average monthly

nominal wages increased by 129 percent (in January-August 1994 the increase was 389 percent).

New Agency Planned To Boost Tax Collection

MK2109093295 Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian
21 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Creation of Commission To Secure Collection of Taxes Planned"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A proposal to create an inter-departmental commission to ensure the timely and full collection of taxes and other payments constituting budget revenues should soon be submitted to the Russian Federation Government. This decision has been made by the Government Commission on Improving the Structure of Executive Power Agencies in the Russian Federation, chaired by First Deputy Premier Oleg Soskovets. It is planned to put Finance Minister Vladimir Panskov at the head of the commission in question.

Central Bank To Monitor Hiring, Firing of Bankers

MK2109093095 Moscow *MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS* in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Bankers Will Be Made To Keep Files on Themselves"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Bank has established a requirement that commercial banks submit more documents to Russia's Central Bank to receive clearance for their prospective managers.

MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has been told at the press service of the Central Bank's Moscow Main Administration that a special form is being introduced for candidates to executive positions in credit organizations and their branches. From now on, those aspiring to the position of board chairman or deputy and chief accountant or deputy should list on the form all previous places of employment and positions held. If a candidate has already worked in the banking system, the person should specify details of the nature of the [previous] job and the reason for quitting.

Moreover, it is necessary to submit to the Central Bank's Main Administration photocopies of one's passport, employment records, diplomas, and certificates of professional continuing education and on-the-job training.

When removing a bank manager from his position, the board of directors is to notify the territorial administration of the Central Bank and to give the reasons for the dismissal.

The new forms are being introduced to increase control over the professional level of bankers.

Central Bank Signs Accords With News Agencies

MK2109073895 Moscow *KOMMERSANT-DAILY* in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 5

[KOMMERSANT-DAILY own report: "Central Bank Arranges for Information Exchange With Journalists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The [Central] Bank of Russia signed, late last week, accords with a number of business information agencies and analytical agencies that will disseminate information provided by the Central Bank on Russian commercial banks' emission activities. The six agencies to receive information from the Central Bank of Russia on a priority basis are INTERFAX, PRAYM, AFI, the Institute of Commercial Engineering, the Association for the Protection of Investors' Information Rights, and Konsultant Plus. The list is to be expanded over time. According to the Central Bank, information will be provided on a reciprocal basis: The journalists will furnish the Central Bank with economic news it is interested in. The database size these agencies can use is over 200 megabytes. A special division is being created at the Central Bank to work with the above agencies and other news companies.

Doubts Expressed on Farmers' Repayment of Fuel Debts

MM2109103795 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
21 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by Yelena Yakovlev: "Agrarian Hole Will Emerge in Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year Russian agrarians have not shaken the government by calling for trillions of rubles in loans for sowing and harvesting. For the first time money has not been provided, and the long-promised economic apocalypse did not occur. Quite the contrary, certain indicators — for instance, the amount of fertilizer used — even increased.

But, of course, some forms of state support for rural commodity producers have been maintained. One of these is the commodity loan.

It was decided that major oil companies engaged in oil supply would provide fuels and lubricants for peasants and would, in return, be exempted from paying taxes to the federal budget. Moreover, they would obtain a prepayment of 10 percent of the value of the fuel. At the year's end, once the grain harvest was over, agricultural producers would repay the Finance Ministry what they owe, plus 10 percent interest. Given that the banks are issuing loans at 210 percent, these were very favorable terms for the agrarians.

Vladimir Kolesnikov, deputy chief of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food's Investment and Resource Policy Administration, believes that the commodity loan scheme has worked, albeit with certain holdups. Unfortunately, the prices of the oil products supplied in the form of commodity loans were increased by approximately 10 percent, and sometimes the oil was received late by refineries. But in principle, given that money for the sowing season used to be catastrophically late — clearly being held up at every administrative stage — commodity loans have not been the worst option.

Of the commodity loan of 11 trillion rubles [R] that was provided, agricultural producers have taken up only fuels and lubricants worth R6 trillion. But field work is not over yet — sugar beets have not yet been harvested and fall plowing has not been finished.

But the agrarians have to settle up with the Finance Ministry 1 December. Will they be able to pay?

The Ministry of Agriculture claims that they will, although there may be some problems. Many regions have suffered from drought. Low productivity means high prime cost, high prime cost means high prices, and high prices make sales more difficult and will delay the repayment of debts.

In recent years Russian agrarians have been famed not only for biting off a huge chunk of the financial pie in the spring that was used for anything but rural needs, but also for almost never repaying their loans. A well-known private farmer once recounted almost in tears how he had repaid his loans and paid a lot of interest, while all the kolkhozes in the district had written them off.

But it should also be noted that those loans were also issued at 200 percent interest, which was hard for the country people to repay. But the commodity loan this year has carried an unusually preferential rate. The agrarians, who took nothing out of the budget in the spring, have actually found themselves in a more favorable economic situation than usual — at least as regards fuel supplies.

It seems at first glance that only the federal budget has suffered. But this is not quite the case. The Finance Ministry told us that the taxes which the oil companies had provided commodity loans to cover had, as a rule, been paid badly and the companies owed a lot of money. The supplies of fuel for the sowing season — albeit in this strange fashion — have started to repay the amounts owed on tax payments.

There have recently been calls for the commodity loan scheme to be altered or even scrapped. Clearly,

nothing good is expected this time either from agrarians who have never repaid their debts over the past few years. But even if they do repay them, the question of increasing the interest rate charged on the commodity loan will probably still arise.

So the agrarians' springtime modesty — for which the government was so grateful, possibly even repaying them by increasing customs duty on imported food — could turn into a hole in the budget this fall.

Impact of Grain Shortage, Prices Viewed

MM2009125195 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Sep 95 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Gavriluk: "Bread Is King, If You Are Smart"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We can definitely say now that bread will be considerably more expensive by the end of the year. If the price doubles, that should be considered a most favorable outcome.

Since the spring the Ministry of Agriculture and Food has been giving a variety of figures for the grain harvest. Whereas, for example, in July it hoped to maintain last year's level and harvest 82 million tonnes, by the end of the summer the forecast was less optimistic — 75 million tonnes. In the first days of fall the ministry named the final figure of the official forecast — 66-69 million tonnes compared with minimum needs of 100 million tonnes. Independent experts believe that the harvest will not exceed 60 million tonnes of grain. This is less than in the year that members of the older generation remember so well, 1963, when bread was baked with the addition of corn, peas, and goodness knows what else. But this year there is no corn and most farms have forgotten how to grow peas. In short, because of the very severe drought and the lack of fertilizers and plant protection agents the wheat yield is expected to be extremely low — 14-15 quintals per hectare on average. Moreover, according to Aleksandr Kirillin, president of the Russian Grain Union, a very large quantity of grain, for example in the North Caucasus, has been affected by a bug [klop-chernushka — meaning unknown], so it cannot be used to make bread.

The situation is made worse by the fact that, as the International Council on Grain has stated, there will be a marked reduction in world stocks. World production will fall because of poor harvests in China, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and Russia. The consequence has been that the dramatic confrontation taking shape on the world grain market enabled the European Union to take advantage of the situation: For the time

being, until 12 October, the EU has banned the sale of wheat outside the community. Moreover, whereas there used to be a flour subsidy in the EU, the duty has now been raised and it is perfectly obvious that duty on grain will be raised after 12 October. Anyone wanting to buy it in Europe will have to pay too high a price. It is the same with the Americans — they have stopped subsidizing grain deals altogether and the price of grain has now reached \$196 per tonne, and that is free on board, without delivery. In short, the price of grain on the world market has at least doubled compared with last year.

But what bearing does this have on us, a country which has said for the umpteenth year that there will be no return to grain imports on a grand scale? It is not entirely clear or, rather, it is not clear at all how they intend to generate the federal stocks intended to supply big cities, the Army, the Internal Affairs Ministry, the North. Purchases for these stocks are extremely slow at the moment and, according to Russian Grain Union experts, we cannot manage without imports of commodity wheat — the federal granaries will have to be filled at budget expense, and we are talking about at least 10 million tonnes, according to their calculations. But on the external market we will now have to pay double the price.

Was there a way out of this situation? Specialists claim that in order not to fall into this trap the foreign grain should have been bought last year, when we also had a poor harvest, although not as small as this year; we should not have dipped into our own resources; it would have made sense to keep the grain. The situation could have been saved in May, when the world grain price was 50 percent less, while in Russia the total area sown to winter grain for the 1995 harvest was reduced to 11.5 million hectares, which turns out to be the smallest area of winter grain in the past 30 years. Moreover, the area of spring grain turned out to be 1.5 million hectares less than last year. And then we had the disastrous shortage of mineral fertilizers and plant protection agents, so where was the "bumper harvest" supposed to come from?

But we tried to persuade the whole world, or, rather, ourselves, that our own grain would do. That remains to be seen: For example, we have resolved the feed grain problem, we have enough of our own, but in so doing the number of livestock has been practically halved countrywide.

There are also problems with the grain that will be grown in the country. At the moment it is entirely controlled, including prices, by those who produced, sold, and bought the grain (from themselves) — and that is a single entity. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food, or, rather, its organization, the Federal Food Corporation, is the only one performing these operations. There is no "master to watch over them," consequently producers are currently demanding 750,000-800,000 rubles [R] per tonne of wheat, plus value-added tax — so the price at home exceeded \$200, and that is higher than the world price. Then add to that delivery to the point of consumption (everyone is talking about railroad tariffs), add five percent for each month the grain is in store (that is approximately the cost of elevator and warehouse services), and you get after two-three months a price of around \$300 per tonne of grain.

There has never been a price like this in the history of the grain trade. Russia used to gear itself to world prices, now world prices are geared to Russian prices. Just as some time ago we pushed up world sugar prices, now something similar is happening to grain. Evidently, the lesson of the "sweet affair" has not been learned.

We ordinary folk have learned it, though: Expect an increase in prices in the fall, this time for bread and bakery products, which constitute the chief element in the diet of many Russians. According to Leonid Cheshirskiy, president of the "Roskheobprodukt" corporation, as soon as flour from the new harvest reaches the bakeries, the price of a loaf of bread will rise to R7,000-8,000 at least. Consequently mixed feed and meat will become more expensive. And this will happen right before the elections, with unforeseen consequences.

International Affairs**Kuchma on Visit to Kazakhstan; Constitution**

LD2009201495 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service
in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] On 20 September Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma left for the Republic of Kazakhstan on an official visit. Before his departure he answered questions from journalists. Vitaliy Naumenko has the report:

[Begin recording] [Naumenko] Leonid Danylovych, what is the main aim of this visit to Kazakhstan, so long overdue?

[Kuchma] Although we reached agreement with esteemed Mr. Nazarbayev a long time ago, this meeting, indeed, has been scheduled and is very important to Ukraine.

First, the processes under way within the CIS dictate that communication with my colleagues should be possible every day. Second, Kazakhstan to the economy of Ukraine is a state with vast raw material reserves, without which our industry is unable to function, which particularly applies to the metallurgical and, primarily, non-ferrous metals industry. So that is also of importance.

Of course, our future [should also be considered] in terms of oil and gas and their huge reserves in Kazakhstan. We should look at how this oil and gas can reach Ukraine. So, the number of issues and the package of documents we are bringing to Almaty are considerable and I believe that this visit will certainly be successful.

[Naumenko] Will you be discussing the strategic course of Russia, as recently published, in its relations with the CIS? Will you raise this subject?

[Kuchma] By all means, I think. Unfortunately, however, I have not yet seen this document. Where is it? We certainly will discuss the subject.

[Naumenko] There is the original of the edict.

[Kuchma] There is the original? Our Foreign Ministry has not yet received it. This question, nevertheless, is of utmost importance, as you understand. The view held by my colleague, Nazarbayev, is of much importance to us and myself personally.

[Naumenko] How do you feel about the stance of Ukraine's left-wing forces at all costs to prevent holding a referendum and putting Ukraine's Constitution to a referendum?

[Kuchma] I can see frequent changes in their attitude. Earlier they vociferously insisted that nothing other

than a referendum would do and that the people alone should say the word. Today their opinion has changed because the president said: Boys, if you say that the constitutional treaty does not exactly suit you let us then push for a speedier adoption of the Constitution, which Constitution, indeed, should only be passed at a referendum since we have no other means of passage. We can see a split within the Constitutional Commission and we can see that the Supreme Council...[pauses] I am totally at a loss as to what to say about it. There are so many political undercurrents and factions that one does not know what decision this Supreme Council will take tomorrow. So I think there should be no preemptive action, which the Constitutional Commission proposed. After its consideration by the Constitutional Commission the draft of this Constitution should be debated by the Supreme Council and be put to a referendum. [end recording]

Kuchma's Agenda for UN Session Reported

AU2009132295 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 19 Sep 95 p 2

[Report by URYADOVYY KURYER and INTERFAX-UKRAYINA: "On the Occasion of the UN 50th Anniversary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will take part in and will deliver a speech at the formal session to mark the 50th anniversary of the United Nations that will be held on 22-24 October at the UN Headquarters in New York.

This was stated on the eve of the General Assembly session by Anatoliy Zlenko, Ukraine's permanent representative to the United Nations. The Ukrainian delegation's work at the present session will be aimed at securing national interests, strengthening national security, and creating a favorable climate for implementing economic reforms. Our diplomats will try to resolve problems related to reducing Ukraine's membership dues for financing the UN activity, in particular peacekeeping operations, and those pertaining to settling our current indebtedness.

It is expected that Ukraine will insist on the resolving of issues of economic assistance to third countries that have been sustaining losses as a consequence of their adherence to the UN Security Council resolution on Yugoslavia, boosting international cooperation aimed at overcoming the aftermath of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant, and accelerating integration of countries with transitional economies into the world economic system.

Crimea Assures OSCE Chief of Loyalty to Kiev

LD2009165795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1317 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, Sept 20 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE) — Crimean Parliament Speaker Yevgeniy Suprunyuk at a meeting with OSCE High Commissioner for Minorities Max van der Stoel on Wednesday reaffirmed his commitment to work "within the legal space of Ukraine."

A new Crimean constitution and regional economic issues were high on the agenda of the meeting, the press office of the Crimean parliament told INTERFAX-UKRAINE.

The commissioner spoke of being impressed by the scope of the program of reintegrating deported peoples in Crimea. He said he understood that the process was being funded by Ukraine alone though it was still unable to bring a rapid and comprehensive solution to all problems.

In an interview with INTERFAX-UKRAINE, van der Stoel spoke of the need for international aid to help resolve the problem of deported peoples, pledging to do his utmost as high commissioner to achieve this end.

In the meantime, the Crimean parliament opening on Wednesday is expected to call on the CIS heads of state to take part in funding the repatriation program.

Mayors of Black Sea Region Capitals Hold Session

AU2009131095 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA
UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 16 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Vitaliy Prykhodko: "An Alliance of Black Sea Region Capitals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 13 and 14 September, governors and mayors of capitals of countries situated in the Black Sea Region met in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. Such contacts have been promoted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Region Economic Cooperation, which held its first mayors' roundtable in Istanbul in September 1994.

The second roundtable discussed the following issue: "Capitals of the Black Sea Region: Problems of Development of the Urban Infrastructure and Prospects for Cooperation." Delegations from Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Armenia, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Romania, and Turkey, headed by the mayors and governors of their capitals, were invited to participate in the session.

The contacts at the conference enabled its participants to exchange their ideas, experiences, and proposals ranging over a wide area of problems of cooperation and

to determine its specific spheres. For example, during the second roundtable, an accord was signed on wide cooperation between Kiev and Yerevan and an agreement between Kiev and Istanbul on supplying the population of our capital with the necessary commodities. Kiev's stores will soon start receiving, on a centralized basis, high-quality goods from Turkey at reasonable prices. Similar negotiations are under way with the mayors of Chinese cities. In the near future, cooperation agreements between Kiev and Sofia, Tbilisi, and Buenos Aires will be signed.

"Despite the diversity of the cities, many of their problems are common in character," pointed out Kiev Mayor Leonid Kosakivskyy. "That is why roundtables are expected to promote joint solutions to these problems and the development of multilateral cooperation and the establishment of friendly ties among the capitals of the Black Sea Region's capitals."

"For myself," said Yerevan Mayor Mr. Khachatryan, "at this conference, I have learned much that will help solve my city's complex problems. I will see to it that housing bonds are introduced in Yerevan just as in Kiev."

The second roundtable passed a resolution on the results of the conference, specifying priorities in cooperation and joint actions by the capitals of the Black Sea Region. It was decided that the next roundtable will be held in the Romanian capital of Bucharest

Russia's Zatulin on Black Sea Fleet Issue

LD2009102995 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0850 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow — The problems of the Black Sea Fleet cannot be simplified down to the division of ships, bases, and infrastructure, Konstantin Zatulin, the chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs and Ties with Compatriots, said in an interview with UNIAN.

According to Zatulin, the problem can only be addressed if Ukraine and Russia find common political aims and mutual understanding in relations between each other. If Ukraine "sees Brussels as the center of the CIS rather than Moscow, then it is unlikely that one would come across a Russian politician who would dare to offer Ukraine cheap Russian oil and gas," Konstantin Zatulin said.

In his opinion, a large-scale treaty between Ukraine and the Russian Federation will not be signed until Ukraine puts on a legal footing its relations with Crimea, and removes the problem of dual citizenship and bilingualism. "Even if it is signed the Russian

State Duma will not ratify it unless these problems are addressed," he said.

Russian Noncompliance Threatens Nuclear Cycle Project

WS2109103395 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 14 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Ihor Osypchuk: "'Warhead' Shock"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Twenty-two thousand containers with radioactive waste have been stockpiled at Russia's only plant which reprocessing weapons-grade uranium and plutonium and dismantles nuclear warheads, in Krasnoyarsk. A UNIAN correspondent was told this by Valeriy Menshykov, member of the Russian Federation Interdepartmental Commission for Environmental Safety. He believes Russia has the right to refuse Ukrainian warheads, since this [overstockpiling] threatens the Russian Federation's national security.

According to the Ukrainian-U.S.-Russian agreement on our country's disarmament, signed in January 1994, Kiev is to send warheads to Russia during the course of five years, and in exchange is to receive fuel for nuclear power plants. The United States assumes the responsibility for all expenditures connected with this.

The agreement is about fuel for VVER-1000 reactors, Mykhaylo Umanets, chairman of the Ukrainian State Nuclear Committee, told our newspaper. There are 10 such reactors in our country, out of 14 currently operating. The pace of the withdrawal of warheads will make it possible to supply our nuclear plants with 65 percent of free fuel. This is approximately half of the needs of the entire Ukrainian power engineering industry (we purchase 100 percent of fuel for other reactors).

If Russia refuses to fulfill its commitments outlined in the agreement, Ukraine will have to not only double purchases of fuel for nuclear plants, but also say goodbye to the hope of creating its own nuclear fuel production cycle on time. The point is that money saved by exchanging warheads for fuel is to be spent on creating our own nuclear cycle, as we were told by the public relations center of the State Nuclear Committee. We were also told by this center that Ukraine had not been officially informed about the possibility of suspending the reception of warheads.

Commentary on Bosnian Serbs, NATO Air Strikes AU2109105395 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 19 Sep 95 p 5

[Commentary by Valeriy Druzenko: "The Serbs Must Now have Their Say"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This week will probably answer the question of whether the NATO forces will stop their air strikes against the Serbs or will resume them on an even larger scale. The strikes had earlier been halted to enable the Serbs to withdraw all of their heavy weaponry from around Sarajevo. On Sunday, the deadline was extended for another 72 hours. However, if the weapons are not withdrawn, then, according to U.S. President Bill Clinton, "NATO will resume the air strikes."

There is nothing surprising about the fact that assessments of these events by Ukrainian politicians, who are largely opposed to the confrontation, have been unanimous. According to Ukraine's Foreign Ministry statement, it "was pleased with the reports on recent positive changes in the cause of settling the Yugoslav crisis, especially regarding the Bosnian Serbs' consent to withdraw the weapons."

It is hoped in Ukraine that such a development of events, along with the accords reached in Geneva on 8 September with the sides to the conflict, will contribute to the full cessation of hostilities and will render the negotiating process irreversible.

However, Ukraine's position remains Ukraine's position. Even though Kiev has once again reiterated its readiness to step up its participation, the cause of settling the crisis (if only partially, so far) now depends upon the Bosnian Serbs' tractability and their readiness to keep their promises.

National Affairs

Composition of New National Security Council Published

LD2009085295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0720 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian president has signed a decree on changes to the National Security Council and its Presidium. The decree approves the personnel of the National Security Council and the personnel of the Presidium.

The composition of the National Security Council under the president of Ukraine:

Leonid Kuchma — President of Ukraine, chairman of the National Security Council;

Volodymyr Horbulin — secretary of the National Security Council under the president of Ukraine, adviser to the president on national security issues;

Viktor Bannykh — chairman, State Committee for Defense of Ukrainian state borders;

Petro Hermanchuk — minister of finances of Ukraine;

Vasyl Hureyev — minister of the economy;

Vasyl Durdynets — deputy prime minister for issues of state security and emergency situations;

Yuriy Kostenko — minister for the environment and nuclear safety;

Yuriy Kravchenko — minister of internal affairs;

Yevhen Marchuk — prime minister of Ukraine;

Serhiy Osyka — minister of foreign economic relations and trade;

Volodymyr Radchenko — chairman of the security service of Ukraine;

Dmytro Tabachnyk — head of the president's administration;

Hennadiy Udovenko — foreign minister of Ukraine;

Valeriy Shmarov — minister of defense.

The Presidium of the National Security Council of Ukraine:

Leonid Kuchma — president of Ukraine, chairman of the Presidium of the National Security Council.

Other members of the Presidium:

Volodymyr Horbulin,

Vasyl Durdynets,

Yevhen Marchuk,

Volodymyr Radchenko,

Valeriy Shmarov.

Progress of Conventional Arms Reduction Program

WS2109094495 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lvov, Sept. 19 — The Lvov-based 17th Armored Vehicle Repair Factory this week dismantled the last tank of the Transcarpathian military district under terms of a European conventional forces reduction treaty signed by 29 countries in Vienna in November 1990, Ukrainian military representatives said Tuesday [19 September].

According to Viktor Matsko, Ukrainian Armed Forces conventional arms department chief, the conventional arms reduction program in Ukraine and Europe will be finished by Nov. 19.

Matsko said that the program consists of three stages. During the first stage — November 1992 to November 1993 — Ukraine eliminated 25 percent of its armored

vehicles designated for elimination (431 tanks and 405 armored personnel carriers). During the second stage — November 1993 to November 1994 — another 35 percent (370 tanks and 210 APCs) were decommissioned. The remaining 40 percent slated for reduction will be eliminated by Nov. 19, the scheduled end of the third stage.

After the program is completed, NATO countries and the former Warsaw Pact countries will maintain equal forces. Ukraine will have 4,080 tanks, 5,050 APCs, 4,040 artillery pieces, 1,090 airplanes and 330 helicopters.

The Lvov factory dismantled 1,127 tanks and 518 armored vehicles. A portion of these military vehicles were converted into civilian use as earth movers, tractors, fire vehicles and cranes.

The NATO inspection group that oversaw the final stage of arms elimination at the Lvov factory said it was satisfied with the results.

Rukh Leader Comments on 'Deep Crisis' in Country

WS2109105195 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Lvov, Sept. 19. Rukh leader Vyiacheslav Chornovil recently declared at a party rally that Ukraine remains "in a deep crisis" because the state has not yet introduced economic reforms.

Chornovil said he believes the "so-called party of power that surrounds the president is ruling the country." As for the government and President Leonid Kuchma himself, Chornovil said Rukh would support them if they would carry out efficient steps toward economic reform.

Responding to recent leftist comments about an "autumn attack" of working people, Chornovil said, "We have to prevent this attack. With this purpose we repeat our intent to carry out a mourning march, dedicated to 'black November,' and I think we will be able to neutralize the leftists in Kiev."

Chornovil said that in eastern Ukraine to oppose leftists, Rukh would have to "involve the democratic forces from Halychyna to launch a counter attack against the left."

UNA-UNSD Deputies Charged With Organizing Mass Disturbances

LD2109111295 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0910 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Twelve regional council deputies from the UNA-UNSD [Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense] who were

detained on 20 September in Independence Square, have being charged with organizing mass disturbances, Yaroslav Ilyasevych, a Ukrainian people's deputy from the UNA-UNSD, told UNIAN.

According to him, UNA-UNSD members intend to picket the building of the Starokievskiy regional internal affairs directorate where the detained are currently being held.

In an interview with UNIAN, Yaroslav Ilyasevych said that "the detention of the hunger-striking deputies is a well-planned provocation which testifies to the emergence of a police state in Ukraine." In his opinion, the authorities' actions on the eve of Ukraine's admission to the Council of Europe could lead to negative consequences.

According to the people's deputy, nobody from the presidential administration cared to ascertain the circumstances leading to the detention of the hunger-striking deputies.

People's deputies Oleh Vitovych and Yuriy Tyma as well as Kiev council deputy Oleh Kubakh are continuing the hunger strike in Independence Square.

UNA Members Begin Hunger Strike, Issue Demands

WS2109103095 Kiev *INTELNEWS in English*
0813 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept. 19. Dmytro Korchynskyy, Ukrainian National Assembly deputy chairman, said that some UNA members started another hunger strike on Tuesday [19 September].

Last week eight UNA members began what became a three-day hunger strike after President Leonid Kuchma said he would launch an investigation into the Justice Ministry's decision to remove UNA's political party status. The UNA said it decided to begin another hunger strike after waiting a week without results from Kuchma.

After announcing the resumption of their protest, the UNA hunger strikers including parliamentary deputies Oleh Vitovych, Yuriy Tyma and other local councils' deputies from Kyiv, Vinnytsya and Cherkasy, headed to the presidential administration, flanked by other UNA members and journalists.

However, presidential guards prevented the strikers from meeting administration members. After being thwarted, the UNA hunger strikers went to Maydan Nezalezhnosti to continue their protest, donning white ribbons and laying out their sleeping bags.

The hunger strikers repeated their demands: punishment for those governmental officials responsible for violent militia conduct against mourners at the July 18 funeral of Patriarch Volodymyr Romaniuk, reinstating UNA political party status, the resignation of acting Justice Minister Volodymyr Chernysh and no increase in municipal service fees.

Trade Unions Seen Moving Right

WS2109094695 Kiev *ZERKALO NEDELI in Russian*
16 Sep 95 p 4

[Report by Serhiy Moruhin: "Trade Unions: Blown to the Right"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The First Congress of the Association of Ukrainian Independent Trade Unions [OVPU] has been in operation for three days. This organization now includes 73 trade unions, comprising approximately 15 sectoral trade union organizations. The congress has adopted its charter and elected its leadership. Petro Poberezhnyk, representative of the Chervonohrad Miners' Independent Trade Union, became the new OVPU chairman.

A decision was adopted to regard the congress as the first one, even though the OVPU has been in operation for about two years. During all this time, Oleksandr Mryl, chairman of the Ukrainian Miners' Independent Trade Union, headed the OVPU. Oleksandr Mryl, a recognized "star" of the trade union movement, did not participate this time in the work of the congress. As it turned out, he was removed from his position because the OVPU audit commission has revealed financial abuses of the former OVPU leadership. Despite the fact that the financial scandal has passed, the OVPU assets are still frozen and its numerous staff have not been paid for three months, thus far.

The outcome is not very comforting. After its effective appearance on the stage in 1988-90, when it seemed that it was the end of the official Ukrainian Federation of Independent Trade Unions [FNPU], the OVPU began to gradually, step by step, lose its gained positions. One of the primary reasons for this was the conflict of leaders' ambitions. Similar battles also occur in other public and political organizations, but if in parties the main stakes are placed on power, the trade unions are affected by the "yellow devil."

A trade union is unthinkable without money. The most important form of work of any trade union organization is the accumulation of assets of its members for mutual assistance. "Rainy day funds," credit unions [kreditnyye soyuzy], social and pension funds are being set up; sometimes even the establishment of "survival funds" —

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these are thoroughly concealed funds to provide clandestine operations of a trade union — is envisaged. The great amount of cash money must be augmented and protected from inflation. Serious commercial activities are being launched. It is far from always that trade unions' treasurers or partners turn out to be honest and businesslike people. As a result, members of new trade unions become not only disappointed in the opportunities of the organized trade union movement, but also stop believing in any opportunity to self-organize, shifting to a passive, lumpen state.

Journalists like to place a diagnosis: Society is sick. But this disease affects rather young public organizations that turn out to be sick from birth. Internal squabbles provoked by the absence of political and organizational experience and the knowledge of concrete work objectives absorb up to 90 percent of trade unions' constructive potential. The increase in apathy triggers a response: One begins to search for a strong hand, a powerful authority whose iron will will break through the employer's resistance.

The most probable place to find such a leader is the Ukrainian ultra-right organizations. They themselves do not shun from playing the role of social-democrats or anarcho-syndicalists. Of all things, the ultra-right do not show a deficit of experience in working with the labor movement. Mussolini's labor corporations were trade unions, were they not? The main slogan under which trade unions are established is solidarity, and the concept of solidarity implies the choice between "bad," mechanical, and wrong solidarity with bad people and "good," organic, and true solidarity with good people. As regards the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA], it is its leader who specifies the meaning of the concepts "bad" and "good" at the beginning of each week; consequently, a UNA adherent must sense a feeling of deep comfort and not be burdened with the problem of making a choice. Such an approach can once and for all resolve the problem of intellectualization of trade union leaders, who represent the interests of blue-collar workers. The spring appeal by Dmytro Korchynskyy to throw away communists from trade unions, however, could have a slightly more lengthy effect.

The chances of the left are considerably worse. Yes, at the beginning of the century, they created the social "working class" out of an incoherent mass of workers. But their success in consolidating the working people came to an end at this phase. The Communist Party of Ukraine is currently partly overseeing some regional and local trade unions. But these trade unions belong to the FNPU, headed by Stoyan, the distinctive feature of which is record-breaking incoherence. Practically any decision adopted at the top is extinguished by

the sectoral leadership. If by a miracle the sectoral leadership supports the decision adopted at the top, one can be 100 percent sure that local organizations will ignore it. Do not worry, they will not go on strike!

In this aspect, the OVPU is more mobile. It "controls" the key economic sectors — coal and iron-extracting industries and transportation. Even a small strike in these sectors can, if not halt the economy, then in any case make much fuss. Therefore, it is much more dangerous to make such a powerful social weapon available to radical forces. The red will not score success here: Together with the dislike of FNPU, the OVPU members also received a legacy of stable immunity against this color. The combination of the red flag with the black cross, however, is a serious threat to the entire Ukrainian trade union movement.

The UNA experience shows that it is not so difficult to get the upper hand over a trade union. The emergence of new trade unions, created from below, has not yet acquired a mass nature. Members of any political organization could become perfect catalysts of such a process. Even one party member, in agreement with his two-three friends, can create a trade union at their enterprise. Given certain financial and organizational support, this trade union will quite easily expand; delegates for a congress will be elected in proportion to the number of trade union's members; however, at the congress, a small but quite well-organized group, can take power without any specific problems.

Approximately such a scenario was used at the OVPU First Congress. The Independent Trade Union of Servicemen, which is under the strong influence of the UNA, almost took power by force on the last day of the congress when, under the umbrella of the vote-counting commission, it began to arbitrarily reregister delegates. Despite the fact that the congress disapproved of this, the new OVPU Chairman Petro Poberezhnyk was elected precisely through "bayonets" of the Independent Trade Union of Servicemen, whose delegates greeted him with prolonged applause. After the congress, Konstantin Zakharenko, chairman of the Ukrainian Students' Trade Union, Po-STUP, ["movement ahead"], who was the primary VPVU [expansion unknown] opponent, said: "We tried to behave like gentlemen, but it led to no results. The UNA went right through. It has even resorted to open threats."

All these developments make us doubt that it would be possible to seriously speak about a trade union lobby in Ukraine soon. Yes, independent trade unions do a lot of work in provinces and autonomously participate in elections. For example, Hryhoryy Nedviga, trade union activist of the Kazatyn railroad depot, was elected

Ukrainian Supreme Council deputy; miners' hunger strikes and protest actions are not subsiding. One, however, cannot speak about a single workers' front that could also be able to cooperate constructively both with the government and private employers.

Parliament Prohibits More Enterprises From Privatization

*WS2109094395 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept. 19 — Parliament passed a resolution on Tuesday that added more enterprises to the list, approved earlier this year, of 6,100 enterprises prohibited from privatization.

The newest enterprises added are primarily related to natural gas storage and transport. The resolution states that the enterprises on the list should remain exclusively in state hands without transfer to other states. There are more than 100 enterprises, primarily the largest gas industry facilities, on the list.

The resolution was passed, according to Parliament deputies, after various state and private groups expressed concerns over creation of the GazTranzit Russian-Ukrainian joint venture and state gas facilities to be transferred to the new company. According to Valeriy Cherep, parliamentary Key Industries and Social Development of Regions Committee head, the approved list includes the two biggest gas storage facilities, in Lvov and Ivano-Frankivsk, with a 35-billion-cubic-meter capacity, which together hold 40 percent of Ukraine's annual gas requirement.

The owner of such storage facilities would control a large monopoly, Cherep told INTELNEWS.

Five parliamentary committees were scheduled to consider GasTranzit activity at their Wednesday meeting and to inform Parliament about this on Thursday. According to Cherep, the committees' meeting was postponed and will take place after Oct. 1 because top government officials traveled to Kazakhstan with the president on Wednesday.

It is planned that top government officials, led by First Deputy Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, will participate in the October meetings, Cherep said.

Kuchma Commission To Investigate Collapse of Currency

*WS2109094595 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 95*

[By Valeriy Druzhenko, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept. 20 — President Leonid Kuchma has created a special committee to investigate the August collapse of the karbovanets, the presidential administration revealed Wednesday.

The committee, chaired by First Deputy Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko and staffed by 14 people from parliamentary and banking structures, was ordered Thursday to report back by Oct. 15 concerning the reasons behind the massive dive taken by the currency and prepare remedial recommendations.

The karbovanets, weakened by government announcements of an impending currency changeover and the issuance of massive credits to industries, lost about 35 percent of its value against the dollar during the second week of August, reaching a street trading low of KBV205,000/USD.

Politicians have since been calling for the heads of those responsible, with National Bank of Ukraine Chairman Viktor Yushchenko being singled out for particular ire by the leftist majority in Parliament.

The establishment of the committee may in fact be a move intended to buy time for Yushchenko, whose dismissal by Parliament was reported to be imminent, according to sources in the parliamentary Presidium and banking circles.

Foreign Legal Entities Released From Nuclear Liability

*WS2109103295 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 Sep 95*

[by Valeriy Druzhenko, "Special to INTELNEWS"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept. 20. The Cabinet of Ministers has issued a resolution releasing foreign legal entities from civil liability for nuclear accidents.

To be released from accountability, legal entities should be engaged under a technical support program or on a commercial basis related to supplying and installation of equipment, construction, start up and shut down of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste processing facilities or other similar activities.

The entity should submit all necessary documents to the Coordination Committee for Population Protection,

according to the Cabinet order, which was issued Tuesday.

The liability exemptions are to be approved on a case-by-case basis by the committee and the government, according to the resolution.

Parliament had earlier set off a storm of criticism on April 26, the ninth anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster, when it authorized the Cabinet to allow the exemptions.

Although proponents of the move contend that it is necessary to remove the huge liability exposure if Ukraine is to attract foreign investment to its troubled nuclear industry, opponents questioned the ability of the government to control the activity of these foreign firms if the measure were made effective.

"This resolution was lobbied for by people in the government who do not worry about the Ukrainian people," said Ukrainian National Assembly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense Organization (UNA-UNSO) Deputy Yaroslav Illiasevych. "We clearly know that foreign businesses did not care and will not care about Ukraine's needs."

But Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko defended the measure as making possible the tremendous amount of Western help needed to upgrade the country's nuclear facilities.

"According to current Ukrainian legislation, all damage caused by nuclear incidents should be the responsibility of the organization which uses the nuclear facilities, but not the institution which delivers facilities," he said.

Test Launches of 'Strizh' Drones Completed in Crimea

WS2009083095 Lvov INFOBANK in English
0701 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Test launches of the Strizh pilotless reconnaissance aircraft or "drones", as they are called in the military, were completed at the Bagirovo range in Crimea. Journalists were permitted to attend the tests for the first time. There is a regiment and a squadron of such aircraft in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. All components of Strizh are fully Ukrainian-made, and aircraft themselves are assembled by the Kharkov aviation plant. A drone needs significantly less fuel than an ordinary plane, may be launched from a special pad, and flies either by radio commands or a pre-determined program. The Strizh is 12 m long and has the wingspan of 6 m, the minimum flight altitude of 50 m, and the maximum altitude of 3 km.

Economic Issues

Adviser Says Second Stage of Economic Reform Under Way

LD2009170095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Adjusting the reform process proclaimed by the Ukrainian president, opens up the second stage in reforming the Ukrainian economy. If the aim of the first stage (beginning October 1994) was "financial stabilization at any price" then now it is necessary to search for mechanisms of combining monetarist methods with an increase in the level of output. Anatoliy Halchynskyy, the adviser to the president on macroeconomic issues, said this at a regular briefing for journalists held at the president's administration on 20 September.

According to him, the main achievement of economic reforms was that the situation in Ukraine was being controlled and managed. The introduction of the president's economic program assisted the formation of an active government that has prepared a program of actions for the Cabinet of Ministers in the area of the economy.

Halchynskyy explained his own criticism of monetarism by saying that the supporters of this model of reforming the economy "left no doubt as to the positiveness of the influence of monetarist policies."

Savings Lost Due To Inflation Will Be Compensated

WS2109094295 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0813 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, Sept. 19 — Certificates intended to compensate citizens whose savings was lost to inflation will be issued by year end, Oleksandr Kaptsov, deputy chief of the State Property Fund, announced Tuesday [19 September].

In other matters, SPF officials announced that 1,527 medium and large enterprises have been privatized to date, about 900 of them through certificate auctions.

In addition, the SPF announced that six gas stations, including the land under them, were auctioned in Rivne Saturday at a price of KBV2 billion to KBV3 billion each (about US\$ 16,500). Each station has one pump.

After the auction, the auctioneer's gavel was put up on the block for KBV1 million. An anonymous purchaser eventually bought the gavel for KBV1 hammer of auctioneer was proposed for sale with starting price of KBV 1 million. The hammer was sold for KBV 1 billion (US\$ 5,500). The money was donated to the Rivne orphanage.

Text of General Wage Agreement

954K0680A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 19 Aug 95

["General Agreement Between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Trade Union Associations of Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

SECTION I**GENERAL PRINCIPLES**

The General Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") was concluded in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Collective Contracts and Agreements" on a bilateral basis between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and trade unions (hereinafter the "Parties") on behalf of which authorized representatives conducted collective negotiations for the purpose of concluding this Agreement.

The provisions of this Agreement apply directly and cover all entities within the jurisdiction of the Parties as of the date of the signing of this Agreement.

The norms of the Agreement are binding in negotiations and the conclusion of agreements (contracts) at the sectoral, regional, and production levels as minimum guarantees.

The Agreement comes into force from the moment it is signed and remains valid until a new Agreement is concluded or this Agreement is reviewed.

The Parties have agreed to the following:

SECTION 2**IN THE SPHERE OF ENSURING PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR THE POPULATION FROM UNEMPLOYMENT**

2.1. Ensuring productive employment and social protection for workers freed up in connection with the structural reorganization of the economy, changes in the form of ownership, and the organization of production and labor:

2.1.1. To improve the ways and mechanisms of implementing a policy of employment and social protection for the population, including through the development of sectoral, territorial, and a state program for the employment of the population.

2.1.2. To retain the level of legislative guarantees in effect in 1994 for individual categories of the population, as provided for in Articles 5 and 26 of

the Law of Ukraine "On the Employment of the Population."

2.1.3. In the process of structural reorganization, to include measures designed to redistribute labor resources in social production, including in a manner that will benefit future and strategically vital sectors of the economy.

2.2. Regulating the problems of mass lay-offs of workers:

2.2.1. To provide for extraordinary measures to ensure employment and social protection of the population in the event that the level of unemployment exceeds the limits set in the State Employment Program for 1995.

2.2.2. To prepare in the third quarter of 1995 in coordination with the trade union Party proposed changes in acting legislation with respect to regulating the problem of partial unemployment and social protection of those partially unemployed.

After the necessary changes have been made to acting legislation, to submit according to established procedure ILO Convention No. 168 "Concerning the Promotion of Employment and Protection Against Unemployment" for ratification by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

2.3. For the purpose of ensuring the productive employment of the population and social guarantees in the event of unemployment, in the fourth quarter of 1995 to work out in collaboration with the trade union associations a long-term (three- to five-year) program for the employment of the population of Ukraine and a conception of developing a job market, taking into account the structural reorganization of the economy, privatization, and investment and taxation policies.

2.4. To improve the system of providing information for the study and analysis of the state of the job market as a basis for objective forecasting of trends in this market.

SECTION 3**IN THE SPHERE OF GUARANTEEING PAYMENT FOR WORK, REGULATING THE WAGE LEVEL, AND PROTECTING WAGES**

3.1. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall submit to the Supreme Council of Ukraine proposals regarding bringing the legislative acts of Ukraine into conformity with the Law of Ukraine "On Wages" and shall work out in coordination with the trade union associations the normative acts that flow from this Law.

3.2. With the participation of trade union associations, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall calculate and prepare forecasts of the impact of the amounts of

minimum state guarantees with respect to wages on the level of unemployment and prices and on this basis prepare proposals in the fourth quarter of 1995 regarding the phased implementation of the second part of Article 9 and Articles 10, 33, and 34 of the Law of Ukraine "On Wages" and the ratification of ILO Convention No. 26 "Concerning the Procedure for Establishing the Minimum Wage" and No. 131 "Concerning the Establishment of the Minimum Wage With Special Attention to Developing Countries."

3.3. For the period until the Supreme Council of Ukraine approves the new minimum wage as a state social guarantee, to establish guaranteed minimum wages in sectoral and territorial agreements and collective contracts in accordance with Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine "On Collective Contracts and Agreements" and Article 19 of the Law of Ukraine "On Enterprises in Ukraine" in pursuance of the goal to bring the minimum wage guarantees closer to the amount designated as the poverty line.

3.4. In the third quarter of 1995, in collaboration with the relevant trade unions, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall prepare proposals regarding establishing the optimum ratios in the wages of employees of budget institutions and organizations.

3.5. To establish in accordance with the addendum a list and minimum guaranteed levels of supplementary payments, bonuses, and compensation that are of an intersectoral nature.

3.6. To establish that payment for overtime shall be double the usual rate.

3.7. Beginning in 1995, to calculate the actual value of the labor force and ensure that these data are published in the mass media.

3.8. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine pledges to solve issues pertaining to minimum wage guarantees in the production and budget spheres and to protect them by means of negotiations (consultations) with the trade union associations of Ukraine.

3.9. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:

shall apply measures to pay off in July-August 1995 that portion of all outstanding wages and leave pay in the budget sectors that has formed from the state budget [as published];

in collaboration with the trade union associations, by 1 September 1995 shall draw up and submit for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine drafts of legislative acts aimed at replenishing the state budget and earmarking these funds for the payment of wages in the budget sphere;

in the third quarter of 1995, working together with the trade union associations, shall review the timeliness with which wages are paid at state enterprises, organizations, and institutions, study the reasons for delays in payment, and work out measures to prevent instances of late payment of wages in the production and budget spheres.

3.10. The government Party shall provide the trade union associations free of charge with statistical data on wage amounts in accordance with the provision in Article 15 of the Law of Ukraine "On Collective Contracts and Agreements."

SECTION 4

IN THE SPHERE OF ENSURING SOCIAL GUARANTEES

4.1. Guarantees of the living standard of the population:

4.1.1. To review periodically the amount of the average per capita aggregate income that entitles the recipient to state assistance correspondent to the rise of the consumer goods and price index in order to narrow the gap between the average per capita aggregate income and the level of the poverty line.

4.1.2. To work out the social norms of food product consumption for persons of nonworking age, as well as the accepted standards for providing the population with housing and municipal services (water, gas, electric power, heat, and sewerage), in order to calculate the value of the poverty line during 1995 in accordance with Article 25 of the Principles of the Legislation of Ukraine on the Protection of Health and to submit them for approval by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

4.1.3. To initiate monthly reporting to trade union associations regarding the level of the poverty line, taking into account the rise in prices and rates of goods and services.

4.1.4. To ensure a review of fixed personal incomes (pensions, stipends, social and compensatory payments) contingent on the rise of the consumer price index.

Proposals to review the amounts of pensions, stipends, and social and compensatory payments contingent on the rise of the consumer price index and the level of the poverty line shall be coordinated with the trade union associations.

4.1.5. To prepare with the participation of the trade union associations and to submit proposals regarding making changes and additions to the Law of Ukraine "On Pensions" based on economic possibilities.

4.1.6. To work out by the end of 1995 a draft Law of Ukraine on making changes and additions to the Law of Ukraine "On State Assistance to Families with Children," ensuring that this law provides for enhancing social protection for families with children who need special support from the state, based on the possibilities of the state budget.

4.1.7. To work out approved proposals regarding improving the mechanism of providing social protection for the population for the purpose of enhancing the personal nature of social aid, and also to create the necessary services within the limits of the funds made available for maintaining the services that provide social protection for the population.

4.1.8. To prepare proposals by 1 October 1995 regarding the establishment of a maximum personal income tax (not to exceed 40 percent of income).

4.1.9. The Parties pledge to ensure the targeted use of the funds under their jurisdiction that have been allocated for social purposes. Reports on this shall be published in the mass media each quarter.

4.2. Housing and Municipal Services Guarantees:

4.2.1. To work out a draft State Housing Program that provides for the most favorable conditions for the construction and purchase of housing for families that have spent a long time waiting for improved housing and earn low incomes.

4.2.2. Given the phased increases in the prices and rates of municipal services, liquefied gas, and solid fuel, to ensure by the end of 1995 that the share of costs paid by the population for housing and municipal services, liquefied gas, and solid fuel does not exceed 15 percent of the average monthly total income of a family within the limits of the sanitary norm for the ownership or use of total living space and the accepted standards for use of municipal services.

4.2.3. To complete the drafting of a new Housing Code of Ukraine and to submit it for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

In the draft legislative acts, to provide for the protection of the housing rights of socially vulnerable strata of the population, including the right to the cost-free maintenance of housing within the limits of the established social norm for the disabled and war veterans, low-income families, persons who suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station, etc.

SECTION 5

IN THE SPHERE OF LABOR RELATIONS, WORK AND VACATION REGIMES

5.1. Monitoring and verification of compliance with labor rights and guarantees established by legislation:

5.1.1. Until a state labor inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor is created, to retain the trade union legal labor inspectorates.

5.1.2. To provide for in the statute on the state labor inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor that in its work this body shall cooperate with trade union agencies responsible for public monitoring of compliance with the labor rights and guarantees of workers.

5.1.3. That the State Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor and the central and local agencies of the state executive branch shall work out a system for monitoring compliance with state labor legislation.

5.2. Work and holiday regimes:

5.2.1. In the third quarter of 1995, to submit for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine a draft of the Law of Ukraine "On Holidays."

5.2.2. To submit to the Supreme Council of Ukraine proposals to ratify ILO Convention No. 132 "Concerning Annual Holidays With Pay" and No. 140 "Concerning Leave With Pay for Training" within three months of the time that the Law of Ukraine "On Holidays" comes fully into force.

5.2.3. To adopt decisions that will ensure implementation of the Law of Ukraine "On Holidays" according to the schedule provided for in the decree of the Supreme Council of Ukraine "On the Procedure for Bringing Into Force the Law of Ukraine 'On Holidays.'"

5.2.4. To recommend to enterprises that they introduce the practice of deducting at least 0.3 percent of the wage fund from the income left at their disposal to turn over to the trade union committees for cultural and sports activities.

SECTION 6

IN THE SPHERE OF THE PROTECTION OF LABOR, HEALTH, AND THE ENVIRONMENT

6.1. Protection of labor and the environment:

6.1.1. With the participation of trade union associations, to work out a program for the phased limiting of the use of women for night work, as well as removing women

from industries that involve heavy labor and hazardous conditions.

6.1.2. To promote the organization of the production of special work clothing, special work footwear, and other means of individual and collective protection for workers in amounts required to meet the needs of enterprises and organizations with all forms of ownership in accordance with existing standards.

6.1.3. In collaboration with the trade union associations, to begin a review and drafting of:

a list of industries, shops, professions, and jobs involving hazardous work conditions, employment in which entitles an individual to additional holidays and a shortened workday;

typical sectoral standards for the issue free of charge of special work clothing, special work footwear, and protective means.

6.1.4. To work out and ensure the implementation of a program for training specialists to deal with emergencies in various sectors of the national economy and include provisions in this program for the establishment of appropriate training centers.

6.1.5. To continue the construction of complexes for recycling and burying toxic industrial wastes (toxic chemicals, pesticides, chemical substances) that cannot be utilized.

6.1.6. To submit to the Supreme Council of Ukraine a draft of the Law of Ukraine "On Zones With Special Ecological Conditions, Their Classification and Status," and following passage of this law to identify zones of ecological disasters and apply a complex of measures to improve the living conditions of the population that resides in ecologically hazardous environments.

6.1.7. In accordance with Article 12 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of Labor" and with the participation of trade union associations, to begin working out the criteria for assessing moral losses and the procedure for compensating these losses.

6.2. Public health protection, recovery, and the physical development of the population:

6.2.1. With the participation of the trade unions, to work out and submit to the Supreme Council of Ukraine a draft National Program for Reforming the System of Public Health Protection in Ukraine.

6.2.2. With the participation of the trade union associations, to prepare and submit to the Supreme Council of Ukraine a proposed list of public health and social security establishments that are not subject to privatization.

6.2.3. To work out and approve normative documents regulating the procedure for providing health care and rehabilitation in sanatorium and health resort institutions to persons who took part in eliminating the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station and to the population that suffered as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

6.2.4. To continue the retrospective assessment of the radiation dose suffered by children to their thyroid gland in ecologically polluted population centers of Ukraine in order to designate them as victims under Article 27 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Status and Social Protection of Citizens Who Suffered as a Result of the Chernobyl Catastrophe."

6.2.5. To work out and approve a normative document "On the Procedure for Removing Persons of Working Age from the Exclusion Zone and Providing Them with Employment Based on the State of Their Health."

SECTION 7

IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL SECURITY

7.1. With the participation of trade union associations, to work out the draft of the Fundamental Principles of the Legislation of Ukraine on Social Insurance and to submit it for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

7.2. To examine the question of creating a national scientific research center on social security issues, including social insurance.

7.3. With the participation of trade unions, to continue working on the establishment of an insurance rate and to put into force a mechanism for providing social insurance against accidents and job-related illnesses in accordance with Articles 8 and 11 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Protection of Labor."

SECTION 8

IN THE SPHERE OF GUARANTEES IN THE PROCESS OF CONDUCTING PRIVATIZATION

8.1. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the State Property Fund of Ukraine, as well as other bodies of the state executive branch and organizations charged under the law with the functions of managing state-owned property, shall consult with trade unions at the appropriate levels regarding social and labor issues connected with the process of privatizing or reforming state ownership.

8.2. In the course of drawing up legislative and normative acts, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall ensure that small investors are protected, that a mechanism

of reciprocal conversion of privatization documents is worked out, and that government officials, financial intermediaries, and other entities taking part in privatization are held liable for any violations of the legislation governing privatization.

8.3. To work out jointly with the trade union associations proposals on insuring risks connected with utilizing privatization papers.

8.4. The State Property Fund of Ukraine, together with the trade union associations, shall organize nationwide training concerning various aspects of privatization in accordance with a special program.

8.5. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall ensure the creation of a mechanism for implementing the Edict of the President of Ukraine of 24 November 1994 (No. 698) "On Compensating the Citizens of Ukraine for Losses Suffered as a Result of the Devaluation of Savings in the Institutions of the Savings Bank of Ukraine and Ukrainian State Insurance," which shall provide for compensating the citizens of Ukraine for losses sustained as a result of the devaluation of their savings.

8.6. With the participation of trade unions, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the State Property Fund shall review questions and adopt decisions with respect to the conditions for maintaining, handing over, or converting objects in the social-cultural and public health spheres that are on the books of enterprises and organizations.

8.7. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine shall work out and with the approval of the trade union associations shall submit a Concept of the Privatization of Objects in the Social Sphere for consideration by the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

8.8. The State Property Fund of Ukraine shall ensure that the citizens of Ukraine and trade union bodies are provided with complete and timely information about privatization issues.

SECTION 9

IN THE SPHERE OF SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP

9.1. The Parties believe that the contractual regulation of social and economic processes based on principles of social partnership is an objective necessity in the conditions of a transition to a market economy.

9.2. The principal elements of the mechanism for implementing this social partnership are collective negotiations, consultations, and cooperation, as well as settling conflicts through labor arbitration, intermediation,

and conciliation within the framework of acting legislation.

9.3. In accordance with ILO Recommendation No. 113 "Concerning Consultations and Cooperation Between Government Agencies and Organizations of Businessmen and Employees on the Sectoral and National Level," the consultation and cooperation between the Parties to this Agreement shall have as their goal the preparation and implementation of a legislative and normative base, which shall define the legal status of the subjects of social partnership and the forms of their interaction, squaring the interests of hired employees and owners, improving social-labor relations, and settling collective labor disputes (conflicts) in accordance with the norms of acting legislation. Towards this end, the Parties shall promote the drafting and passage of the Laws of Ukraine "On Associations of Businessmen," "On Trade Unions," "On Social Partnership," and "On the Procedure for Settling Collective Labor Disputes (Conflicts)."

9.4. By means of consultations, negotiations, working out joint proposals, and constructive actions, the Parties shall focus their efforts on creating conditions favorable to productive labor, stabilization of the economy, and raising the living standard of the population.

9.5. Each Party shall inform the other Party about the subsequent adoption of decisions on matters that concern the social and economic interests of the population of the country and are the subject of this Agreement, and shall agree in advance regarding such decisions by means of official negotiations and consultations. In the event of a failure to agree, the Party submitting drafts of such decisions shall simultaneously inform the body that is to pass the relevant legislative or normative acts about the position of the other Party.

9.6. The Parties shall assist owners, associations of owners, or bodies authorized by them, local organs of the state executive branch, trade unions and their associations, and other bodies authorized by labor collectives to represent them to conduct collective negotiations and draw up sectoral or territorial agreements and collective contracts.

9.7. In the fourth quarter of 1995, the Parties shall prepare agreed-upon proposals with respect to making changes and additions to the Law of Ukraine "On Collective Contracts and Agreements" designed to improve the contractual regulation of social and labor relations.

9.8. The trade union associations that have signed this Agreement shall refrain from organizing and conducting strikes with respect to issues provided for in this Agreement on condition that they are settled.

SECTION 10

CONCLUDING PRINCIPLES

10.1. Changes and additions to this Agreement during the period that it remains in effect may only be made with the consent of both Parties.

10.2. Compliance with the execution of this Agreement is monitored directly by the Parties to this Agreement or their authorized representatives in accordance with the procedure established by the Parties to the Agreement.

10.3. Every quarter, the Parties shall analyze how this Agreement is being carried out, exchange relevant information, and ensure that it is published in URYADOVYY KURYER, PROFSPILKOVA HAZETA, and other mass media. A protocol shall be drawn up regarding failures to execute the provisions of this Agreement, for implementation of which the deadline has passed, and shall be signed by both Parties. Each of the Parties shall name the persons responsible for execution of the provisions of this Agreement.

10.4. The representatives of the Parties are liable in accordance with acting legislation for violating or failing to execute the provisions of this Agreement, failing to take part in negotiations, or failing to provide in timely fashion information that is required in collective negotiations and to monitor compliance.

The Agreement has been signed:

on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:

Prime Minister of Ukraine Ye. MARCHUK

on behalf of the trade union associations of Ukraine:

Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine
O. STOYAN

Chairman of the Association of Free Trade Unions S.
KARIKOV

Chairman of the Council of the Federation of the Trade
Unions of Employees of Cooperatives and Other Forms
of Business Enterprise in Ukraine V. KOSTRYTSYA

Chairman of the Council of Trade Unions of Railroad
Workers and Transportation Builders of Ukraine A.
CHORNOMAZ

Chairman of the Central Committee of the Trade Union
of the Personnel of the National Academy of Sciences
of Ukraine A. SHYROKOV

Chairman of the Solidary Trade Unions of Ukraine O.
SHEYKIN

Acting Chairman of the Trade Union of Certified
Employees of the Internal Affairs Organs of Ukraine
H. KABANCHENKO

Chairman of the All-Ukrainian Association of Workers'
Solidarity (VOST) O. DZHULYK

President of the Trade Union of the Association of
Flight Personnel of the Civil Aviation of Ukraine S.
ROHANIN

The Agreement has been joined by:

The National Confederation of Trade Unions of Ukraine

ADDENDUM to the General Agreement Between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Trade Union Associations of Ukraine

LIST of Supplementary Payments and Bonuses of an Intersectoral Nature to the Wages and Salaries of Employees of Associations, Enterprises, and Organizations

Description of supplementary payments and bonuses—
Maximum amounts of supplementary payments and
bonuses

SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS:

For combining professions (jobs)—no limit set on
amounts of supplementary payments to a single em-
ployee and amounts are determined by the savings
achieved in terms of the wages and salaries of com-
bined employees

For expanding the zone of services or increasing the
volume of jobs—no limit set on maximum amounts
of supplementary payments to a single employee and
amounts are determined by savings achieved in wages
and salaries that would be paid if there were the standard
number of employees

For performing the duties of a temporarily absent
employee—up to 100 percent of the wage (salary) of
the absent employee

For work in difficult, hazardous, and especially haz-
ardous conditions—for work in difficult and hazardous
conditions, up to 12 percent; for work in especially haz-
ardous conditions, up to 24 percent of the standard wage
(salary)

For labor intensiveness of employees—up to 12 percent
of the wage rate

For night work—up to 40 percent of the hourly wage
(salary) for every hour of night work

During the period of setting up new norms of labor
costs—raising piecework rates up to 20 percent, raising
wage rates up to 10 percent

For heading a crew—supplementary payments differ
depending on the number of workers in a crew (up

10, more than 10, more than 25). The exact amount of supplementary payment is determined by sectoral (regional) agreements depending on the amount of the grade rate of the crew foreman. Team leaders, if the team numbers more than five members, receive additional payments amounting up to 50 percent of the corresponding wage of a crew foreman.

BONUSES:

For a high degree of professional skill—different bonuses added to wage rates: for category III workers—12 percent;

—for category IV workers—16 percent;

—for category V workers—20 percent;

—for category VI workers and higher grades—up to 24 percent

For high accomplishments in work—up to 50 percent of salary

For performing especially important work within a specified deadline—up to 50 percent of the salary rate.

Share of Defense Industry in Machine-Building Shrinks

LD2009190795 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1520 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Over the past four years in Ukraine there has been a considerable reduc-

tion in the share of goods produced by the defense industry. While at the end of 1991 the share of defense machine-building enterprises in the total production volume was 60 percent, in 1995 it makes up 20 percent. This was announced by Valeriy Malev, minister of machine-building, military-industrial complex and conversion, at an open meeting of the Commission of the Supreme Council for Basic Industries and Socio-economic Development of the Regions on 20 September. He named the main reasons for the production slump to be the absence of a new structure of the industry, the taxation pressure, and the high prices on raw materials, as a result of which the goods of Ukrainian machine-builders became uncompetitive on the world market.

Valeriy Malev said that for the industry the priority lies in creating a closed system of the aviation industry and searching for markets for products of the shipbuilding and the car manufacturing industries. The minister said that at the moment the absence of turn-over capital remains to be the main problem. "If we were viable, then we could make a qualitatively new step," said Valeriy Malev.

According to him, "the worst slump" has been suffered by the agricultural machine-building. Valeriy Malev believes that it is unacceptable that certain agrarian circles lobby for the sake of obtaining foreign funds in order to purchase agricultural machinery abroad because the agro-industrial complex is the least viable.

Belarus

Chyhir Sends Condolences to Relatives of U.S. Balloonists

LD2009155595 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 2050 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Mikhail Chyhir, prime minister of Belarus, has sent condolences to the relatives of the American balloonists who died tragically on 12 September. The letter to Mrs. Stuart-Jervis, who lives in the state of Maryland, says:

Dear Mrs. Stuart-Jervis: Please accept my sincerest condolences in connection with the tragic death of your husband, John Stuart-Jervis. I want to assure you that the Government of Belarus is treating the investigation of the facts connected with this incident in the most scrupulous manner. (Let us hope) that the findings of the state commission which is working together with international experts will allow us in the very near future to elucidate the reasons for the tragedy. Please believe me, we are all learning lessons from this senseless accident and we are making efforts to ensure that such a thing will never happen again. God give you courage in this irreversible loss. With much grief, Mikhail Chyhir.

A similar letter was sent to Mr. Victor Fraenckel, the father of Alan Bernard Fraenckel.

IMYA Journalists Find New Details on Balloon Incident

LD2109085695 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy
in Russian 0800 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Journalists of the Belarusian independent daily IMYA learned that the organizers of the balloon competition in Switzerland had a telephone conversation with Minsk at 1100 on 12 September, whereby Minsk gave permission for the balloons to fly over Belarusian territory without setting any further conditions. But, as is known, 54 minutes after that the balloon piloted by two Americans was shot down by military helicopters of the republic's air defense forces.

Friendship Pact With Slovakia Not 'Initialed'

WS2109094095 Minsk Radio Minsk Network
in Belarusian 0300 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The signing of an agreement on mutual non-visa travel of citizens allowing Slovaks and Belarusians to visit each other with ordinary foreign passports and without visa if their stay in Belarus or Slovakia does not exceed 30 days has concluded the negotiations held by Slovak Foreign Minister Juraj Schenk and his Belarusian counterpart, Uladzimir Syanko. Despite earlier plans, the friendship and cooperation treaty between the two countries has not been initialed. As

a BELINFARM correspondent has learned, it was decided to postpone initialing procedures to a later time. Economic cooperation issues were discussed during the talks of the Slovak guest with [Belarusian Prime Minister] Mikhail Chyhir. The sides examined a range of specific projects. The Slovak side proposed that Belarusians participate in the construction of the Yamal-West Europe gas pipeline on Slovak territory. For its part, the Belarusian side proposed that Slovakia buy military equipment as part of the ZVSYe [CFE] Treaty, as well use Belarusian repair facilities for renovating Slovak weapons. Also discussed was the possibility of creating a military union of Slavic states. An official ceremony opening the Slovak Consulate General was held in Minsk.

Parliament Presidium Discusses Issues for Next Session

WS2109093695 Minsk BELAPAN in English
0710 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At its September 20 sitting the Supreme Soviet Presidium resolved to submit over 20 issues for consideration at the next plenary sitting of the 18th parliamentary session, which will start on October 3. The Supreme Soviet is expected to hear information from the government about the fulfillment of the Programme of Urgent Measures to Lift the Economy from Crisis Levels, a report by Minister of Finance Pavel Dzik on the course of the fulfillment of the law on the budget estimates for 1995. These issues were entered in the agenda of the previous parliamentary sittings, but President Likashenka did not allow his subordinates to appear at the Supreme Soviet. In addition, Parliament is to consider a bill on budget estimates for the next year. The Presidium also considered it necessary to study Stanislaw Bahdankevich's resignation from the post of National Bank chairman. A number of amendments is expected to be introduced in legislation concerning economic development. The Presidium decided to no longer put off the consideration of the question concerning the restoration of the rights of citizens who suffered from repressions in the 1920-80s. At the second plenary sitting Parliament is to consider a number of bills in their second reading: the Housing and Forest Codes, "On the Interpretation of Certain Constitution Articles," "On Organisational and Legal Measures for the Struggle against Organised Crime and Corruption," "On People's Applications," among others.

Minister Urges Reforms in Agriculture

WS2009111095 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 Sep 95 p 2

[Interview with Agriculture and Foodstuffs Minister Vasil Lyavonaw by SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondent Anatoliy Gulyayev "specially" for NARODNAYA GAZETA: "Belarusian Agriculture and Foodstuffs Minister Vasil Lyavonaw: 'The Former System Based on Economic Constraint Has Exhausted Itself....'"; place and date not given; first three paragraphs are NARODNAYA GAZETA introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The myth about "enemies of the kolkhoz system" is being created not without reason. The situation in the Belarusian agricultural sector, however, is so far the most stable compared with other branches. It is so stable because it is hard to restore the potential of the countryside, but it is even harder to destroy it!**

Still, it is possible to do so. If we keep doing nothing for another three years, Agriculture and Foodstuffs Minister Vasil Lyavonaw believes, only such farms as the outstanding "Rassvet" kolkhoz will remain afloat; that is, less than 20 percent of all farms. The rest will collapse. In four years, 10 quintals of grain per hectare will be harvested. This means that we will have to liquidate cattle, because we will have nothing to feed it, and peasants will not receive even a beggar's wage. If they do receive something, it will be impossible to buy anything for it, everywhere — including the cities!

It is hard to believe in a threat of famine in Belarus, though there are some CIS countries which have already learnt what famine is....

[Gulyayev] Vasil Sevastyanovich, after saying the aforementioned words, your reputation of being an "enemy of the kolkhoz system" will be amended by a reputation of being a very gloomy and angry peasant Nostradamus....

[Lyavonaw] You unintentionally become angry and gloomy if you say obvious things and people do not believe you! After the news conference at which I presented the real state of the countryside, many people accused me of exacerbating the situation, claiming that everything is normal. But I cited the same objective figures I provided at a meeting of the Security Council and the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by the president. Should I provide new figures each time to please the public?

Yes, "thanks" to the policy conducted during the first few years of so-called democratization, when the cities were overcoming the crisis at the expense of the countryside, the kolkhoz system suffered very heavy

losses. Farms' working capital was taken away, and their capital stocks were considerably used up.

I will repeat the main thing I have already said: During the past four years, a decline in production unusual in peacetime has taken place in all branches of the agroindustrial complex. In 1994, the gross production in the agricultural sector decreased by 30 percent compared with the average annual production in 1986-1990. According to preliminary assessments, in 1994 the production of beef fell by 38 percent compared with 1990, the production of milk — by 27 percent, and the production of pork — by 42 percent. We were short of products worth 23.3 million tonnes of oil (in 1995, our Republic will receive as little as 10 million tonnes of oil).

Since the period 1990 to 1994, the number of tractors in the Republic dropped by 7 percent, and the number of grain harvesters — by 20 percent. A tendency to deplete the reserves of humus and phosphorus has been observed in 26 Belarusian rayons. In a year or two, the grain crop may fall by 50 percent if we do not take care of land fertility.

Still, I am convinced that the situation may be improved within two or three years, because the situation in agriculture is better than that in other branches, and although it is hard to restore agricultural production, it is even harder to destroy it!

...I remember the post-war days well, when I became the head of my family as a five-year old boy. Industrial production was being restored slowly and with difficulties at that time. But peasants began to grow grain immediately after the liberation!

Of course, we do not currently have working capital to develop quickly. It has been sucked out by inflation. Searching for money, however, is a matter of tactics rather than a strategy. It is certainly a difficult question, but it is possible to resolve it, and the president promised his support.

[Gulyayev] How much money is needed?

[Lyavonaw] It would make a good start if we had \$1 billion, or at least 12 trillion Belarusian rubles. You should keep in mind that even [former National Bank Chairman] Stanislaw Bahdankevich, who would never give anybody a spare kopek, said that the countryside needs \$1 billion! So, if even he said this...

Having such a foundation, we could begin to improve the situation....

[Gulyayev] We will not achieve any improvement if we destroy what currently exists, and you want to

destroy the kolkhoz system. This, anyway, is a common opinion....

[Lyavonaw] Do you think I resemble a lunatic? Only a lunatic can destroy large-scale efficient production! Moreover, nobody would currently allow him to do so. I, as you know, worked in Germany, and visited many Western countries. And I had the opportunity to become personally convinced that the entire world is switching from small farms to large-scale production! It is doing this painfully and slowly by proceeding along a path of numerous bankruptcies and people's tragedies! Currently, however, there is no official talk about destroying kolkhozes, as was the case during previous years, because the state does not have money to support a large number of farmers! We know that this is essential during the initial period....

Another thing is that our large-scale production needs reforms. The former system based on economic constraint has exhausted itself, and should yield to economic freedom! Otherwise, everything I have said will take place.

[Gulyayev] How do you understand economic freedom in the countryside?

[Lyavonaw] It is the right of all forms of ownership to exist, the peasant's right to private property, and the right to trade in products and production means.... Given that we have "nobody's" property, the production costs in our agricultural sector are so high that nobody wants to buy Belarusian meat, milk, or eggs! However, if one starts calculating, one sees that — except for production of beef — all branches of animal breeding should be profitable. But animal breeding in which one cow produces 2,000 liters of milk cannot be profitable. We do not need such cows; goats are better in this situation!

Production in which an increase in cattle's weight amounts to 300-500 grams cannot be profitable. This is shocking; there is no hope! Are there not enough people to calculate losses in kolkhozes? No, there are many farms in our country in which there are 50 managers for every 40 machine operators!

There is only one reason behind the economic crisis, and much has been said about it. Although I, too, have said this a thousand times, I will repeat that "nobody's" property cannot be efficient!

Our best managers have already understood this, and have embarked on the path of reforms. As it is, the "Progress" kolkhoz no longer exists; it has been transformed into a collective agricultural enterprise! The "October" kolkhoz from Hrodna Oblast has also been transformed into a collective enterprise.... In Belarus,

there are 40 kolkhozes whose workers have received their property. Not a single farm has collapsed, but just the opposite, they have become even more solid, simply because the property used to be termed collective, but it was actually nobody's property. It has now become collective property, since something collective is nothing but a sum of private things! For a long time we did not want to understand this simple truth. Many people still do not understand it. You must remember that since my first interview after my appointment I have, and will always, advocate the principle of economic freedom. I have, and will continue to say that if a sovkhos operates well, let it operate! If a kolkhoz operates efficiently, let it continue to do so! I advocate the equality of all forms of ownership. To change something or not is a choice of kolkhoz workers and managers!

[Gulyayev] Do you want to say that there will be no decollectivization?

[Lyavonaw] I will repeat once again that it is a matter of kolkhoz workers to decide how they want to live! Everybody should have the freedom of choice.

Moreover, people often suggest the following to me: Draft a presidential edict or a ministerial order to finally start reforms! Everything will be done very quickly....

[Gulyayev] So why do not you draft it...

[Lyavonaw] This will never happen! God forbid, to administer reforms in the current situation, when many people have no idea how they should proceed, and there are millions of those who want to settle accounts with their foes! This would be worse than collectivization!

However, nobody should interfere in matters of those who have already embarked on the path of reforms. Nobody taught Vasil Staravoytaw [not further identified] how to live. Nobody commanded Krymko [not further identified] from Hrodna....

The task of the Agriculture and Foodstuffs Ministry is to convince those who still have doubts and help those who want changes. And there is simply no talk about destroying anything!

[Gulyayev] So why is there the persistent opinion that Lyavonaw will destroy kolkhozes and leave everybody without a chunk of bread? It is primarily voiced by pensioners and specialists....

[Lyavonaw] The answer is simple. However, I will begin with something else, if you do not mind. During my work in East Europe, I had an opportunity to observe characteristic processes. In these countries many people deliberately destroyed cooperative farms very quickly,

and then took loans and bought these farms! Following this, they revived them! But, by that time, all people proved to be hired workers! Neither specialists nor members of cooperative farms received anything! Everything was taken by one individual!

...The chairman of a "hopeless" kolkhoz recently visited me. He already wants to lease the farm, and then buy it. He wants to lease only the best land with the able-bodied population, however. And he does not need poor land with pensioners inhabiting it.

In the current situation, he does not rush so far — after all, capital stocks depreciate every day. The worse the situation, the less he will later pay!

Do you think that my interlocutor is the only smart guy? Does he need changes for the better?

[Gulyayev] He certainly does not, though...

[Lyavonaw] Let us not be naive. The preservation of the status quo is leading only to squandering of the accumulated potential — in my opinion, nobody has to prove that any more. We have also become convinced that there are people for whom this squandering is convenient! It is convenient for them if the price of shares in a farm fall to zero, and they then buy everything for nothing! I must finally call things their true names. **Those who search for and "find" enemies of the kolkhoz system, and call for preserving the current situation, are the real enemies of this system! They want to become masters, thus making everybody else hired workers!**

All ideological dogmas have nothing to do with this!

[Gulyayev] Certainly, there are people who simply believe in this, who cannot but believe....

[Lyavonaw] Perhaps there are such people. In general, however, quite intelligent people are trying to conduct this policy.

Until recently, they did whatever they wanted. Let us recall that when we were Supreme Soviet deputies we created such abracadabra that everything was turned topsy-turvy. A rayon executive committee chairman depended on a kolkhoz chairman being a deputy. If he said something the kolkhoz chairman did not like, he could be fired during a parliament meeting. According to the Constitution, the executive authorities are currently appointed in rayons, and an executive committee chairman no longer depends on rayon soviet deputies.... That is to say that everything is normal now!

[Gulyayev] This means that he now depends on the leadership whom he serves — not the rayon, not the people, but the leadership. The same situation as a long

time ago! It was also abracadabra.... Yet, this is another question....

[Lyavonaw] Yes, this is another question. Returning to the topic of our conversation, I would like to recall that it was the current government that freed procurement prices for agricultural products, thus beginning to implement the resolution on economic freedom. Industrial prices were freed earlier, as early as 1992. A stranglehold was thus put on the agricultural sector, and had we not begun to restore justice, the difference between prices for goods required in the agricultural sector and prices for agricultural products would have been bigger! The difference would have been so vast that we would have been unable to harvest crops this year.

This step significantly improved the situation. At the same time, it irritated those for whom the worse the situation in the countryside the better! By the way, you mentioned specialists and pensioners who may end up without a chunk of bread as a result of reforms. This is another strange thesis, **because as a matter of fact, everything is just the opposite!**

What would happen before if an intractable specialist did not go along with his chairman? It was always easy to find an excuse to boot the specialist without particular ceremony. And since his house belonged to the kolkhoz, as a rule, he was automatically left without housing! Go wherever you want, and complain to anyone you want....

Even now specialists are basically unprotected against highhandedness! Everybody has become accustomed to this and thinks it is a correct thing. However, if reforms are conducted, specialists, as a rule, will receive a larger share of property than ordinary workers, including housing, which nobody will then dare to take away from them.

Nonetheless, a share in property does not yet mean the right to decide on the most important issues. This means that it will not be so easy to chase anybody out! **This means that reforms provide specialists with possibilities of social protection which they have never seen!**

I am not even saying that the ministry is currently intensively drafting a program for state protection of specialists, who may temporarily prove to be redundant during the process of reform, since in farms — where there are 50 specialists for every 40 machine operators — somebody will have to be dismissed. Thus, we are planning certain retraining, employment measures, etc.

By the way, reform has been under way in the Sverdlov kolkhoz from Horki rayon, Mahilyow Oblast, since 1988. Having become the owners of it, the kolkhoz

employees hired specialists, and nobody suffered from this.

[Gulyayev] What about pensioners? Their fears that they will be unable to make a living without assistance from kolkhozes are justified....

[Lyavonaw] **Have you ever seen how this assistance is implemented? Have you seen women, who have worked all their lives in a kolkhoz, bowing down to a young chairman to obtain hay, a tractor, or a sack of feed...? Such a woman is nobody in this kolkhoz! She was exploited all her life, and then thrown away on the dole! Moreover, it was the height of cynicism that she was supposed to be happy with the handouts!**

Who is she?! One of the most famous Belarusian managers, Hero of Socialist Labor Ivan Melnik devoted all his life to a kolkhoz in Horki rayon! He set up a farm that was famous in the entire Soviet Union! And he ended up with nothing when he retired. He even did not have time to build a house because he was taking care of the kolkhoz's matters. His savings have now been eaten up by inflation, and the prominent — without any exaggeration — man has ended up in a kolkhoz two-room apartment! These are his savings....

If reforms are conducted, pensioners will remain co-owners for the rest of their lives! They will have the right to vote, and it will be a young chairman without a large share in property who will bow down to pensioners!

[Gulyayev] As for bowing, in my opinion, it is an exaggeration...

[Lyavonaw] This will happen, because pensioners, being the owners, will be able to block any decision, if needed. It again proves that if reforms are conducted, pensioners will be protected much better than they are currently!

By the way, the former chairman of the "Progress" kolkhoz and current Hrodna Oblast Executive Committee chairman, Alyaksandr Dubko, keeps his share of the kolkhoz's property.

However, to introduce this everywhere, we must return to the fountainhead of the movement for collective property, to the times when our grandfathers would give kolkhozes their land, plows, and cattle. Property! At that time collective property meant a sum of private things! And if my grandfather saw somebody working poorly, he did not keep silent, because he did not want his property to be squandered!

We will not understand this immediately, but in three or five years, everything will change, because the Belarusians can work as efficiently as the Germans,

(whose productivity is five times as high as ours), the Americans or the Dutch.... We have markets, and we have a very convenient geographical location. Thanks to the customs union, profits automatically increase by 15 percent!

We should also remove institutions providing social and cultural services from the neck of kolkhozes, because they no longer can afford them; those who have been charged with taking care of them — the executive authorities — should do that.

We should look into taxes — they have doubled over the past four years. We should resolve the issue of subsidies. For example, the Finns guaranteed their producers procurement of meat at prices not lower than \$2 per kilogram a long time ago. We guaranteed only 60 cents. Moreover, the Finns pay for resources at world prices, while we pay more for them, as well as for diesel fuel, phosphorus, or potassium chloride....

During his recent speech in Horki, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka provided answers to these questions. Moreover, he provided positive answers. Thus, I believe the matter will move from current the deadlock.

Moldova

Deputy Parliament Speaker Meets Officials in Hungary

AU2109064895 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
1930 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, September 18 (INFOTAG) — Dialogues in Budapest, particularly with the Hungarian speaker Zoltan Gal, will promote cooperation between the Parliaments of our two countries, Deputy Parliament Chairman Dumitru Diacov has stated upon his return from a private visit to Hungary. Mr. Diacov was there on the invitation of the governing Socialist Party of Hungary.

Zoltan Gal positively appraises the democratic evolution in Moldova, and he confirmed Hungary's readiness to expand links and cooperate with Moldova in international organizations' frameworks.

The Moldovan deputy speaker had meetings with representatives of the Hungarian Socialist Party, and visited several industrial enterprises there.

Opposition Demands Release of Dniester Political Prisoners

AU2109064795 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
1930 GMT 18 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, September 18 (INFOTAG) — The Christian Democratic Popular Front

[FPCD] is resolute to use all possible methods to liberate the political prisoners sentenced by the non-constitutional Tiraspol authorities, Front leader Iurie Rosca and the chairman of the Popular Front parliamentary faction, Valentin Dolganiuc, stated at today's press conference. "The current authorities — the president, Parliament, and Government — are negligent about the prisoners' fate. We know nothing about whether or not the issue was discussed at summits with Tiraspol leaders. And though we raise the problem constantly, nobody would hear us.

"With the current differences in the top power echelons, we are getting an impression that various power branches are more concerned not about the poor guys' liberation but rather about preventing political opponents from earning political capital on that misfortune. We don't care about the earnings, for our main concern is to liberate our colleagues, no matter who will help in that," Iurie Rosca said.

At the forthcoming parliamentary session opening on September 19, the Popular Front faction is planning to include the liberation problem into the agenda, and to demand reporting by all power branches on what measures have been undertaken. "In case the parliamentary majority refuses or gives a formal reply, we shall leave the room to hold consultations and to seek other ways to liberate our colleagues," the leader warned. He said, the Popular Front will not insist any more on having the special parliamentary commission set up 1.5 years ago, as it has been practically idle, and gathered only twice during the time. Your correspondent asked how realistic it was to nominate Ilie Ilascu, one of the above prisoners, as a presidential candidate, as was recently suggested by the Front's ex-leader and Moldovan ex-prime minister Mircea Druc currently residing in Romania. On which Iurie Rosca replied that "as long as Ilascu is in prison, it is premature to speak about it."

"Such talks may only irritate Moldovan and Dniester authorities. It is quite possible that Ilie Ilascu is kept in prison specially to exclude him from the team of potential presidential candidates," Rosca emphasized. He named as absurdist the accusations that the Popular Front is, allegedly, seeking to use the political convicts in order to earn political gains in election campaigns. "Such accusations were only offered by the chairman of the Moldova's Helsinki Human Right Committee, Stefan Uratu, who was arrested together with the so-called Ilascu group, and was released from a Dniester prison under very mysterious circumstances. We do not seek to be monopolists in the liberation struggle. Different variants are possible, and we agreed on many concessions to set the group free. However, the

authorities either do not wish or cannot use any of the variants," Rosca said.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION: The leader of the Tiraspol subdivision of the Popular Front, Ilie Ilascu, and his colleagues were arrested in the spring of 1992 during the armed conflict in Dniester. The Tiraspol authorities have accused them of subversive activities and committing several grave acts of terrorism. In December 1993, they were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and Ilascu was sentenced to death. However, the death sentence has not been carried out. Already when in prison, Ilie Ilascu was elected to the Parliament on the Popular Front's list.

The Popular Front parliamentary faction is not going to participate in discussions of the Constitutional Court's resolution on the reinstatement of ex-Deputy Speaker Nicolae Andronic and two committee chairmen who were dismissed by a parliamentary majority's vote last July, after they had quitted the Agrarian Democratic Party and its parliamentary faction. Valentin Dolganiuc said, "we did not dismiss the deputies, so we are not going to join a possible discussion around the Court's resolution. We cannot comment the resolution, either, as we haven't seen it yet. However, by law, it is final and without appeal," he said. Commenting a probability of having an early parliamentary election in Moldova, Mr. Dolganiuc remarked, "under the Constitution, such a variant is only possible in two cases — Parliament's incapacity or failure to form a government. So far, we do not have a situation which would necessitate such an early election. Should it emerge, we shall have no objections to using the law. None of us is grasping at its parliamentary chair," he said.

Parliament Resumes Autumn Session

AU2109064495 Chisinau INFOTAG in English
1930 GMT 19 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau, September 19 (INFOTAG) — The Moldovan Parliament opened its autumn/winter session in Chisinau today.

Opening the forum, Parliament Chairman Petru Lucinschi said, the current legislative body, no matter good or bad, reflects the present-day proportion of political forces in the republic. It is not an ideal organ, he remarked. It suffers certain differences fed by deputies who pay tribute to conservatism and believe in the eternal existence of relative postulates.

"Due to this reason, we missed a chance to adopt a prudent decision on the official language name, which has become a political seism again," Lucinschi remarked. However, he refuted some recent statements

that the Parliament is, allegedly, the biggest obstacle for reforms.

Reviewing the evolution of recent events in Moldova, the speaker warned that if the events will be developing towards further polarization of extremities, the situation will grow into a crisis: tension and confrontation will aggravate, reforms will stop, and economy may collapse, which will retard the country's development for several years.

In the current conditions, the Parliament should concentrate on finding a way out and solving economic problems. "Other important issues shall also be settled gradually, but only if we allow for no deviations from this main stem," he said.

"We should finally decide: Either we continue the path, set by the Constitution, as a consolidated force and save

our population from new political earthquakes, or we return to our initial position of several years ago which brought only sufferings to the people."

The agenda for the first days includes mainly economic legislation issues. Various factions suggested to broaden it with such topics as wage and pension arrears, indexation of population's deposits in the savings bank, the fate of Ilie Ilascu group, Dniester dispute.

The Agrarian Democratic Party faction is planning to submit for consideration a draft declaration denying various accusations against the Parliament which were heard in recent time.

Kazakhstan**Ukrainian President, Delegation Arrives in Almaty***LD2009192595 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and his delegation has arrived in Almaty. At the door of his aircraft the Ukrainian president was met by Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Akezhan Qazhygeldin. Given the time difference between the capitals of the two states, it is 2300 local time in Almaty as this bulletin is being broadcast. The bulk of work is planned for 21 and 22 September.

Our future bulletins will cover the details of the Ukrainian president's stay in Kazakhstan. This is his first visit to Almaty in his capacity as the head of state. He will meet Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and representatives of Kazakhstan's intelligentsia, Ukrainian cultural centers, and local businessmen. He will also take part in the inauguration of the Ukrainian Embassy in Almaty.

The sides will discuss trade, economic cooperation, and humanitarian ties, coordinate their positions on their participation in CIS structures, and sign a number of bilateral accords. The visit will end on 22 September.

Ukrainian-Kazakh Talks Begin*LD2109053995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0427 GMT 21 Sep 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Almaty, 21 Sep — An official welcoming ceremony was held this morning for Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, who arrived in Almaty yesterday evening on a visit. The Ukrainian leader was greeted by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev. An honor guard was formed up at the presidential palace, and the two countries' national anthems were played.

Then one-to-one talks began between Nursultan Nazarbayev and Leonid Kuchma. At the same time, talks were held between government delegations headed by Kazakhstan Deputy Prime Minister Nyghmetzhan Yesengharin and Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko.

Kuchma Visit Strengthens Trade*LD2109111695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 21 Sep 95*

[By correspondent A. Svyazin]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Video shows President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and President Kuchma of Ukraine walking along a red carpet together,

watching a military parade, signing documents, and attending a news conference] Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma is in Kazakhstan on an official visit at Nursultan Nazarbayev's invitation. Talks took place in Nazarbayev's Almaty residence between a Ukrainian government delegation and representatives of the power ministries of the Republic of Kazakhstan this morning. Meanwhile the presidents themselves were conversing behind closed doors. Nursultan Nazarbayev and Leonid Kuchma signed a joint communique on the outcome of the talks as well as an agreement on the future development and expansion of economic cooperation between the two states. Agreements were also signed on cooperation in the spheres of science and technology, in the fields of military and civilian education, and on pension provision. Answering journalists' questions after the signing, the presidents stated that the views of Ukraine and Kazakhstan coincided fully on all issues.

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] I am sure that this visit will represent a new stage in the strengthening of cooperation between us and in strengthening the importance and the volume of our trade and cultural links. [end recording]

Paper Examines Reasons for Economic Crisis*LD2109094895 Almaty EKSPRESS in Russian 15 Sep 95 p 2*

[FBIS Translated Text] The article entitled: "Who is responsible for the underdevelopment of the people in Kazakhstan?" published in the EKSPRESS on 8 September, claims to be an attempt to reveal "the individual who is personally responsible" for the consequences of the social and economic crisis in the country. This individual, in the author's opinion, is Daulat Sembayev, the present chairman of the Kazakhstan National Bank. He also held the post of deputy prime minister up to the end of 1993, determining our reform strategies in many areas.

Whether by chance or design, Sembayev and his present young team, as "theorists," are opposed by the "energetic pragmatists" from the government, who have not been afraid to hand over the most promising Kazakh export-oriented enterprises to foreign managers (who, evidently, will be full owners in the near future).

Well, confrontation between the leadership of the National Bank and the Cabinet of Ministers is not a new method, especially as relations between those two independent state structures truly leave much to be desired. The government team, which has grown stronger organizationally and received wider powers under the constitution (as seen in its evident superiority over heads of regional administrations), has developed a taste for

economic power and the independent position of the National Bank on some matters provokes much dissatisfaction among some of its representatives. Even prohibited methods are coming into use. The other day a very well-known news agency, quoting confidential sources, reported that the leadership of the National Bank — Sembayev and his two deputies — were on the point of tendering their resignations. This creates a negative psychological "background" which is beneficial to those who want to have "their own" people — more obliging people who "understand everything" — in the top positions at the National Bank.

Strained relations between the central bank and the executive are natural in theory and do not reveal any inherent "schism." On the contrary, consistent economic policy and a predictable situation are guaranteed by a kind of "division of authority" when the body which is responsible for the stability of the national currency and the reliability of the banking and finance system is not subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers, which has an objective interest in an "expansionary" policy on issuing money, even for the very best of reasons.

It would be a manifest exaggeration to sing laudatory odes in honor of the National Bank leadership but striking changes have taken place in the republic since the time of the unenviable legacy bequeathed to Sembayev by [his predecessor] Galym Baynazarov, when our banking system became virtually the "engine" of the shadow economy and a powerful stimulator of the primary accumulation of capital that was far from honest. Earlier, the situation in our banking system in many respects replicated that in Russia (with a delay and often on an enlarged scale). At present, for all its defects, the situation in Kazakhstan financial markets looks much more stable than in Russia. We have not had another "black Tuesday" (as in October 1994, when the exchange rate of the Russian ruble fell sharply in a single day). The National Bank has managed to avert the banking crisis which has led to the ruin of hundreds of Russian financial institutions and the inflation level is lower than in Russia. The stability of the tenge gives no cause for fear (the state's growing gold and foreign currency reserves are the best confirmation of this).

Of course, the National Bank, like the government, can be blamed for the high social cost of the reforms being pursued. What is the use of "good" macroeconomic indicators, if the level of citizens' real incomes is falling, the standard of living is sinking, output is being cut, and the "index of human development" calculated by UN Development Program experts is, inevitably, deteriorating? However, none of the other CIS republics, including the far richer Russia, has yet thought up a better policy. We should also not forget that while it

belonged to the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan received a lot in subsidies from the USSR budget and the very same Russia was its virtual sponsor. In exchange for this, the union center liberally used the republic's territory to site various kinds of test ranges and economized on the ecological safety of the extracting industries, seeking to pump out minerals at minimum expense.

It seemed that the preservation of the ruble zone would prolong the situation of concealed "subsidies." However, in Moscow they started to calculate carefully and found an unequal exchange, covered by "technical credits" from Russia. After these credits were turned into Kazakhstan's state debt, recalculated in terms of convertible currency (\$1.3 billion), it was clear that "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears" (Russian film title) and that we could not count on having a kind neighbor. We were unaccustomed to living within our own means and we have found it hard. The minimum wage and pension in Kazakhstan today are half those in Russia and the average level of consumption is likewise lower than that of our neighbors. That is the main reason for migration by people of Kazakhstan to the near abroad (CIS countries).

Thus, the economic changes going on in Kazakhstan (which in terms of certain indicators remind one not so much of renewal as of a backward movement) were in many respects natural and rooted in the old system, from whose "birthmarks" the inertia-based economic mechanism has not yet freed itself. That is why, in my opinion, it is absolutely senseless to try to "expose" certain high-ranking personalities who are blamed for our current difficulties. It was not Daulet Sembayev who initiated "mutual settlements" between enterprises in spring last year, which did not manage to solve the payments crisis but "knocked over" the tenge against the dollar, changing the exchange rate from 11 to 30 tenge to the dollar. It was not Sembayev who generously gave out government guarantees on foreign currency credits worth many millions. He was not the man who used the "black box" — the republic's currency fund. He was not the man who concluded an agreement to purchase gas from fraternal Uzbekistan at a price 50 per cent higher than the world level. He is not the man who is now manipulating enterprises and deposits, giving them one day to certain good foreign investors and the next day to others, who are even better.

"Human underdevelopment" in Kazakhstan will last for as long as national income declines. According to Ministry of Economy experts, we can expect another one to two years of decline. This should be the "low point," after which slow growth will begin. This is an objective process and it would be strange to extol those who happen to have their hands on the economic levers

of state authority at that time. Neither "heroes of the day" nor "scapegoats" are required for the government team. It should have competent and decent people.

Present Socioeconomic Development Viewed

954F3457A *Almaty EKSPRESS-K in Russian*
14 Sep 95 p 2

[Article by Larisa Chernenko: "Output and Prices Are Growing, Wages Also, Seemingly, But Life Is Becoming Increasingly Hard...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last Tuesday B. Saparbayev, chief of staff of the cabinet, summed up the republic's socioeconomic development in eight months of the current year and, particularly, in August and also shared the plans for September.

Two news items may be noted from what was said at the news conference: one unpleasant—the freeing of the prices of public utilities as of September—and one that is more pleasant—as of October the minimum wage will rise to 300 tenge. But, as Saparbayev observed, lest the increase in the rates for public utilities kill people outright, it will occur in phases, in accordance with a schedule that has been drawn up.

A trend toward an increase has emerged in the production of the gross domestic product, which is composed of industrial production, tax payments, and so forth. Thus the August level compared with July constituted 105 percent. The volume of industrial production in the reporting period also grew 3.7 percent, and for the eight months this indicator constitutes 85 percent in relation to the same period of last year. But in September-October even, according to government forecasts, the decline in industry's output is to end, and last year's level is to be achieved. The definite changes have become possible thanks to an improvement in the operation of a number of sectors and thanks to the production of steel and coke and oil and natural gas production and also the generation of electric power, where some increase was observed. Specifically, measures were adopted for an improvement in the situation at the Karagandaul Association. If viewed from an oblast angle, enterprises of East Kazakhstan Oblast and also of Mangistau and Aktyubinsk are lagging behind considerably.

The consumer price index characterizing the overall level of inflation constituted 102.1 percent, which was 0.8 percent lower than in the previous month and 6.8 percent lower than in January. Since the start of the year prices and rates in the consumer sector of the economy have grown 39.2 percent, foodstuffs, 36.5 percent, nonfood commodities, 25.3 percent, and paid services, 104.8 percent.

The National Bank refinancing rate in August was fixed at the level of 46 percent compared with an annual 55 percent in July (for comparison: in August 1994 this indicator had constituted 300 percent). The average credit interest rate declined from 66.9 percent in July to 66 percent.

In the eight months the sum total of tax receipts at the treasury constituted 99.7 billion tenge. Some 14.56 billion were received in August, which was somewhat less than in July—by 2.8 percent.

The exchange rate of the U.S. dollar in the month fluctuated negligibly between 57 and 60 tenge to the dollar. Mr. Saparbayev observed that the purchasing power of "green" on the domestic market in this month declined 10 percent, whereas the purchasing power of the tenge diminished only 2.1 percent.

Per capita monetary income constituted 2,134 tenge, which was 26.2 percent higher than in July. Average pay in the national economy amounted to 5,400 tenge, in the material production sectors, 6,050, and in the nonproduction sphere, 4,080. Pensions remained at the previous level, approximately 1,460 tenge on average. Some 2.5 billion tenge were appropriated from the budget for settlements with retirees.

Considering the increase in prices in the month, the real wage increased 2.4 percent. The level of compensation for labor fluctuates considerably, depending on the forms of ownership of the enterprises and organizations. The pay of the employees of joint ventures with foreign and mixed ownership is two or three times above the republic level. And the level of the employees of private enterprises and public associations is below the republic average. The government is continuing, as before, work on the development of the market infrastructure and the nonstate sectors of the economy.

The cabinet chief of staff also said what the budgetary funds had been spent on, in the main. As before, the bulk of them went to finance social and cultural measures—41.8 billion tenge, which constituted 46.3 percent of total spending. Sixty-three percent of the allocated annual resources were spent on educational facilities, which was somewhat higher than the overall level of budgetary financing. Culture was allocated 49.7 percent, health care, 41.6 percent.

Expenditure on the support of the law enforcement authorities constitutes 7.8 percent, although only 7.1 percent had been planned for 1995. As B. Saparbayev said, with regard to the current situation in the republic, the most urgent needs and priority payments were funded, in the main: wages, grants, meals, purchase of

medication. All other needs were covered in line with state budget revenue.

In the agricultural sector the main task today is, as we know, the harvesting of the grain. More than 18 million tonnes of grain crops were sown, and 10.2 million have already been threshed (just over 50 percent). The yield this year constituted 5.6 quintals per hectare. West Kazakhstan Oblast let us down considerably on account of the severe drought, but, nonetheless, as the chief of staff assured us, there will be no problems when it comes to bread.

As far as foreign economic activity is concerned, a growth in the volume of exports was observed. Kazakhstan's foreign trade turnover in eight months constituted \$5.048 billion. The export volume, what is more, amounted to \$2.938 billion against imports of \$2.11 billion. Exports to countries of the far abroad constituted \$1.432 billion, which was 78 percent higher than in the same period of last year. Some \$850 million of products were imported from distant countries. It is noteworthy that in the reporting period total commodity turnover with countries of the far abroad exceeded commodity turnover with CIS countries for the first time. Kazakhstan is cooperating actively with such countries as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Britain, China, and Turkey.

The country's foreign economic debt in July constituted approximately \$85 billion. In respect to specific debtors who obtained government guarantees unjustly, 63 cases have been transferred to the court of arbitration.

In August the cabinet prepared eight presidential edicts, and 163 government decrees and 30 various statutes were issued. As to whether the government intends to compensate people for the depreciated deposits and to raise pay and pensions, Mr. Saparbayev said that a special working group, which is drawing up a short-term program of the republic's development for the next three years, is working on these matters. On 22 September this program will be presented to the president for consideration. Even now it may be said that there will be sizable cuts in the staff of state institutions, where the numbers of employees are quite inflated.

Tajikistan

Rakhmanov Sends Condolences to UN Over Observer's Death

LD2009123995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1123 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmanov has sent U.N. secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali his condolences in connection with the tragic death of a U.N. military observer in Tajikistan, head of a Tajik

foreign ministry department Zafar Saidov informed INTERFAX Wednesday [20 September].

Military observer Wolf Stonner died not far from the city of Kurgan-Tyube (southern Tajikistan) September 18, when shooting began between the 1st and 11th brigades of the Tajik Defense Ministry located on the southern and northern city limits.

Rakhmanov expressed hope that this incident "will not spoil relations of effective cooperation between Tajikistan and the U.N."

He also wrote that Tajikistan's law-enforcement bodies were making "strenuous efforts to investigate that tragic incident" and that a government commission was analyzing the circumstances of the tragedy.

Rakhmanov assured Butrus-Ghali "that those guilty of the tragedy will be found and punished in strict accordance with the law."

UN Hails 'Stabilization' of Military Situation

LD2109090195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0804 GMT 21 Sep 95

[By Boris Sitnikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] UNITED NATIONS September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The U.N. Security Council hails stabilisation of the military situation in Tajikistan and compliance by official Dushanbe and the Tajik opposition with the truce, said U.N. Security Council chairman Francesco Faolo Fulci of Italy.

He said in a statement after today's consultations of the Security Council that the council agreed with the report by U.N. Secretary-General Butrus Butrus-Ghali who said the situation in Tajikistan was stabilised and the truce observed.

As for negotiations between the Tajik leadership and the opposition, there is the hope that the sides will resume them in the form of permanent talks under earlier agreements, Fulci said.

It is also likely that the positive effect of an earlier protocol signed by the sides and of truce extension will not be lost, Fulci continued.

He said the Security Council would hear U.N. envoy to Tajikistan Ramiro Piriz-Balon on Tuesday or Friday to decide on further activities of the U.N. monitoring mission in Tajikistan.

Fulci said Security Council members extended condolences to the Austrian government and the family of Lieutenant-Colonel Wolf Sponner, a U.N. observer, who was killed in a clash between Tajik army units.

Sponner was a veteran U.N. peacekeeper in Tajikistan.

Border Troop Commander Briefs Kozyrev on Situation

LD2009164695 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was a meeting yesterday evening between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Pavel Tarasenko, commander of the group of Russian Federation Border Troops in Tajikistan. During the conversation the commander described the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. He paid particular attention to the attempts being made by the fighters to blockade checkpoints, border posts, and roads and to prevent reserves being brought up.

Meanwhile, the situation in Kurgan-Tyube remains difficult. Tabarali Safarov, deputy commander of the 11th Ministry of Internal Affairs brigade, who was escorting UN military observer Wolf Sponner and was gravely wounded during an exchange of fire with a criminal group, has died. The government is holding talks with the criminal groups, which have their supporters in the 1st and 11th brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan. The situation here is being monitored by the authorities in the republic.

Today the Russian foreign minister arrived in Sochi. He is meeting President Yeltsin. A source in the Foreign Ministry has told INTERFAX that Kozyrev will report to the president on the outcome of his trip to the Central Asian republics. They will also discuss the situation in the Balkans and progress in settling the conflict in that region.

Kozyrev Meets Afghan Commissar on Border

LD2109083995 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Uzbek 1300 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As we informed you earlier, Andrey Kozyrev, Russian minister of foreign affairs, was in Dushanbe on 19 September. The same day Emomali Rakhmanov, president of the Republic of Tajikistan, received Andrey Kozyrev, who was paying an official visit to our country. [passage omitted]

The head of the Russian Foreign Ministry spoke about his visit to the [Russian] Border Troops in Tajikistan and the border posts. He gave his views on the activities and living conditions of the border guards and laid emphasis on the next stage of inter-Tajik negotiations. He mentioned that due to these negotiations, tension was being eliminated on the border. Border violations are mainly with the aim of transporting drugs.

Then, speaking about his meeting with the Afghan commissar on the border, Kozyrev noted that the neither Russia nor Tajikistan have any border claims, nor do they wish to interfere in the internal affairs of the neighboring country. We are sorry about the events, which are occurring in their country and sincerely want peace and good-neighborly relations on Afghan soil.

Similarly, speaking about the Russian aircraft and its crew, the Russian diplomat noted that it was in the hands of the Taleban armed groups. The lives of the people are turning into an object of bargaining, and purchasing and selling. He said that ways of getting out of this situation should be sought jointly.

The president of the Republic of Tajikistan sincerely welcomed Andrey Kozyrev on Tajik soil and he mentioned that the government of the country had an interest in further extending cooperation with Russia in the field of economy and culture. The head of state said that Tajikistan would do everything to accelerate implementation of the agreement reached at the recent meeting of the two countries' presidents.

Uzbekistan

Kazakh President, Karimov Discuss Relations

LD2009210895 Tashkent Radio Tashkent Network in Uzbek 0615 GMT 20 Sep 95

[Report on news conference given by Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev in Tashkent on 19 September]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear listeners, as we reported earlier, the international conference devoted to the Aral problem has been continuing its work in Nukus, the capital of Karakalpakstan. The heads of the five countries in Central Asia are participating in today's session of the conference. Today they will draw up serious documents aimed at resolving the regional problem.

Meetings were held between President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov and President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, who arrived in our country on a working visit to participate in the Nukus international conference, as well as to discuss the further deepening of Uzbek-Kazakh relations.

We now present for your attention a report by our special correspondent, Ghofir Jamolov, summarizing the news conference held after the meeting between the two heads of state. [passage omitted]

Replying to the question put by a correspondent of the Kazakh newspaper POSTFACTUM, who asked whether

any matters relating to Uzbek-Kazakh relations were discussed, the Kazakh president said, inter alia:

[Begin Nazarbayev recording, in Russian] [passage omitted] No offense to the other countries, but Uzbek-Kazakh relations have global significance for stability in the region. None of the other republics should feel hurt, but relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and between our two peoples are a global factor of stability, thanks to which we can move forward. I make no secret of the fact that this is a factor of our security. We have appealed to the United Nations to enable us to create our own peacekeeping battalion here. God forbid, we are trying to prevent it, but if something should happen we will be able to sort out things here ourselves. UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali supports us. He has supported us in his letter. We have discussed the specific measures for setting up such a battalion. It will consist of companies from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; each deployed in its own republic. If the United Nations approves, and I hope we will gain the status of a military group of the United Nations, then our lads might participate in peacekeeping processes all over the world. Why not? Of course it will be war, but they will be there not to fight but to separate. I think that is not bad. [end recording]

The Kazakh leader also appreciated the Uzbek Government's experience in fighting crime as an example to be followed. Answering a question put by a Kazakh reporter on the issue of whether there will be any changes in Kazakh legislation in terms of the war on crime, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan said, among other things:

[Begin recording] [Nazarbayev, in Russian] On 30 August Kazakhstan adopted a new constitution by referendum, where the problem of strengthening executive power was clearly outlined. [passage omitted]

[Karimov, in Russian] [passage omitted] I am not going praise the situation or create the illusion that we have no problem in these spheres. I will certainly say that this problem cannot be resolved overnight. It requires persistent and laborious work in many areas. It does not mean only enforcement by the police or the authorities, or law enforcement bodies. This would be a simplification of the problem. You remember when Mr. Yeltsin, speaking on TV somewhere in Moscow some time ago, said: You see that here [in Russia] the situation is awful, but we will not act in the way some states do, like in Tashkent where they are shooting criminals. The impression was created that criminals were being shot right in the streets and taht car theft carried a sentence of 15 years in Tashkent, in Uzbekistan. I think the term is not 15 years, but only 10-12 years. Yeltsin was misinformed. But the question here is one of oversimplifying; one should not interpret the fight against crime in such a simplified way. [passage omitted]

The public belief must be created that no crime will remain unpunished. The inevitability of punishment — that is main thing needed in my opinion. Secondly, much depends on the climate of society; when people are embittered, where there is hatred, when they are ready to clash with each other, then order cannot be restored by policemen or by armed personnel. So a climate should be created; a climate in which the good wins over the bad in people, where people have faith while working. And the third factor: everyone should realize that the fight against crime is a common task. It is a problem for the whole of society. Only then can the problem be solved. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Armenia**Minister Receives UN Deputy General Secretary***NC2009141695 Yerevan SNARK in English
1459 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, September 19 (SNARK) — Today, Vahram Papazyan, Armenia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, received the UN Deputy General Secretary Aldo Agello who paid a business visit to the NKR [Republic of Mountainous Karabakh] conflict region.

Snark was informed by the Press Office of the Armenian Foreign Affairs Ministry that during the meeting Papazyan familiarized Aldo Agello with the attitude of Armenia's authorities towards the NKR conflict settlement. A number of issues concerning the security of the region were discussed during the meeting.

Papazyan: Support For Gradual Solution*LD2009123695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1123 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Armenia stands for gradual solution of the Karabakh problem and discussion of the Karabakh status at the final stage of settlement at the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] Minsk conference, Armenian Foreign Minister Vahan Papazyan told visiting UN Under-Secretary-General Tuesday [19 September] night in Yerevan.

According to the Minister, the Armenian side is ready to return the occupied Azeri lands with the exception of the Lachin town, through which passes the only road from Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. Papazyan stressed Azeri territories can be freed only on security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh, a source at the Armenian Foreign Ministry told Interfax.

A meeting of the UN official and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan is scheduled for Wednesday.

Karabakh 'Can Not Agree To' Unilateral Concessions*NC2009135095 Yerevan SNARK in English
1458 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, September 19 (SNARK) — Arkadi Ghukasyan, NKR [Republic of Mountainous Karabakh] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in his interview with Snark that Karabakh can not agree to unilateral concessions because this will weaken its defense capacity.

According to him, the Azeri side strives to obtain everything but give nothing in return, and thus slows down the negotiation process. This is the reason that

Karabakh's stance depends in a way upon the position of Azerbaijan.

One of the most important issues is to ensure the security of Karabakh, noted Ghukasyan. Karabakh does not insist on the final determination of the Karabakh status right now, but it insists that major elements of the status which are also elements of security, should be determined soon. He said that Karabakh's borders must be defined anyhow, and if there are territories must be returned, then there should also be territories which will not be returned.

Ghukasyan regards a "physical border, the physical connection between Karabakh and Armenia" as the main element of security. Both mediators and the world community agree that Karabakh can not exist as an enclave anymore, said Ghukasyan.

A post-war existence must be defined after any truce. Azeri leaders do not take into account that there was a war and now there is the aftermath of war. Baku officially demands the capitulation of Karabakh. The Minister underlined that if Baku does not change its stance, progress can not be made in the negotiation process.

Turkish Diplomat on Acceleration of Karabakh Settlement*NC2009143595 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1453 GMT 19 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 19/09/95 NOYAN TAPAN — Turkish special envoy for the Karabakh conflict, Ambassador Ayhan Kamel, underlining the importance the recent OSCE Minsk group meeting held in Moscow said that at present a work on preparation of a new package of documents is being carried out.

According to the Istanbul-based Armenian "Marmara" daily, Kamel announced that Co-Chairmen of the Minsk group along with delegations from Finland, Russia, the USA and Switzerland should convene a "coordinating" assembly. Proposals made during the assembly will be presented to the conflicting sides during visits to Baku, Yerevan, and Karabakh. Kamel said that among measures, which have been taken are: official sealing of truce, creation of security zone between the warring sides and ban on flights.

According to Turkish Ambassador, the issue of dispatching OSCE peacekeeping forces to the conflict zone still unresolved, however, according to Kamel "it is necessary that preparatory works be carried out in this direction as well". Besides, Kamel stressed that Erzerum should be the main place for stationing of peacekeepers.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev on Readiness To Develop NATO Relations

LD2009123295 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1033 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku, Sept 20 (INTERFAX) — Azeri President Geydar Aliyev confirmed Baku's readiness to develop relations with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program Tuesday, at a meeting with a NATO delegation headed by representative of the NATO allied command (Europe) Italian Brigade General Angelo Arenò.

The President told the delegation that the Azeri presentation document necessary to join the program will be submitted in the near future.

According to Aliyev, the Partnership for Peace program aims at "consolidation of global peace."

The President hopes NATO will render political support to Azerbaijan in finding a solution to its territorial integrity problems. "The on-going Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan must be denounced," he said.

General Arenò said that NATO is ready to expand cooperation with Azerbaijan.

According to him, an official NATO representative in Azerbaijan will soon be nominated to coordinate cooperation between NATO and the Azeri Ministry of Defense.

Banned Communist Party Viewed With Nostalgia

MM2109095195 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by Zaur Kadymbekov: "Communist Party Banned in Azerbaijan. Though Past Is Working in Its Favor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku — As has already been reported, Azerbaijan's Supreme Court has used its authority to abolish the republic's communist party after the Justice Ministry made representations to it. The reason for this harsh decision is the fact that the objective stated in the communists' program of "creating a renewed Union" apparently runs counter to the constitutional act "On State Independence."

Ramiz Akhmedov, chairman of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan [CPA] Central Executive Committee, said that the communist party is being incriminated due to the participation of Azerbaijani communists in the second Congress of USSR Peoples, at which the question of reestablishing a renewed Union was examined, and also its membership of the international organization, the Union of Communist Parties-CPSU.

The minister who brought this action refers, according to the communist leader, to Article 4 of the law "On Political Parties," which says that "it is not permitted for parties to form and operate whose aim is to overthrow and change the constitutional system by violent means or to violate Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, advocate war, violence, and brutality, as well as to whip up racial, ethnic, and religious conflict, and commit other acts which run counter to the Azerbaijani Republic's constitutional system and are incompatible with its international obligations."

The communists, however, have not committed a single one of these violations, if you do not regard their support for the re-establishment of a renewed Union as an attempt to "chance the constitutional system" and to "violate the territorial integrity" of the sovereign republic. After all, the "renewed Union" is conceived of as a voluntary union of independent states, which is how it is renewed.

The saddest thing for the communists is that the ban caught it at a time when its campaign for the parliamentary elections was unfolding, and judging by the communists' current opinion poll rating, they could hope to win many seats there. Incidentally, alongside the communists about 10 other parties went "overboard," which were not reregistered at the Justice Ministry. It was only at the second attempt that the Azerbaijan People's Front movement received the status of a party and it immediately renounced its previous intention to boycott the elections.

Meantime, the communists intend to try to get the Supreme Court's decision reviewed. As concerns the possibility of their participating in the elections for single-seat [mazhoritarnyy] electoral districts in the regions, this question will, according to R. Akhmedov, be resolved at the forthcoming CPA plenum.

I should point out that the communist party does not today have to make any particular effort to gain popularity among the masses. There exist indisputable truths which even the most rabid anti-communists cannot dispute: During the period when the communist party was in power, the ordinary people had an easier life. True, there were no "proprietors of plants, newspapers, or shipping lines," but on the other hand the majority of the republic's population did not live below the poverty line. Pensioners did not go out onto the street to beg. The children of workers, peasants, doctors, teachers, and academics were free to take their holidays at pioneer camps while their parents did the same at sanitariums and holiday complexes. Medicines and health care, and food products were available to all, and the lowest pen-

sion and wage were not equal to the cost of 20 loaves of bread as they are at present.

Strange as it may seem, the past is working in the communists' favor. They do not have to be ashamed of it. After all it is not for nothing that ordinary people now look at the astronomical prices at Baku's bazaars, private stores, and stalls and say nostalgically: "We indeed lived under communism but did not realize or value this."

Georgia

Patsatsia: CIS, UN Mandate Not To Be Extended

*LD2009164295 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian
1300 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi, 20 Sep — The press center of the Georgian Cabinet of Ministers has reported that today Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia received UN Assistant Secretary General Iqbal Syed Riza, who is in charge of all UN peacekeeping operations. The meeting discussed the situation in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone and the return of refugees.

The prime minister said the United Nations, its Security Council, and the CIS peacekeeping forces had failed to influence the Abkhaz side. He also said that the Georgian Parliament and government would not permit the extension of the mandate of the peacekeepers and military observers because they had lost their credibility. This would lead to consequences for which not only the Georgian government but also the peacekeepers and the United Nations would be responsible.

According to Riza, if Russia helped Georgia, the problem would be fully solved.

Nadareishvili on 'Fruitless' UN Efforts

*LD2009175795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1422 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, September 20 (ITAR-TASS) — U.N. efforts to settle the conflict in Abkhazia have turned to be fruitless, Georgian vice-premier Tamaz Nadareishvili told on Wednesday U.N. Secretary-General Assistant on peace-keeping operations Iqbal Riza who is here on a visit.

The vice-premier said at the meeting with the U.N. representative that most U.N. decisions on a settlement of the Abkhazian conflict remained unfulfilled. At the same time, he expressed gratitude to the U.N. leadership and the entire international community for support of the principal of Georgia's territorial unity.

Nadareishvili expressed critical remarks on the work of the military observer mission in Abkhazia and raised a question on shifting the headquarters of the above mission from Pitsunda to the city of Gali since, in his opinion, "Abkhazian police and gunmen continue to persecute ethnic Georgian citizens" in the Gali district.

In the vice-premier's opinion, "there will be no chance for a peaceful settlement of the conflict until the Ardzinba regime is in power in Abkhazia". He accused the Ardzinba government of persecuting and banishing over 300,000 citizens from Abkhazia: Georgians, Russians, Armenians, some part of Abkhazians, etc.

Riza confirmed that the United Nations supports the principle of Georgia's territorial unity. In the opinion of the U.N. representative, a settlement of the Abkhazian conflict should take place in the framework of a united Georgian state.

He said at the meeting with the Georgian vice-premier that the main aim of his visit to familiarise himself with the work of the military observer mission in Georgia.

Riza will go to Zugdidi this evening and to Gali as well as Sukhumi on Thursday: members of the U.N. military observer mission work in all the three cities.

Abkhaz Official Supports Role of Russian Peacekeepers

*LD2109090695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0837 GMT 21 Sep 95*

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW September 21 (ITAR-TASS) — The Russian peacekeeping force guarantees stability in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict and promotes a political settlement of the problem, Abkhazian Foreign Minister Leonid Lakerbaya believes. The Russian peacekeeping activities, as well as the work of the U.N. military observers mission, effectively helped put out the fire of armed confrontation and are now the guarantors of a peaceful life by both sides of the security zone, he told Tass by telephone today.

In his opinion, Russian legislators and the government displayed wisdom, when they agreed last spring to prolong the mandate of the peacekeeping force. "If this did not happen, the extremist forces, which favour the settlement of the conflict by means of force, might have unleashed a war with unpredictable consequences," he said.

Speaking about prospects of the continuation of a dialogue with the Georgian side, he stressed that Abkhazia was ready for the resumption of the negotiating process

and agrees to work out mutually acceptable compromises. He added, however, that Abkhazia would always uphold its right to equality and proper living conditions in a state, where individual rights are fully guaranteed, irrespective of one's nationality.

Lakerbaya described as groundless the statements coming from Tbilisi, which maintain that it is unreasonable to prolong the peacekeeping mandate of the Russian army units, deployed in Abkhazia. "People inhabiting our multinational republic have always respected Russian soldiers, and we are all grateful to them for maintaining peace in the area at this difficult time," he stressed.

U.S. Support For Proposed Pipeline Route Welcomed

LD2109113195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1034 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, Sep 21 (INTERFAX) — U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher has described as very important Georgia's proposal for carrying Azerbaijani early oil through its territory.

The United States has urged the companies affiliated with the international consortium to simultaneously develop export routes through Russia and Georgia to enhance the project's competitiveness and safety, Mr. Christopher said in a message to the Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze.

INTERFAX learned the contents of the message from Shevardnadze's chief of staff at the analytical and information bureau, Tamaz Sakvarelidze.

Christopher said that the diversity of routes to export Caspian oil would promote the wealth of all countries in the region. The United States supports the idea of laying pipelines in the Caucasus and through Turkey, Christopher said.

Concerning Mr. Christopher's message, Sakvarelidze said that Eduard Shevardnadze was the first to come out with the proposal for transporting Azerbaijani early oil by two routes, through Russia and Georgia, and U.S. support for the plan was evident in that the Georgian leader enjoyed authority and the United States paid great attention to the Caucasus in general.

The consortium founded last September to develop the Azeri and Chirag oil fields and the deep sea part of the Gunsheli field in the Caspian estimated at \$7.5 billion consists of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic — SOCAR (10%); Amoco (17%), Unocal (11%), McDermott (2.45%), Pennzoil (9.8%), Ramco (2%) and Exxon (5%), of the United States; the Anglo-Norwegian alliance British Petroleum/Stateoil

(17% and 8.5% respectively); the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (6.75%); Delta, of Saudi Arabia (0.5%); and the LUKoil, of Russia (10%).

A final decision on the route of a future pipeline to transport early oil from the Azeri and Chirag oil fields is expected to be declared in Baku on October 9.

Law on Presidential Elections Published

AU2009081295 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA
in Georgian 7 Sep 95 p 1

["Republic of Georgia Law on the Georgian Presidential Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chapter I

General Provisions

Article 1. The Georgian Presidential Elections

The Georgian president will be elected by Georgia's citizens on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage, according to a hidden ballot, for a period of five years. The same person may be elected as president for only two consecutive terms.

Article 2. Legislation on the Georgian Presidential Elections

The organization and holding of Georgian presidential elections is to be regulated in accordance with the Georgian Constitution, this law, and other Georgian legislative acts.

Article 3. Universal Suffrage

1. Georgian citizens who have reached the age of 18, irrespective of their race, mother tongue, sex, religion, education, political views, national, ethnic, and social affiliation and origin, and property and class status, may participate in the Georgian presidential elections.

2. Mentally ill citizens who have been recognized as incompetent by the court and those persons who are serving a prison sentence following their conviction by the court will not participate in the elections.

Article 4. Equal Suffrage

The Georgian presidential elections are based on equal rights; each citizen is entitled to one vote. Each Georgian citizen will participate in the presidential elections on an equal basis.

Article 5. Direct Suffrage

The Georgian presidential elections are direct; the president is elected directly by Georgia's citizens.

Article 6. Secret Ballot

The Georgian presidential elections are to be held according to a secret ballot. It is impermissible to impose any controls on the electorate's expression of will.

Article 7. Publicity during the Preparation and Holding of Georgian Presidential Elections

1. The activities of the electoral commissions and state and public bodies, which will participate in the preparation and holding of the presidential elections according to this law, will be carried out openly and publicly.

2. The representatives of parties registered by the Central Electoral Commission, the agent and authorized representative of a presidential candidate, and the representatives of the press and television and radio have the right to attend sessions of the electoral commissions and be present in polling places, while the representative of the presidential candidate has the right to be present in polling places on the day of the elections from the moment the ballot boxes are sealed until the election results are tallied. They should inform the corresponding electoral commissions of their intentions no later than two days prior to the elections. It is impermissible for these representatives to interfere in the work of the electoral commissions.

3. The mass media will give broad coverage to the preparation and holding of the elections. Their representatives are guaranteed totally unimpeded participation in any meetings or sessions connected with the elections.

4. During the presidential elections, all public activities connected with the elections will take place without hindrance.

5. The presidential preelection campaign will be held in accordance with the requirements laid down in Article 47 of the Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections." Georgian television and radio will allocate one hour of airtime daily free of charge.

Article 8. The Holding of Presidential Elections by the Electoral Commissions

The Georgian Central Electoral Commission and the electoral commissions subordinate to it will ensure the holding of the Georgian presidential elections.

Article 9. Electoral Districts and Electoral Precincts

Electoral districts and electoral precincts for the Georgian presidential elections are to be created according to the procedure established in the Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections."

Article 10. Electoral Commissions

The system of electoral commissions and their organization and rights will be determined in accordance with the Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections."

Article 11. Lists of Voters

The rules governing the composition of lists of voters, the inclusion of citizens in them, the noninclusion and incorrect inclusion of electors in the lists, their omission from the lists, complaints concerning mistakes made in data pertaining to electors, and also the exercising of electoral rights during the change of a permanent place of residence will be determined in accordance with the Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections."

Article 12. The Right To Nominate Georgian Presidential Candidates

A political association of citizens (henceforth referred to in the text as "party") or an initiative group has the right to nominate a presidential candidate. A candidate's nomination should be supported by the signatures of 50,000 electors.

Article 13. Material and Technical Provision for the Georgian Presidential Elections, Electoral Funds for Presidential Candidates

1. The state will cover costs linked with the preparation and holding of the presidential elections. The electoral commissions will distribute the costs from a general centralized fund that is to be created by the Central Electoral Commission on the basis of state expenditure. The Georgian Parliament will ratify the actual amount of expenditure submitted by the Central Electoral Commission within two months after the elections have been held. The Georgian Central Electoral Commission is to establish the rules governing the allocation and distribution of costs connected with the elections and the publication of the account.

2. Georgian presidential candidates can create electoral funds for which purpose they have the right to use the capital allocated by the state, their own resources, and donations only from nonstate enterprises registered in Georgia and Georgian political and public associations and Georgian citizens. This capital will be credited to the candidate's electoral fund bank account that will be opened in accordance with the rules established by the Central Electoral Commission.

3. The maximum amount of voluntary contributions and also the maximum individual donation to one presidential candidate will be determined by the Central Electoral Commission no later than 45 days prior to the elections.

4. The balance remaining in a presidential candidate's electoral fund after the elections have been held will be transferred to the Georgian budget.

Chapter II

The Organization and Holding of Georgian Presidential Elections

Article 14. The Scheduling of Georgian Presidential Elections

1. The first round of the Georgian presidential elections is to be organized on the second Sunday in April five years after the previous elections have been held.

2. Elections will not be held during a state of emergency or in case of war.

Article 15. The Rules Governing the Nomination of Presidential Candidates

1. A citizen aged 35 and over who has the right to vote and who was born in Georgia and has lived there for at least 15 years and is resident in Georgia on the day on which the elections are scheduled can be elected president of Georgia.

2. Any party and any initiative group has the right to nominate one presidential candidate.

3. To nominate a candidate, a party or group of electors should apply in writing to the Central Electoral Commission no later than 50 days before the elections as a result of which they will have the right to gather signatures of support. The application should be accompanied by a letter from the person nominated as a presidential candidate in which he gives his consent to stand for election. The application should include the candidate's surname and Christian name, date of birth, profession, position (employment), and place of work and residence; party affiliation, length of residence in Georgia, and also the identity of the authorized representative of the party or group of electors. It should also be accompanied by a copy of the candidate's birth certificate; the application should be signed by the head of the party and every member of the group of electors.

4. To register the presidential candidate, the agent representing the party or the group of electors should submit the list of signatures supporting the nomination no later than 40 days before the elections are held. It should bear the signatures of at least 50,000 electors.

5. The gathering of signatures in support of the nominated candidate and their verification will be conducted in accordance with the Georgian Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections."

Article 16. The Registration of Presidential Candidates

1. The Central Electoral Commission will register presidential candidates no later than 30 days before the elections are held.

2. The presidential candidate and his agent and authorized representative cannot be members of the Central Electoral Commission.

3. Within three days after registration, the Central Electoral Commission will provide the presidential candidate with a corresponding document.

4. The Central Electoral Commission is to publish information about the registration in the official press and via other mass media no later than six days after the registration has taken place; it is to give the candidate's surname and Christian name, date of birth, position (principal employment), and place of residence and work.

5. In the event that the Central Electoral Commission refuses to register a presidential candidate, parties and initiative groups can appeal to the Georgian Supreme Court within three days after the rejection. The Supreme Court has to arrive at a decision within three days after the appeal has been lodged. Its decision is final.

6. A presidential candidate can withdraw his candidature at any time before the elections; to do this, he has to notify the Central Electoral Commission in writing.

Article 17. Guarantees Underlying the Activities of the Presidential Candidates and Their Agents and Authorized Representatives

1. As soon as they have been registered by the Central Electoral Commission, presidential candidates will participate in the preelection campaign on an equal basis. They have equal rights regarding the use of the press and other mass media on the entire territory of Georgia.

2. During the election campaign, presidential candidates and their agents and authorized representatives cannot be released from their jobs or transferred to other work or posts without their consent.

3. No criminal proceedings can be brought against a presidential candidate, and he cannot be detained, arrested, or searched unless the bodies of the Procurator's Office have been given permission to do so by the Central Electoral Commission; the exception to this is when a presidential candidate is detained at the scene of a crime, in which case the Central Electoral Commission must be informed immediately. If the Central Electoral Commission does not give its consent, the detained or arrested presidential candidate must be released at once.

Article 18. Election Ballots

1. The Central Electoral Commission will determine the form of the electoral ballot and will ensure they are printed.

2. Presidential candidates will be presented in the electoral ballot according to their order of nomination. It should state the candidate's surname and Christian name, date and place of birth, profession (employment), place of work, party affiliation, and the name of the party that has nominated him; if the candidate has been nominated by an initiative group, it should state "nominated by electors."

3. The electoral ballots will be printed by the Central Electoral Commission in Georgian and Abkhazian (for Abkhazia) and also, if necessary, in any other language that is comprehensible to the people of an electoral district.

4. A precise record of the electoral ballots will be kept.

Article 19. The Voting

1. The day and place of the voting and the rules governing its organization will be determined in accordance with the Law "on Georgian Parliamentary Elections."

2. On the day of the voting, on the electoral ballot, the elector should leave the name of the candidate for whom he is voting and put a line through the names of all the other candidates.

Chapter III

Tallying the Election Results

Article 20. Counting the Votes

1. During the counting of the votes, the following procedure should be observed:

1) Once the voting has ended, the Electoral Commission will count the unused electoral ballots and tie them together as a packet on which should be written the name of the electoral precinct and its number and the number of unused ballots; it should bear the signatures of the commission chairman, his deputy, and the secretary and the commission seal;

2) According to the main and additional lists of voters, the precinct electoral commission will establish the overall number of voters in the electoral precinct and also those participating in the elections or the number of voters who received ballots;

3) The chairman of the precinct electoral commission, in the presence of the commission's members, will verify that the seals on the ballot boxes are in tact, will open them, and will check that the control sheet [sakontrolo purtslis] is inside;

4) The commission will count the number of ballots in the boxes or the number of participants in the voting and the number of invalid ballots (those not corresponding to the prescribed form and those on which it is impossible to make out for whom the elector has voted; in all other cases, the ballot will be considered valid). The invalid ballots will be placed in separate envelopes and will be sealed in such a way that it will not be possible to remove or insert ballots without damaging the seal. The name of the electoral precinct and its number and the number of enclosed ballots should be written on the envelope;

5) The commission will sort out the ballots and will count the number of votes for each candidate. Then, the ballots should be put away as indicated in subparagraph 4;

6) The precinct electoral commission will discuss the results of the counting of the votes and include them in the protocol. The number of votes acquired by each candidate should be indicated in the protocol. The number of copies of the protocol should exceed by three the number of candidates listed on the ballot; each copy should be signed by the commission chairman, his deputy, and the commission's secretary and members. It should bear the commission seal;

7) Two copies of the protocol and all the electoral ballots will be sent immediately to the corresponding district electoral commission in line with the procedure established by it; one copy will be kept in the precinct electoral commission itself and one copy should be given to each of the presidential candidates' representatives.

2. In the event that there is any doubt regarding the validity of an electoral ballot, this matter will be resolved by the Central Electoral Commission by means of a vote.

Article 21. The Establishment of the Election Results in the Electoral District

1. On the basis of the protocols received from the precinct electoral commissions, the district electoral commission will establish the number of unused ballots, the total number of electors in the electoral district, how many participated in the elections and how many voted, the number of invalid ballots, and the number of votes that each candidate received.

2. The district electoral commission will examine any gross violations of this law and will immediately present its views on whether the elections should be recognized as invalid to the Central Electoral Commission. A complaint concerning the violation of this law may be submitted to the district electoral commission no later

than the day following the elections. The commission should examine it the very next day and present its views to the Central Electoral Commission no later than the following day.

3. The district electoral commission will confirm the election results at its session and draw up a protocol.

4. The number of copies of the protocol should exceed by two the number of candidates listed on the ballot. All copies of the protocol should be signed by the commission chairman and his deputy and the commission's secretary and members. It should bear the commission seal.

5. The first copy of the protocol and the unused ballots are to be sent to the Central Electoral Commission no later than five days after the elections have been held according to the procedure established by it and one copy should be given to each of the candidates' representatives.

Article 22. The Establishment of the Election Results in the Central Electoral Commission. The Announcement of the Victorious Candidate

1. On the basis of the protocols received from the district electoral commissions, the Central Electoral Commission will establish the overall number of electors, how many participated in the elections and how many voted, the number of votes that each candidate received, and the number of invalid ballots.

2. The presidential elections will be recognized as having taken place if the majority of the electorate has participated in them.

3. The presidential candidate who has received more than half of the votes cast will be considered as elected.

4. If the elections were recognized as having taken place and two or more presidential candidates were nominated but no one was elected president, the Central Electoral Commission will schedule a second round of elections. This second round will be held within two weeks.

5. If it is declared that the elections did not take place or did take place but only one candidate participated in the first round and he failed to get the necessary number of votes, or no one was elected president in the second round, fresh elections will be held within two months.

6. The Central Electoral Commission will tally the results of the elections according to the electoral districts at its session within 20 days after the elections have taken place and draw up a protocol.

7. The number of copies of the protocol should exceed by two the number of candidates listed on the ballot. Each copy will be signed by the chairman of the

Central Electoral Commission and his deputy and the commission's secretary and members. It should bear the commission seal.

8. The protocol will be kept in the Central Electoral Commission and one copy should be given to each of the candidates' authorized representatives.

9. The Central Electoral Commission will publish information on the results of the elections via the official mass media within five days after the results have been tallied.

Chapter IV

The Second Round of Elections. Fresh Elections

Article 23. The Second Round of Elections

1. A second round of elections will be held if two or more presidential candidates were nominated and the elections were recognized as having been held but none of them was able to gather more than half of the votes.

2. The two candidates who received the best results in the first round will run in the second round. The second round will be recognized as having taken place if at least one-third of the electorate has participated in it. The candidate who receives a majority of the votes, provided these amount to one-fifth of the total number, will be recognized as elected.

3. In the event that both candidates receive the same number of votes in the second round, preference will be given to the candidate who received more votes in the first round.

Article 24. Fresh Elections

1. Fresh Georgian presidential elections will be held if the elections were not recognized as having taken place or did take place but only one candidate participated in the first round and he failed to gather the necessary amount of votes or no one was elected president in the second round. As soon as a decision has been adopted on the summation of the results of the elections, the Central Electoral Commission will set a date for fresh presidential elections in accordance with Paragraph 7 of Article 70 of the Constitution.

2. Fresh elections will take place within two months.

3. Information on the scheduling of fresh elections will be published in the official press and via other mass media.

4. During the fresh elections, electoral activities will take place as prescribed by this law and within the time period determined by the Central Electoral Commission.

Temporary Provision

Instead of the date stipulated in Article 14 of this law, the first round of the Georgian presidential elections will be held on 5 November 1995 in accordance with this law.

[Signed] Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian Parliament-head of state.
Vakhtang Gogvadze, speaker of the Georgian Parliament.

[Dated] Tbilisi, 1 September 1995.

Estonia

Premier Calls For Better Relations With Russia

LD2109110395 Moscow Russian Public Television
First Channel Network in Russian
0500 GMT 21 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Relations between Estonia and Russia dominated Estonian President Lennart Meri's speeches during his recent visit to Sweden. The border question must be resolved in a peaceful way following the example of other European countries, the president said, referring to some disputed territory in Leningrad Region and Pskov Region. Furthermore in the past few days, Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi called for relations between the two neighboring countries to be normalized.

In the premier's opinion, the first stage of the process should be based upon the resolution of the four most important questions. For example, the ratification of the agreements on the troop withdrawal and welfare support for army pensioners.

[Begin Vahi recording] I think that it is very much in the interests of Estonia to improve, to normalize relations with Russia and I would say that there are four ways of improving relations. First of all, the agreements should be ratified. Second, the border question should be properly resolved. Third, trade relations should be improved. Finally, there should be good possibilities for the transit of Russian goods, goods from Russian enterprises. [end recording]

It is not just the politicians of the government coalition in Tallinn who are for improving relations with Moscow rapidly, but also the republic's major entrepreneurs who see Russia as Estonia's closest and largest business partner.

Trade With Russia Records First-Half Deficit

MM2109110195 Moscow IZVESTIYA [Financial
IZVESTIYA section p i] in Russian 21 Sep 95

[RIA-NOVOSTI report: "Estonia's Imports From Russia Exceed Its Own Exports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the first half of 1995 Estonia imported goods worth 2.1 billion krooni (100 Russian rubles are worth approximately 0.27 krooni) — which is 200 million krooni more than Estonia's exports. According to figures from the Estonian Foreign Ministry's Foreign Economic Policy Department, trade with Russia went into deficit this April. In the Estonian side's opinion, the main cause is the lack of most-favored-nation status for Estonia in bilateral trade. Despite this, Russia is the republic's number two trading partner after Finland. Estonia imports mineral raw materials, non-

precious metals, and timber from Russia, and exports ships, boats, and agricultural products.

Parliament Votes Confidence in Economics Minister

LD2009155495 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1400 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Minister of Economy Liina Tonisson will continue in her post as the Riigikogu [parliament] voted for confidence in her. [passage omitted]

And here is a commentary from Ain Saarna, deputy director of Radio Tallinn:

[Saarna] Yes, this vote of confidence in Minister of Economy Liina Tonisson went as predicted in fact. [Passage omitted] The game of questions and answers focused more on the issue of Silmet's privatization, with the attempts on the part of Fatherland [opposition party] supporters to turn this discussion into a broader analysis of the work of the Ministry of Economy not bearing fruit. Minister of Economy Liina Tonisson, however, stated from the parliamentary rostrum that as of today, not a single privatization bid has been received for Silmet. She also stated that Silmet would not be sold to the Russian capital. Those were then the words of the minister of economy from the rostrum. [passage omitted on details of which faction voted for and against]

[Moderator] This vote of no confidence or of confidence will probably be the beginning of a process, as it is not likely that this is where privatization problems stop.

[Saarna] Yes, that is so, as the problems still stand as they did in the parliamentary hall. [passage omitted]

Latvia

Defense Minister, Ukraine Counterpart Issue Statement

WS2109074295 Tallinn BNS in English
1841 GMT 20 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Sep 20, BNS — Ukraine understands Latvia's choice to integrate into NATO, the European Union and the Western European Union, its Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov and his Latvian counterpart Maris Gailis said Wednesday in a common statement.

The potential expansion of NATO should not enhance the formation of new military blocs and spheres of influence in Europe, according to the document.

Ukraine and Latvia are ready to expand their mutual cooperation in the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, the defense ministers said.

The ministers described an agreement on conventional armed forces in Europe as "a corner stone of the continental security."

During their meeting in Riga, Gailis and Shmarov signed a protocol on stepping up bilateral contacts in the frame of an agreement on defense cooperation of July 12, 1994.

The Latvian Defense Ministry officials told BNS that the protocol is a secret document whose content should not be revealed to the media.

On Wednesday, Shmarov also had talks with Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs.

Shmarov and Birkavs discussed mutual trips of military specialists, common training and technical assistance.

Latvian-Ukrainian cooperation will by no means be directed against Russia, Birkavs underscored.

Shmarov also visited today the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion's training center at Adazi.

Home Guard Signs Protocol With Estonian Force

*WS2009120295 Tallinn BNS in English
1034 GMT 20 Sep 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Sept 19, BNS — An agreement protocol was signed Tuesday between the leaderships of Latvia's Zemessardze (Home Guard) and Estonia's Kaitseliit (Defense Union).

The agreement says that observers or subunits of the other country's voluntary organization will be invited to

any military trainings. The document has been signed by the Latvian Acting Home Guard Cmdr. Raimonds Graube and Estonian voluntary military organization's Cmdr. Johannes Kert.

Representatives of the other state will also be invited to all staff-level sports competitions and cultural events.

Graube said the commanders agreed on regular exchange of information and the set-up of a common radio communications channel.

The agreement protocol provides for exchange of information concerning the drafted training programs.

Representatives of the Home Guard and the Defense Union plan to set up a joint working group for drafting a plan on activities and cooperation in case of possible ecological disasters.

Graube said that a meeting of the Baltic voluntary organizations' commanders will be held in Tallinn at the end of October. During this meeting an agreement protocol on military cooperation will be possibly signed.

Joint trainings of the Baltic voluntary military organizations will also be organized next year.

This was the first official visit to Latvia by the Estonian Defense Union's commander.

In the future, meetings of both commanders will take place at least three times a year.

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